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Abstract.
This thesis is a study “of the constitution making 
processes in Nigeria from the colonial inception to the 
1989 Constitution which is scheduled to usher in a 
putative third republic. Although apparently covering a 
wide scope, its boundary is limited by its perspective.
Constitution making in any polity is essentially a 
political process where all the major, relevant and 
active interests seek to protect and advance themselves. 
Consequently, the focus of the research is on determining 
these competing interests, their interactions, 
compromises, winners and losers, etc. Attempts were made 
to provide the criteria for class identification in 
Nigeria to serve as a guide for determining class based 
action.
The value of the work is threefold. First, it makes a 
modest but important contribution to an ongoing debate on 
whether or not Nigeria's post independence constitutional 
processes in particular were grounded in class interest, 
in the tradition of Charles Beard's interpretation of the 
constitution of the U.S.A. Second, it disputes and in 
large measure seeks to contradict some of the earlier 
widely held assumptions and assertions regarding the 
making of some of the constitutions, especially the 
Macpherson Constitution, 1951.Finally, it attempts to 
provide a complete and realistic account of the 
constitutional evolution of Nigeria less the military 
rule, from its inception as a country up to 1989.
The method of investigation was largely analytical using 
official records, official reports, communications of key 
officials, biographical data, etc. Theoretical guidance 
was significantly drawn from political economy writings 
in politics, history and law.
Eventually, the analysis revealed the existence and 
interplay of important interest configurations, reducing 
class to a subtle rather than an obvious phenomenon in 
the constitutional process. But overwhelmingly, the 
entire process was elitist and self serving with the 
mainstream of the population left in the margin in the 
composition of the constitutional bodies, the setting of 
agenda and the institutions and mechanisms established 
for governing the country.
Finally, it found that there was a great deal of 
continuity of the values and institutions established for 
colonial ends with little or no will manifested in the 
constitutional process to break with the past. Rather 
what transpired was an expansion of institutions and 
creation of formulae in the constitution to accommodate a 
new breed of elites who were able to manipulate potential 
cleavages in the society to serve personal ends.

1. INTRODOCTION AND THEORETICAL SETTING
In discussing the value of constitutions in "our 
revolutionary age", Loewenstein observed that "the 
epidemic of constitution making in the wake of world war 
II has no parallel in history. Since 1945, some fifty odd 
nations have equipped themselves with new constitutions."1 
The number of constitutions that have been churned out 
afresh or refurbished in Africa, Asia and the Pacific 
attests to the contagious effect of constitution making 
since the middle of the twentieth century. The reasons 
for this are manifold. McWhinney2 explains that once there 
is a fundamental change in the existing social and 
economic base occasioned by popular revolution or certain 
cataclysmic political event as with the experience of the 
German and French constitution making, the need for a 
grundnorm arises. But in states with stable
constitutional order, constitution making would involve a 
voluntary and consensual redefinition of the main 
political and social premises, as represented by the 
prevailing political elite.
From this broad framework, several categories of reasons 
can be distilled: First reason for the making of new 
constitutions, is the emergence of new countries 
following the downfall of the old order, for instance,
I"! Karl Loewenstein, (1963) -Reflections on tha Valúa oí Constitutions in our
Revolutionary Age' in H.,Bckstain and D.E..Aptar,ads. Comparativa Politics! A 
Reader.( London, tha Praa Prass of Glencoe) p.149
2. E.McWhinney,(1981) Constltutlon-makingtPrinciplas.Process, Practica (Univarsity of 
Toronto Press, Toronto.London.)p.1-16
the collapse of the imperial dynasties of Europe, the 
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. A second wave began 
in Eastern Europe after the second world war which marked 
a transition from bourgeois to Soviet system and now, a 
reform or reversal of the latter has been firmly on the 
agenda since the late 1989. The latter development has in 
turn led to the initiation of processes to introduce some 
measure of multi-party systems in hitherto one party 
regimes in Africa, inevitably requiring constitutional 
reforms. A third situation was witnessed during the 
decolonization period which involved a progressive 
movement through constitutional means to independence of 
countries hitherto under colonial rule. These
circumstances generally led to the drawing up of new 
constitutions. They obtained generally in Asia, Africa 
and the Pacific.3 A final tendency involves only the 
refurbishment of old constitutions to take account of an 
existing climate for such change. Examples are the 
various amendments to the American constitution of 1787, 
the constitutions of France, Germany, etc, especially the 
latter in view of the unity of the two Germanies. In 
these cases constitutional continuity is ensured albeit 
sometimes tenuously.4 Whatever the motives for this spate 
of constitution making, it overtly represents" the 
triumph of the ideology of democratic legality."5
7! y.p.Chal ( 1988),ad.,Law, Politics and Government in tha Pacific (Institute of 
Pacific Studies, University of Soutn Pacific ).
4. John Hawgood, ( 1939) Modern Constitutions Since 1787. (Macaiillan a co Ltd. a 
St.Mart ins London )pp.16-21.
Loewanstaln, ibid. 149.
Nigeria which became independent in 1960, is one of such 
countries whose people have manifested profound desire to 
be regulated by a constitution. Out of a total period of 
thirty years of independence, the military has been in 
power for twenty years. But during the period of military 
rule (except the civil war spell) constitution making has 
been the kingpin of the political agenda and 
preoccupation of the nation. During the first transition 
period (1975-1979) three of the four years were occupied 
with constitution making while in the second transition 
schedule (1986-1992), three of the six years are devoted 
to it. Its importance is further strengthened by the fact 
that even when there is a putsch, the military suspends 
only those portions of the constitution which are 
incompatible with military rule even though they do not 
derive their authority from the constitution whicn 
however widely formulatedi would be a limitation.*’ But in 
this case, as with all dictators, where a constitution 
was resorted to, it is only to serve as a frame to make 
the existing power arrangements "legally”
unchallengeable.7 It is not therefore a surprise that when 
the Nigerian Supreme Court embarked on a judicial frolic 
in Lakanmi v. the Attorney General of Western State,* i** 
was rebuffed by the military. The court had decided that
6. The first legislation . • tms regard was the Constitution (Suspension and
Mod 1 fication)Decree Nc , It suspended those provisions relating to the
executive and parliaaient and asserted the powers and supremacy of the military. On 
the relation between a decree and the constitution, see Akande.O.(1969) 
"Reflections on some Recent Constitutional Issues in Nigerian Law Journal, 102.
7. Loewenstein, op. cit.9S
8. 1971 University of Ife Law Report.The case is discussed in A.Orojo, (1971) "The
Search for a grundnorm in Nigeria" in 20 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 117.
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a military decree was subject to the rules of the 
constitution.
However, the predominance of military rule has not damped 
but rather fuelled the burning desire for a
constitutional order in Nigeria which is reflected by the 
series of constitution making efforts since 1966.
The purpose of this thesis therefore is to study the
processes of constitution making in Nigeria. Emphasis is 
on the period of intensive and sustained constitutional 
activity, 1951- 1960 and 1975-1989. The political economy 
approach is adopted because constitutions, in spite of 
their normative appearance are anything but a neutral 
framework for political activity.9 Specifically, this 
approach will enable us to concentrate on the actors 
because Mit is valuable to identify the actors who shape 
decision making during crucial periods of regime 
transition, since this facilitates assessment of policy 
changes and new political structures as well as likely 
systemic outcomes"10 *.
By this means , two crucial matters are intended to be 
clarified. First, it will be argued that constitutions 
are not just a se* of abstract principles, but have a 
historical and ideological reality based on the
experiences of its makers. Again by considering the 
actors and their situation in the socio- economic
9. v.Ghai (1972) ’Constitutions and ths Political Ordar in Bast Africa* in 21 
International and Comparative Law Ouarterly 403.
10. P.Koahn,( 1969 ) "Competitive Transition* in 27 Journal of Modern African Studies,
3>401-430 at 402.
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structure as an important component, an insight will be 
obtained as to the particular interests the constitution 
is intended to serve. The concept of constitutions as 
being based on abstract principles is predicated on the 
assumption that it flows from the genius of a group who 
knew the general will- von Savigny's .volkgeist (the 
distinctive legal genius of a people in the society) and 
that such intelligent philosophers are then in a detached 
and selfless fashion able to distil and put such diverse 
interescs in a workable document.11 A demonstration in 
brief, of the historical and economic forces behind the 
making of some major constitutions and the origins of
western liberal constitutions will enlighten us more on 
this.The constitutions considered are selected because 
they represent the major models or contain unique
features as to provide useful contrasts. 
l.A.THE D.S.A CONSTITUTION, 1787.
It was J. Allen Smith who first noted that the U.S.A
Constitution of 1787 " was the outcome of an organized
movement on the part of a class to surround themselves 
with legal and constitutional guarantees which would 
check the tendency toward democratic legislation".12 This 
conclusion received greater elaboration and specificity 
from Charles A. Beard. Using biographical economic data 
in respect of the participants, he concluded that "the
XI. B.A.Bad* jo, ( 1989) * Tha Economic Idaology of tha Babangida Constitution ' Papal 
prasantad at a National Saminar on tha Nat, constitution and Transition to Civil 
Hula hald on tha 24th of July, 1989,Lagos.
12. J.A.Smith (1907), quotad in Calvin C. Jlllson (1988) Constitution Maklngi Conflict and Consansus in tha Padaral Convantion of 1787 ( Agathon Praaa, Inc. N.*.) p.J.
5
members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the 
constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, 
directly and personally interested in, and derived 
economic advantages from the establishment of the new 
system." Specifically, it was ,he said a victory of 
"personality" over "reality".13
Subsequent writings criticized him for economic 
reductionism but some nonetheless offered evidence 
demonstrating that the leaders of both the Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists shared the same class background.14
However, C. Jillson 15, in a revisionist interpretation 
sought to show that economic analysis does not tell the 
whole story and that there were shifting, sometimes 
crosscutting cleavages . What position was taken depended 
on whether the question pertained to a "higher" or lower 
level of the constitutions. In the former, principles 
applied, whereas in the latter, cleavages were
determined according to the perceived effect of a 
proposition on specific interests whether geographic, 
economic or some other localized matters.
For our purposes, none of the strands of interpretation 
contradicts the basic thesis that the constitution is 
anchored on a historical and ideological underpinning.If 
the predominant factor was abstract principles rather 
than economic considerations, the former are western
13. C.A.Beard, ( 1913) An Economic Interpretation of the American Constitutions p.324.
14. R.B.Thomas (1953), Forrest Macdonald (1958), cited in Jillson, op cit.
15. C.C.Jillson, op. cit. Caps 1 4 10.
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liberal values itself rooted in specific liberal 
capitalist ideology, as will be shown below.16 
l.A.l THE USSR CONSTITUTIONS.
On the other hand, constitutions and their making in the 
Soviet Union are more categoric.Beginning with the 1918 
constitution, all its constitutions are intended to 
provide a constitutional formula for the social and 
economic structure unleashed since the revolution in 1917 
17. Subsequent developments were directed at "preserving 
the continuity of the ideas and principles of the first 
1918 Soviet Constitution, the 1924 USSR Constitution and 
the 1936 USSR constitution, formalize the principles of 
the USSR's social system and policy, establish the
rights, liberties and duties of citizens and the
principles of organization and aims of the socialist
state of all the people, and proclaim them in this
constitution. "18.
The same can be said of the Chinese constitutions of 1978 
and 1984.Its constitutional evolution since the cultural 
revolution has been the rationalization of the basic 
ideology evolved by Chair Mao Tse Tung and the Communist 
party.This is categorically declared in the preamble to 
the 1978 constitution.19.
IT! Lundberg,?.. ( 1980) Cracks in the Constitution ( Lyla Stuart inc. Secacus, N.J.) 
cap. four, discussas the intallactual disposition of tha participants and thair 
economic status.
17. Hawgood,J.A.op.cit. 393-414.
18. Preamble to tha 1977 Soviet Constitution. Saa Appendix in Mcwhinney, op clt.
19. Constitution of tha Peoples' Republic of China ,as Appendix in ibid.
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However, of particular significance to Nigeria is the 
constitutional history of Yugoslavia. First, because the 
two countries share the diversity of nations, 
nationalities, regions and religion. Secondly, their 
constitutional experiences all claim to seek unity and 
equality within that diversity and democratize the 
political process.20 But unlike Nigeria, as will be shown, 
constitution making in Yugoslavia, particularly since 
the 1963 constitution, moved away from providing a 
political plan only to become a social document. Concrete 
structures were established to realize the latter.21.
The former and subsequent reforms were to 
constitutionalize the principles of self-management which 
enabled workers to manage resources,products and the 
conditions of their labour. The main actors behind these 
changes were President Josip Tito and Edward Kardelj, the 
leading self management theoretician.22 In this way the 
constitution secured greater autonomy (at the cultural 
level for its diversity) secured unity of elites and 
relative overall integration of the populace at the more 
basic economic level.lt also drastically minimized the 
role of state. But the workability of the system seemed 
to depend on the charisma of President Tito as since his
2<n Djordjevic.( 19S8 ) *The Creation of the 197« Constitución of the SocialistPsdsral Rspuollc of Yugoslavia "In Goldvln, R.A..and Kaufman,A..ads Constitution 
Makars on Constitution Making, THE EXPERIENCE OP eight NATIONS ( American 
Enterprise Inst.for Public Policy Rasaarch.Washington,OC ) p.197.; Lapanna I., 
(1972) ‘Main Pasturas of tha Yugoslav Constitution, 1946-1971* 21 International 
and Comparativa Lav Ouartarly 209. On Nlgaria, saa Nvabuasa. B.O.( 1985) Nigaria's 
Prasidantial Constitution caps 1 6 2i Nvabuasa,(1982) Tha Presidential 
Constitution of Nigeria, cap. 2
21. Pasic. M.,< 1988) ’Commentary* in Goldvln » Kaufman op. cit.pp.210-22ÍI 
Djordjevic. ibid pp.186-190.
22. ibid.
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death, the political system manifested the fragility of 
institutions and previous schemes worsened by the crisis 
in hitherto communist regimes.
However, the approach to constitution making in Nigeria 
is akin to the reaction of the Venezuelan dominant elite 
class in the 1960s. The latter, faced with the 
indignities of right wing absolutism both of the military 
and civilians signed a pact in 1958-the Pact of Punto
Fijo.23.The parties to the pact were exiled leaders of the 
liberal centrist parties, some of whom "were schooled in 
a middle class, democratic system"-24 The pact and the 
resultant constitution of 1961 sought to establish:(a) 
mutual respect, understanding and cooperation among the 
dominant groups.(b) establish democracy through coalition 
and (c) equitable representation "of all the sectors of 
society interested in the stability of the republic " and 
omitted all sectors not interested in their kind of 
stability. The latter is an allusion to those with views 
and positions both of the left and right, considered
extreme.25 This seems to have been the essence of the 
constitutional process in Nigeria as we shall see
throughout this work.
The making and ideological foundations of most
constitutions of African countries at independence and 
after, came heavily under the influence of one or the
JT. ManrIque.G.P. (1988) "The Making of the Venezuelan Constitution’ In Goldvin t
Kaufman op. clt. pp.353-378; Brewer-Carlas.A.R.,"Commentary’ In Ibid.pp.379-396.
24. Brewer-Car las. op. clt.p.392.
25. Ibid p.381.
other of the main liberal "or socialist constitutions.24. 
This is mainly due to the colonial legacy and its hold on 
post colonial institutions.27.
However the Egyptian constitution of 1956,which embraced
the basic tenets of socialism bolstered in 1971 by Anwar
Sadat, came under strains in the 1980s because it did not
take into account the religion and way of life of its
people.Consequently, it had to be amended to provide for
Islam as one of its ideological pillars.2*
l.B.Origins of Liberal Constitutions and 
Constitutionalism.
Constitutions, as a system of formalized rules for the 
creation and regulation of power and institutions, are 
recent constructs.2*.The states that preceded came mostly 
under monarchs which needed no formalization of 
power.However as capitalism developed,it needed serfs to 
be converted into wage earners, and to expand and 
nationalize power and markets. To achieve that ,the 
bourgeoisie had to cooperate with monarchy against 
feudalism. Correspondingly, the monarch's arbitrary and 
discretionary powers had to be restrained to secure 
property rights. General rules therefore became
26. da Smith,S.A. ( 196« ) Tha Naw Ca— onwaalth and lea Conic 1 tut ion» (Stavana. London), 
Nvabuaia. B.O.,( 1973 ) Constitutionalism In tna Emargant Stataa.
27. Ghai, Constitution» and Political Ordar...,op. clt. , Crovdar, M., (1997) "Who*a 
Draaa was it Anyway7 Tvanty- Flva Yaars of African indapandanca * in 96 African 
Affairs 7.i O'Connall. J., (1967) *Tha inavitability of Instability* ln S Tha 
Journal of Modorn African Studios Si 181
29. Salah.I..(1999) *Tha writing of tha 1971 Egyptian Constitution* in Goldwln a 
Kaufman, op. cit.p.299 , AL-Shaoir, T.. "Coamantary* in ibid.332. 29
29. Loowostain, op. clt.194
10
convenient which also curtailed discrimination and
retroactivity of legislation,etc.10
Although the struggle was begun in Britain in the 17th 
century, no written constitution resulted. Rather, power 
shifted pragmatically to the contending .*classes which 
culminated in the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 which
introduced universal franchise for men 11
The desire for a written constitution was reached for 
practical reasons in the colonies of America and the
European key state of France under the inspiration of 
Rousseau's social contract. But demand for written 
constitutions reached its apogee in Europe in the 18th- 
19th centuries at same time as capitalism attained a high 
water mark in Europe. In view of the latter, the search 
for a formula to tame political power and provide for a 
system of mutual guarantee for the social forces became
urgent.12 Therefore, the successive development of the 
constitutional system marked the successful assertion of 
claim of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie over 
the monarchy and finally over labour. The constitution 
only rationalized and legalized the shift and balance of 
power.**
10. Shai.I.P. (1989) Challenges of Religion. Pluralism and Nationhood! A working Papor 
for tha Aalan Rational Institute of tha American Council of Learned Societies 
Coaiparartive Constitutionalism Project held in collaboration with tha Law and 
Society Trust, Sri Lanka, Feb.1989.Changmai. Thailand.
11. Horowlts,I.L.(1981) 'Military Origins of Third world Dictatorships and Democracy* 
In 17 Third world Quarterly.
12. Loewensteln, op.clt.198 i Vila, M.J.C.I1987) Constitutionalism and tha Separation 
of Powers (Clarendon Osford) caps.l A 2.
11. Loewensteln, Ibid, 19Si Vila. ibid.
11
In its struggle to secularize power, the bourgeoisie used 
the instrument of franchise.But it was an internal 
franchise confined to a relatively self contained and 
homogeneous society. What took place was liberalization 
without democracy.14. Representative ideology served as a 
facade to cover the monopoly of political power by the 
propertied class. It was the growth of a large and
organized working class in the advanced capitalist
countries which fostered the hope and possibility of 
working class victory through the ballot in the tradition 
of Kaustky's advocacy of parliamentary road to
socialism.35
However the constitutions did register some core values 
necessary to sustain and perpetuate capitalism. Broadly, 
these are such concepts as liberty, equality,
predictability and sanctity of property rights and 
transactions, franchise, nationalization of power, etc. 
They are now embodied into an ideology as the rule of law 
or constitutionalism. But as Vile noted, these values 
contain potential seeds for conflict as well as not being 
self - executing.36 Hence, the search for and debates 
about the institutional structures and procedures 
necessary to rationalize and realize them has preoccupied 
constitutional lawyers, politicians, philosophers,etc.
IT! Przeworski, A. (1988) "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict * inBister,J. and Slagstad.R. , eds Constitutionalism and Democracy ( Cambridge. London 
> P. «1
35. The attitude to state and democracy was the subject of a long running battle between Kautsky and Lenin, two pillars of Marxism. See, Kautsky, (196« ) The 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat (University of Michigan Press,First published in 
1918)» Lenin, V.I., ( 1964 ) The Proletariat Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, 
Collected Works, Vol.28 ( London. Lawrence and Wlshhart).
36. Vila op. clt.p.l
12
Consequently, the various forms of constitutions—that is, 
presidential, parliamentary and convention, offsprings of 
the same parent- the monarchy-37 are results of the 
search. These institutions and values are in varying
forms, standard components of modern liberal
constitutions.
However, although constitutionalism in its origin ( and 
overall use ) had little to do with democracy,popular 
political freedoms or social justice, it has over the 
years widened its scope to encapsulate them, even if it 
is for legitimating and ideological purposes.38 Several 
reasons account for this.First, while constitutionalism 
hides the real location of power, overt behavior 
inconsistent with it can delegitimize power and 
government. Official excess is restrained thereby, 
incidentally securing limited formal rights and freedoms 
to the citizens.39 Second, the broadening of franchise has 
provided an opportunity for mass based parties to accede 
to power and share in the economic and political proceeds 
of it.Where they are unable to form governments, through 
pressure groups and other forms of lobbying available in 
liberal societies, they can influence the policy choice 
of the government in power.Third, it provides the masses 
and sympathetic intellectuals with a forum to put 
alternative ideologies and programmes on the agenda. For
aT! Varnay.D.V. ,Th# Analysis of Political Syatana. (Rouledge and Kagan Paul 
ltd..London ) caps.IX-IV .
38 Ghai. Const 1 tutlonali*m..op.cit.p.Si Loavanstain, op.cit.199.
39. Ghai, ibid p.S
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these and other reasons, constitutionalism commands a 
wide attraction.
But while constitutional experts churned out 
constitutions, it became clear that liberal constitutions 
providing framework for laissez-faire economics, provided 
neither bread nor the modicum of economic security the 
great majority yearn for. Also, it was plain that crucial 
political decisions were not taken within the parameters 
of the constitution40.At another important level,the 
social dislocation caused by the world wars, the 
depression of the thirties and the low ranking of 
politicians by the public led to social discontents.41
Responses were made at two levels: (a) through
constitutional adjustments which gave it greater content 
to accommodate socio-economic provisions. Examples are the 
short-lived Spanish constitution of 1931,the Republic of 
Ireland 1937 as amended in 1972, Denmark constitution ofA
1953,the Cyprus constitution of I960.42.The latter 
provides that "every person has the right to a decent 
existence and to social security".42 The French
constitution of 1958 mandates legislation to be made in 
this regard.44.A host of other constitutions contain 
similar provisions and needless to say all the
constitutions of the East European countries contained
40. Lowenstein op. cit.p.200.
41. Hawgood, op. cit.4S3.
42. Ibid
43. S.9.
44. a. 34.
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provisions on social and economic rights and duties of 
its citizens.
On the other hand, the reaction of the U.S.A. and some
West European countries was to hedge the implementation
of laissez-faire through the New Deal (U.S.A.) and
sponsoring of elaborate government social agencies and
comprehensive social legislation 45.This led to the
acceptance of the view that government has a
responsibility for the maintenance of a standard of life
for its people and the resultant widespread resort to
state placing.Incidentally, it renewed the legitimacy of
constitutions and constitutionalism since all
developments were done either through or claimed to be
within the parameters of the constitution.Declared one of
the authors of the New Deal "what we have done is to
rediscover the constitution, to revitalize the powers it
was intended to create...We are turning our back on the
policeman doctrine of government and recapturing the
vision of government equipped to fight and overcome the
forces of economic disintegration..."46.
l.C.Socialist Constitutions, Leadership and Mass 
Participation7
It is to be noted that although the revolutions and 
subsequent constitutions of the East European countries 
before 1989,the USSR and China rejected bourgeois 
hegemony and constitution, they were not unconcerned with
«5. Hawgood, op. cit.cap.XXVIII.
46. Quoted in ,lbid.p. 450.
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establishing leadership for the masses due to specific 
historical reasons.47
The primary basic law to be observed in any country
adopting Marxism-Leninism was, guidance of the working
masses by the working classes.48 To the Soviet
leadership,what operated as a convention since 1918 
became one of the cornerstone of the constitution of
19 3 6.49 It was expounded in precise terms in a manual 
which declared, " As for socialist democracy it is not 
directionless democracy, but directed democracy, that is, 
democracy directed by the party and the state to further 
the development of socialism and building of 
communism".50.
A similar approach was adopted by China as expressed by 
Mao Tse Tung in 1957. After stating his support for 
freedom, declared that "But this freedom is freedom with 
leadership, and this democracy is democracy under 
centralized guidance, not anarchy".S1 Yugoslavia 
introduced a slight variation to the formula for
establishing leadership.lt is stated in the preamble to
47. First lasson was drawn from the failura of tha Paris Commune of 1871 due to what 
was viawad as lack of strong leadership by a Marxian revolutionary party and 
representation of tha peasantry.Second lasson was drawn from the Soviet experience 
of 190S when the strike could not be channeled into a political movement and was 
easily put down by the Tsar because the workers and educated men sharing their 
interests then,did not envisage the governance of the state. They acted only as 
organs of resistance.
«8. Meyer,A.G.(1970) ’Historical Development of the Communist Theory of the
Leadership’ in Farrell,R.B.ed.Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union (Butterworth, London) cap.2i Lewis, J.W.(1963) Leadership in 
Communist China (Greenwood, Connecticut) cap.ill
«9. Art.126
50. Fundastentals of Marxism S99 (English translation, 2nd edn.1964).
51. Mao Tse Tung, (1964 ) On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People 6 
(English translation.6th edn. )
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the 1963 constitution thus: "Under the conditions of 
socialist democracy and social government, the League of 
Communists, with its guiding ideological and political 
work, is the prime mover of the political activity 
necessary to protect and promote the achievements of the 
Socialist Revolution".52
Broadly, the mechanics of establishing elite leadership 
followed a similar pattern. Briefly,53 they were 
threefold: first, through adherence to the ideology and 
principles of Marxism-Leninism. Second, the ideology and 
goals were espoused by the party which a fortiori 
provided a special kind of leadership since it alone or 
as the dominant party ruled. Moreover.membership of the 
Communist party in the USSR in the early stages was 
restricted to militants who had to go through a screening 
process and a probation period.Thus while its membership 
had by 1968 topped thirteen million, it was only eight 
percent of the adult voters.Finally, to the elite concept 
of parties, was added, iron discipline particularly under 
Lenin's "democratic centralism".
Some important salient features must be stressed here. 
First, both bourgeois and socialist constitutions 
sanctioned class hegemony but of a different kind. 
Second, both were based on specific economic and 
political ideologies. Third both were equally concerned
52. Art.VI (Preamble) Constitution of ths Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
1963.
53. See Fn.48.
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with establishing leadership of the elites. Fourth, their 
approach to involving the masses is different.
Furthermore, implicit in liberal constitutions is a faith 
in and reliance on institutions as instruments for 
resolving societal contradictions. For this purpose,the 
former are presented as autonomous and 
neutral.Consequently, the masses are involved through the 
instruments of franchise and other composite rights like 
freedoms of speech, association, referendum etc, to 
which we shall return below. On the other hand, socialist 
constitutions reject such mechanics as a facade but not 
the rights. Indeed, liberty and equality are claimed as 
socialist values-S4.In place of the former,frameworks were 
provided which in concept are people centered although 
practices may differ.The structures seek to involve the 
masses up to the highest level and also check 
bureaucratic excesses.
As alluded to , form varied, but not widely. In the 
USSR, since the revolution, the instruments of state and 
party comprised, initially only workers, but widened soon 
to include peasants, soldiers and sympathetic 
intellectuals and given a constitutional form in 1918.55 
The Soviet combined in broad terms the functions of a 
parliament in the liberal sense and reserved the right of 
supervision over executive departments.lt could also
54. Marenin, 0.,( 1983 ) 'Essence and Empirlcisn In African Politics* in
Barongo.Y.,ed. Political Science in Africa, A Critical Review (Zed Press. London Ip.229.
55. Art.65, cap.XIII, Constitution of the R.S.r.S.R..July, 1918-denied the bourgeois
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demand reports from the judiciary through its "executive 
committee". 56
Mass participation as a guiding principle was practised 
at three levels:first, until 1921, the term of the local 
Soviet itself hierachically linked to the Supreme Soviet 
was initially set at three months, the purpose of which 
was to educate almost every villager and city dweller in 
the ways of public administration.57 Although the term was 
subsequently increased to 2 1/2 years,the practice of 
rotation had by that year involved over trillions of 
people.58 Second, masses were also involved in containing 
incipient bureaucracy .The "standing committees" of the 
Soviet included deputies and outsiders so much that one 
out of every six or seven adults in the USSR had the 
experience 59.Finally, unpaid volunteers were injected 
into the assembly and administrative departments.The 
reasons for mass involvement on this scale is explicated 
by the fact that the ultimate intended outcome is the 
withering away of state. But even if that is problematic, 
an important effect is the sense and opportunity of 
sharing it gives and the political awareness it 
engenders.
The Peoples Committees of Yugoslavia set up between 1941- 
1945 and given constitutional framework in 1946 had a
5?! Art*. 101 t 108 Constitution ot th* USSR.1936.
57. Art.57, Const. Of ths R.S.F.S.R.,1918.
58. Dsrbyshlre, 1.(1987), Politics In ths Sovlst Union: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev 
(Chambers ltd.U.K.) cap. one: Friedgut, T.H.(1979) Political Participation In the 
USSR (Princeton,N.Jersey) 41-70.
59. Ibid.
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broader base than the soviet 60.It comprised workers, 
peasants, worker oriented intellectuals and the middle 
class and bourgeoisie sharing their cause.A system of 
rotation was also introduced which included deputies and 
outsiders with varying terms.Rotation was not confined to 
the rank and file.In 1963,a constitutional requirement of 
rotation of office was introduced for the leaders except 
President Tito and was personal to him.Finally, a system 
of popular control of administration was introduced 
through town meetings and assembly of all voters of the 
village.The town meetings nominated candidates for 
elections, after which it observes and could recall 
erring deputies.
China, after experimenting with varying forms, settled 
for the "Communes" system in 1958. The function of the 
latter involves economic administration and local 
government.61 The institution most noted for mass 
participation was the "street level" organization. It 
provided forum for street dwellers to participate in 
government.They performed several functions: to monitor 
activities of local officials in the discharge of their 
duties, to minimize extreme bureaucracy, assist in mass 
education and indoctrination, search for necessities in 
times of scarcity, general social control and routine 
administrative tasks. Again, they were to police the 
requirements of simplicity expected of officials who were
6cT Sokol, Smiljo (1980) 'Introduction* In Simmons,W.B.(ad.) The Constitutions of ths 
Communist World, (Sljthoff and Noordhoff, The Netherlands) Maryland, U.S.A. ) 423.
61. These forms of participation are critically examined by Townsend, J.R.(1969) 
Political Parlclpation in Communist China (Berkely).
20
enjoined to live the ordinary lives of the masses without 
much privilege attached to the office 64. Consequently , 
the Chinese system of public control looked up the ladder 
as well as down to the common man “ .But whether these 
were really effected in practice is another matter beyond 
our scope.
The various options of public involvement provide 
starting point for a constitution maker,depending on his 
ideological predilection.Liberal systems place faith on 
franchise and provide structures mainly based on it. 
Whereas socialist constitutions prefer to guide democracy 
through restricted franchise but create forums and 
enabling structures that are people oriented. But in 
making the constitutions, the masses are generally not 
involved.In fact the former merely register decisions 
already made in the political and economic spheres 
intended or claimed to enhance their welfare.However, the 
collapse of communist regimes in the 1990s in Eastern 
Europe is evidence of the erosion of these earlier 
schemes consequent on the ascendacy of bureaucracy and 
paternalism in administration.
On the other hand, in their making, liberal constitutions 
seek to involve the people.But on the whole, decisions on 
crucial matters such as the mode of organizing the 
economy, structure of power, etc are hardly discussed in 
the process. 62
62. Friadgut. op. cit
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l.D.Options for a Constitutional Engineer.
Against the preceding discussion, two obvious models and 
a less obvious and problematic 63 one offer themselves as 
starting point for a Nigerian constitution maker. One of 
the first is represented as a principal model by the 
United States Presidential Constitution, the British 
Parliamentary System, the hybrid 1958 Fifth French 
Constitution and the Bonn Constitution of 1949.64 Their 
common denominator is the espousal and 
constitutionalization of liberal values.
On the other hand is the model represented by the Soviet 
Constitution of 1977, the Chinese Constitution of 1978 
and the Yugoslav constitution of 1971. They are embedded 
in the ideological context of Marxism-Communism.The third 
option is one based on the principles and ideology of 
religion. For instance, the Saudi Arabian constitution of 
1926 together with the decree of 1953-65 Pakistan of 1973, 
Iran 1979 etc.Finally, it is not beyond a Nigerian 
constitution maker to look for something novel as was 
urged on them at one stage.66
63. It is problematic at two levelsi Although there are countries which claim
governments based on Islamic principles, the specific rules of the constitution 
are not clearcut as secular constitutions. Islam is based on two sources, the 
Koran and Sunna ( practices and sayings of Prophet Mohammed,p.u.b.). The second 
problem will be objections from non-Muslims.
64. Mcwhinney, op. cit. p.6.
65. Madani, M.0.(1970) The Relationship between Saudi Arabian Domestic Law and 
International Lawi A Study of the Oil Agreements with Foreign Companies. A 
dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law of the George Washington university 
in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of the Doctor of 
Juridical science.
66. Address by General I.B. Babangida on the Inauguration of the Constitution Review 
Coomittee at Abuja, 7th Sept.,1987. Report of the Constitution Review Committee 
containing the Reviewed Constitution,Vol.1, p.xis.
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The approach of a Nigerian constitution maker will mainly 
be determined by three crucial factors: a) his
ideological predilection and those controlling the 
process. B) the perception and presentation of the 
problems to be solved by the participants. C) the social, 
political and economic environment,
a) Ideological Beliefs and Choice of Instruments:
Participants in the constitutional process within the 
Nigerian context include those in government who appoint 
membership of the various institutions involved in it.The 
Government's position and opinion have been crucial and 
decisive in some matters as we will see. Participants 
will normally be selected according to criteria that 
will tend to reflect the values and thinking of the 
government. This is because given a distribution of 
economic, organizational and ideological resources,
strategies and institutions determine the prior
probabilities that particular interests will be realized 
and in a particular manner.67 This fact, governments are 
often aware of.
It is to be noted that the amendment provisions of the 
partly suspended constitutions of Nigeria have not been 
one of those saved by the military. Therefore, the latter 
not being guided by the constitution regarding amendment, 
has the discretion to adopt any procedure it feels will 
best serve its preferences. Thus while giving assurances 
that he had not decided on their successors. President
67. Przaworski.A. op.cit.p.66.
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Babangida said that "We have only decided on those who 
will not".68 Of course constitution making is part of the 
transition and will largely determine the successors,
b). Perception and Presentation of the problems.
The participants' view of the difficulties bedeviling 
constitutionalism in Nigeria is crucial in determining 
the choice of strategies and persons.In the 1950s and 
1960s as Graf noted, the structural-functional and
modernization theories held sway and prescriptions were
made accordingly.69 They locate the problem in structural 
imbalance, ethnicity and of recent, religious diversity.70 
This view as laterly revived, suggests that 
constitutionalism can be stabilized through 
constitutional engineering " to check, balance and 
decentralize political power as extensively and 
innovatively as possible".71 And that" the economically 
disfunctional consequences of state control over the
economy " can be dispensed with through privatisation.
other incentives and minimum government in general.72 The
68. Speech by President I.B.Babangida,at the 10th Graduation Ceremony of the National 
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies,Kuru, 1989. p.17.
Graf,w.(1989) “Issues and Substance In the Prescription of Liberal-Democratic 
Forms for Nigeria's Third Republic' in 88 African Affairs 350 pp.90. For a short 
account of these theories, see Claude Ake,(1973) “Explaining Political Instability 
In New States“ In 11 The Journal of Modern African Studies 3:347.; For a seminal 
work on ethnic theories,see Horowita.D.L.,(1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(Berkeley, Unlv. of California Press.) The most recent revival of structural- 
functionalism are: Diamond,L.,Lina,J. and Lipset.S.M. eds (1988) Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Almong, G.,(1987) “The Development of Political Development" 
in Weiner M. and Huntington S.P.eds Understanding Political Development (Little, 
Brown, Boston.)
70. Diamond,L.,( 1988) Class, Ethnicity and D. First Republic.(Macmillan Press,Londodn. 
for a Stable Polity, Another Comment" *- 
Nolutshungu,S.M . (1990) “Nigeriaifra< 
Quarterly 1:87.
in Nigeria, The Failure of the
__  la,A.A.(1988) “Nigeria: the Ouest
in 87 African Affairs 348:441. cf 
ents of a democracy* in 12 Third World
71. Diamond,L.(1987) “Issues in the Constitutional Design of A Third Nigerian 
Republic' in 86 African Affairs,.209 at 210.
72. Diamond, “Nigeria“ in Volume Two: Africa, Llpset, Lins, et al op. clt. p. 83
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idea is to remove chose conditions which Eker identified
as "necessary" for the existence of corruption.71 The
constitution thus acts both as "prophylaxis and
panacea".74 In this case, the problem is understood and
presented as a technical one requiring technicians. 
Appointees to che constitutional bodies are therefore 
likely to be professionals sharing similar beliefs,
attitudes and sentiments with the appointors.
On the other hand, one school of thought analyses the 
problem in class terms. The problem is located in the 
inability of the dominant class to establish hegemony 
over the social order in the Gramscian sense7*. Therefore, 
the motive for constitution making in Nigeria has been to 
establish the same.7* However, the latter view argues that 
such approach has H failed to settle crucial underlying 
problems of economic dependence, political culture and 
mass based collective mobilization".77 Therefore
constitution making is not merely a mechanical work, but 
the overhauling of the entire political economy requiring
73. Eker.V. (19*1) "On tna Origins of Corruption: Irregular Incentives in Nigeria* in 
19 Tha Journal of Nodarn African Studias 1:173.
7«. Rirk-Greene. A.H.M.(1999) Tha Nigerian Constitution as Prophylaxie and Panacaa. 
Papar praaantad at a Confaranca on tha 1992 Nigerian Constitution. Univarsity of 
Blrainghaa, 3rd Juaa.
73. Palola.T. and Xhonvbara. J.ads (1993) Tha lisa and Pall of Nigeria's Qacond 
lepubllc.1979-9«. (Zad Books Ltd.London» p.239-293. Graascl Identified two lavais 
of heqeaony. Plrst. tha ability of a social class to establish notarial, aoral and 
intellectual doainance exercised through state institutions in a civil society. 
Second,tha establishaent of control ovar tha coecive insturaants of stata.lt is 
tha foraar that constitutes proper hegeany as it is exarciasd through idaas and 
beliefs released through Institutions. Sea williaas.Cwyn,(1960) ‘The concept of 
Bqeiaonla in tha Thought of Antonio Graasci* in 21 Journal of tha History of Idaas, 
397: Graasci, A.(1990) Prison Notebooks.<N.X.International publishers.)
74. Graf,*Issues.. .* op.clt.i Koehn.P.(1999) -Coapetitive Transition to Civilian Rula: 
Nigeria's Plrst and Second Bxperiaents* in 27 Tha Journal of Nodarn African 
Studias,3:«01.
77. Koehn. op. cit.p.429i Osoba.O. and usaan.y.1..(1974) A Ganaral Report on tha work 
of tha Constitution Drafting Coaaittee, A Minority Subaission.
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the contribution o£ all" sectors of the population 
especially the largely oppressed masses.lt is clear that 
whoever is in charge of the process will be better placed 
for their world view to prevail,
c).Social, Political and Economic Environment:
In systems with broad consensus and settled socio­
political environment the constitutions created neither 
the stability nor the consensus. Also they did not 
determine the substantive question of who gets what, when 
and how.However, they bolster the conditions and serve as 
an overt procedural frame for contests for power.
But in the new nations of Africa, Asia and the Pacific, 
the constitution carried a heavier burden.7* At 
independence, it constituted the nation, and served as 
surrogate since no political institutionalization had yet 
taken place.79 At independence as well, constitutions 
inherited and legitimated administrative and socio­
economic structures established by the colonial power to 
serve colonial ends 90 .Again, it legitimated and 
reinforced the local emerging elites who succeeded the 
colonialists most of whom continued with local structures 
and external linkages established by the latter. 
Consequently, a constitution makers' options are 
constrained as he has to take into account this external
7eT Ovuau.N.(1979) 'Politics without Partiesi Raflactions on tha Union Govarnaant 
Proposals in Ghana* in 1 African Studias Ravlaw,22i89i Ghai,Law,Politics...op.clt. pp.150-369.
79. Bcatain.H. (1961) ‘Constitutional Eng manring and Problaa of Vlabla Raprasantativa 
Govarnaant* in Bcstain.H. and Aptar, D.K. ads. op.cit.102.
•0. Ghai . Law, Politics...op.cit.p.lSl.
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linkage anchored in international and domestic laws and 
political economy. Internally as well, in Nigeria, 
constitution making has been followed by other parallel 
political (Second Republic ),#1 and economic (putative 
Third Republic) processes.lt means on those matters 
considered and decided upon by the government the powers 
of the constitution makers are effectively curtailed, if 
not removed as we will see below.
In the light of this broad analysis regarding choice, we 
now highlight the options available to a constitution 
maker in Nigeria. The preceding discussion highlighted 
the variables that will affect the range of choice and 
strategies available to a Nigerian constitution 
maker.This section will consider the repertoire of 
instruments that may be used in making constitutions. 
l.E.Repertoire of Strategies for Constitution Making
Different instruments may be chosen depending on whether 
the aim is to draw a new constitution or merely refurbish 
an existing, functional one.The Nigerian situation seems 
to be anomalous because the constitution is partly in 
existence whereas the procedure adopted is for all 
intents and purposes for a new one.The anomaly maybe 
explicated on basically three grounds:Pirst, 
constitutions in military regimes have only nominal 
validity.*2 Second, those portions of the constitution 
regarding amendment and review are not in force. Finally,
• 1. Koahn, "CompatItiva Transition...* op.cit.«06 
82. Loawastaln, op. cit.
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the procedure seeks to legitimise the process itself as 
well as the subsequent civilian regime.
The following, divided into two broad categories
depending on whether it is public or private oriented are 
some of the major range of repertoires used. 
l.E.l PUBLIC ORIENTED PROCEDPRES
A public oriented approach provides the forum and 
facilitates public involvement in varying degrees 
a) Conventions/Constituent Assemblies.
The nomenclature differs from place to place and even 
within the same country,at different times.But they 
perform essentially simillar functions but with varying 
jurisdictions or terms of reference 83.A convention or 
constituent assembly is a body set up under local 
legislation or resolution, whose membership is usually 
elected directly by popular vote with mandate to make or 
legitimate a constitution.lt may also be wholly nominated 
or a combination of election and nomination.84
Some constituent assemblies are constituted by the simple 
act of the legislature converting itself into a 
constitutional assembly.Examples are the Bonn 
constitution of 1949, the earlier Weimar constitution of 
1919, Cook Islands 1968 etc.85 The Conventions or
Assemblies have been widely used in the Pacific,
S3. For instance, the Nigeria Constituent Assemblies of 1977 and 1988 had 
jurisdictional differences as we will see below.
84. This has been the procedure in Nigeria since 1975.
85. For Bonn 1949 and Weiner 1919, see McWhlnney, op. cit.p.35. Ghai.Law, Politics, 
op.clt.p.12 for Cook Islands.
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Anglophone-African countries, Germany and Prance.*6 They 
have differed in the range and kind of public involvement 
as will be seen below.Some have also relied on experts or 
consultants for guidance especially in the Pacific. 
McWhinney makes the point that a major assumption for 
establishing a C.A.is the channelling of an existing 
societal consensus for a fundamental change in the areas 
of political, social and economic environment into a 
constitutional formula .Where these great desires are non 
existent, the work of the C.A. is less easy as it has to 
generate or create one.87 
b).EXPERT COMMISSION.
A government desirous of change may also avail itself of 
an expert commission.Commissions are more open to
government influence with regards to the outcome of its 
work.This is achieved through the appointment of people 
whose views approximate those of government or 
circumscribed terms of reference.Moreover the final
exercise of constituent power lies in the political 
decision maker. In Nigeria, the Political Bureau as we 
will see below, set up in 1986 with wide ranging terms 
of reference is the closest to the use of expert 
commission for constitutional review. Nevertheless the 
governments' rejection of a large part of its
recommendations testifies to the exercise of residual 
power by the appointor .The British government have
8i"! For the Pacific, ibid. For Anglo-phone African Countries, see Filip Reyntjens, Off 
tha Horseback ? op. cit.pp. 18-22. For Germany and Franca, Saa McWhinney, op. 
clt.pp.27-40.
87. i b id .33 -3«.
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usually used commissions for review of constitutions both 
at home and the colonies.Hence, the Willink Commission 
was appointed in 1958 to look into the fears of 
minorities prior to independence in Nigeria.88 
C) PARLIAMENTARY ENACTMENT.
Parliaments have been used as principal or sole arenas 
for constitutional change whether on matters of specific 
or general nature.Thus, it is almost axiomatic for 
constitutions to contain enabling provisions for 
parliaments in case changes are desired in the polity. 
The French Government- by-Assembly is the most noted. 
Usually certain extraordinary majorities are required 
sometimes coupled with reference to the people for 
referendum or plebiscite. For example,the 1919 Weimar 
Constitution, the 1979 and 1989 constitutions of Nigeria 
where new states have to be created.89
The use of parliaments to effect changes is a mark of 
belief in democracy.lt makes incremental changes to build 
on constitutional values without resort to radical 
restructuring. However, as with the former, some
constitutions provide for a procedure where changes may 
be effected through executive initiative and appeal 
directly to the people over the head of
parliament.President de Gaulle and the earlier two
Napoleans used this method most effectively.90 In Nigeria,
88. Csnd.SOS
89. Sa.8 a 9,Cap. lv of 1979; 9 t 10 of 1989 Constitutions.
90. McWhinnay op. eit.
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military decrees introducing changes combine both 
elements of parliamentary and executive action but 
without the public involvement which the former entails. 
d). POPULAR INITIATIVE.
This provides the most direct opportunity for the masses 
to effect constitutional changes without the intermediary 
of the legislature or executive.lt is a scheme where a 
specified number of citizens may initiate a change 
followed by a certain procedure.lt was first introduced 
in the Swiss Constitution of 1891.91 Under the latter, a 
proposal for constitutional change may be introduced by a 
petition of 50,000 voters. The proposal may involve 
partial or a wholesale revision entailing a new charter.92 
But for the proposal to sail through,it requires a 
referendum approval.
The Weimar constitution also toyed with the idea where a 
petition could be introduced by one tenth of the 
qualified voters subject to referendum. Outside Europe, 
it found refuge in some Pacific states where it is made 
constitutionally self executing.In Palau and Marshall 
Islands,25% of the voters can initiate proposals. While 
the constitutions of the Federated States of Micronesia 
and Palau require to be submitted to the voters at least 
once every 10-15 years respectively, the question "shall 
there be a convention to revise or amend the
91. Ibid p.36
92. Arts.120-121.
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constitution?".91 Similarly, in the Marshall Islands, the 
legislature has to make a report at least every 10 years 
advising on the need to amend the constitution or to hold 
a referendum on the issue of convening a constitutional 
convention ".Initiative formula have not found a place in 
any Nigerian Constitution. Finally, tied up to popular 
initiative as a system which entails direct public 
involvement at the highest level are referendum and 
plebiscite.
e). PLEBISCITE AND REFERENDUM.
Referendum and plebiscite are devices which apparently 
embody the entire aspects of democracy,that is,voting; 
debating; initiation of subjects of debates.But they fall 
short of pure democracy because they do not involve 
initiation of subjects and votes.95.
Referendum has been defined as " a poll in which every 
elector may vote,not preceded by a debate in which every 
elector may speak, on an issue".96.The differences between 
it and plebiscite are not clear cut.Rather, referendum is 
treated as a generic word embodying both.Referendum has 
been used for several purposes but we are only concerned 
with its use to ratify, revise and amend constitutions.97 
These means of public involvement demonstrate the
93. Arta.XIV(2)> XIV(a) raapactivaly.
94. Act.XII, s.6
95. Aldaraon.L. (1975) YEA OR NAY? rafaranda In tha Unitad Kingdom (Cassall.London) p. 
7
96. ibld.p. 7.
97. Ona of lta «oat fr»quant uaa ha» baan for aalf datarmination. Saa broadly on thia, 
Goodhart,P.(HP) (1971) Rafarandum. (To m  Stacy Ltd. London.) Capa. 2 t 3
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assertion of popular sovereignty. Constitutions made 
through conventions or C.A.s, provide indirect 
demonstration, but will be the more secure if it receives 
the direct approval of the electorate in a referendum.
The French, Australia and the U.S.A.have used it in 
decolonisation processes in the Pacific,98 but rarely the 
British. It has not been used in constitution making in 
Nigeria but was used in Benin 1964 & 1968, Upper Volta 
1970 & 1977 and once in Madagascar,Mali, Zaire, to 
approve constitutions.99 It has been most extensively used 
in the Pacific especially Palau, where an attempt to 
undermine a constitution approved in a referendum was 
rejected by the people in a further referendum, restoring 
the previous constitution.100
Referendum, when used in approving a constitution tend as 
well to set a precedent for policy making elsewhere.101 
For instance, in Western Samoa, a referendum is required 
for amendment of the constitution which seeks to 
authorise alienation of customary land; provisions which 
deal with languages in Vanuatu;the adoption of the 
Compact of Free Association with the U.S.A. by the 
Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.102 In the Weimar 
constitution, differences within and between the
98. Chai, Law, Politics, .op. cit.p.19
99. Philip Rayntjsns, op.clt.p.23.
100. Ghal, Law, Politics.. .op.cit. p. 21
101. Wolfars (1982), citsd in ibid.
102. Chai, Law .Politics, .op.cit.p.23.
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different arms of government in specific cases were to be 
resolved by reference to the people.103
One important use of referendum for controlling executive 
and parliamentary excesses may be noted because of its 
significance for Nigeria. In France, a referendum is 
required for any Bill which although not in conflict with 
the constitution, seeks to organise the public
authorities, etc,hence would affect the working of 
institutions.104 More pertinently, the 1919 Luxembourg 
constitution provided that the electorate may be invited 
to make known its views in a referendum in certain cases 
and specified conditions.
This provision may be used in Nigeria to consider whether 
certain category of people ought to be banned or 
disqualified from politics,the number of parties,
impeachment of executives etc.In effect the referendum 
together with initiative and recall may be used beyond 
the executive and the legislature to provide for a 
further system of checks and balances. This is more so in 
Nigeria where leaders have not been guided by the 
interests of the people in general.This is of course in 
addition to a closer look at some of the schemes used in 
the early stages in USSR and China^
1.E.2 PRIVATE ORIENTED PROCEDURE.
The preceding procedures involve the public in varying 
degrees.There are however instruments which tend to
103. Art«.73 t 76 respectively.
104. Alderson, op.cit. p. 120.
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exclude them in practice, if not in intention.In those, 
the preparation of a draft is conducted in private and if
documents exist * they are restricted to a small
group.Popular reaction is not invited if not
discouraged.The first contact with the public is
referendum, if at all.105 The British approach to
constitution making during decolonisation, typifies this 
procedure except the process that led to the Macpherson 
constitution of 1951, as will be seen below. In the 
former, constitutional proposals were discussed at 
conferences in London, where the leaders were 
cocooned.There was little opportunity for local leaders 
to consult with their supporters which was thought to be 
good as it relieved such leaders of pressure.Moreover 
conference proceedings were treated as confidential.That 
means in the case of rural Nigerians they were doubly 
removed since their leaders were urban dwellers with poor 
communication and other means of contact.
Again, some post independence constitutional processes 
hardly differed from the British practice.For instance,in 
Benin,the draft constitution privately done was approved 
by the government in 1964;by the military in Burundi; and 
by a joint session of the government and party Central 
Committee in Rwanda.10* A similar private procedure was 
attempted during the crisis period of 1966-67 in 
Nigeria.All those involved were hand picked H leaders of
105. Rayntajans, op. clc.p. 41.
IOC. Ibid p.23.
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thought" ( a euphemism for traditional rulers and the 
affluent) from the then three regions as will be seen 
below.
The preceding analysis and discussion highlight the 
important point that the making of constitutions and the 
resultant structures reflect the underlying political and 
socio- economic formation of a country.A definitely 
chosen formation requires a specific institutional power 
structure. Consequently, a specific society requires a 
certain constitution. Therefore, the making of 
constitutions is a definite arena in which class and 
other interests will come to the fore reflecting the 
structure of the society.107 This is because constitutions 
are maps of power which provide the framework for policy 
making, serve as instrument to consolidate, overthrow or 
modify existing distribution of power and influence.In 
particular, written constitution are expected to reflect 
the beliefs, values and interests of those who 
participated or controlled the process.Therefore, in 
order to have a proper insight into the constitutional 
process in Nigeria and the resultant structures the 
socio-economic formation of Nigerian society at bottom 
needs to be unravelled.
l.F CLASS AND CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE IN NIGERIA.
Writing in 1973, Post and Vickers rejected as unsuitable, 
a class analysis of the Nigerian political and socio-
107. Mar an In. 0. "Class Structure and Democracy In Nigeria* In Oyovbaire.S.E. (ad).Democratic Experiment in Nigeria! Interpretative Essays. (Omega Publisher»,Benin)
p. 88
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economic structure because "insufficient work has been 
done to make a full class analysis possible".They 
concluded that "tribal" instead of class consciousness 
determined Nigeria's history, at this juncture.10' It may 
be that for a variety of reasons to be considered 
shortly, class conflict is yet to begin in earnest in 
Nigeria. But that is a question different from one that 
pertains to the existence and consolidation of class in
the country. To be sure, the problematic nature of the
criteria in the determination of class is not a feature 
peculiar to Nigeria.Rather it is a major obstacle 
encountered by orthodox Marxist social theorists who
conceive of class resting entirely on economic 
foundations.
In its most simple form, Marxist theory posits that 
classes in society are determined by the mode of 
production. That classes emerge when people occupying 
similar positions in the economic structure ( a class- in 
-itself ) become conscious of their common interest (a 
class for-itself) .109 The dominant class in a polity is 
that class"whose members own and control the means of
economic production".110 * When defined in this form, 
several reasons are advanced for the unsuitability of 
class analysis to Africa. First, is the dependency theory 
which posits that the African economy is structurally
108. Post,K. and Vickers,M. (1973) Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960- 1966.(Madison, tha university of Wisconsin Press) 6.
109. Por a critical examination of the definition of Marxism and its variants, see 
Hindess, Barry (1987) Politics and Class Analysis (Basil Blackwell Ltd. N.Y.)
110. Sklar.R. L.(1979) 'The Nature of Class Domination in Africa* in 17 The Journal of
Modern African Studies 4iS31.
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embedded and dependent on the international economic 
system. Therefore, there are no indigenous bourgeoisie( 
owners of the means of production), but rather a
comprador class subserving the foreign class who in fact 
constitute the dominant class.111
Tied to the above is the view that capitalism in Nigeria 
is underdeveloped. Consequently, the tiny bourgeoisie 
that exists is inconsequential, lacks class consciousness 
and cohesiveness and is sectoralized along primordial 
cleavages. Correspondingly, the pockets of proletarians 
(producers of surplus value through wage labour) that 
exist if any, suffer an even worse fate than the
bourgeoisie in terms of local differentiation, lack of 
class consciousness, organization etc.112
Finally,it is asserted that historical materialism as 
developed by Marx has no or little relevance to Africa 
because Marx was a European who developed his ideas 
within the European framework, knew nothing about 
Africa,its distinctive values, culture and society.113 * It 
is not the province of this thesis to dwell extensively 
on the issues raised here as they are beyond its 
scope.However, since the methodology adopted is basically
111. For a critical discussion of this view, see Amir, Samir,(1976) Unequal Development 
as translated by Brian Pearce (N.Y.)
112. Discussions on this area are massive and wide ranging.My choice is however 
restricted to few critical materials.See Graf, W.D.(1988) The Nigerian States 
Political Economy, State, Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial
Era.(James Currey Ltd.London); Markovltz,I.L.(1977) Power and Class in Africa: An 
Introduction to Change and Conflict In African Politics.(PrentIce-Hall.Englewood 
Cliffs,N.Jersey)i Gutklnd, P.C.W. and Waterman,P. eds (1977) African Social 
Studies, A Radical Reader (Monthly Review Press.N.Y.t London: Ake, C.(l985) 
Political Economy of Nigeria (Longman, London.).
113. Usman,Y.B.(1983) Karl Marx and the Analysis of the Politics of Contemporary
Africa.Unpublished paper presented to the Centenary Conference on Marx and Africa, 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria in March
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materialist, the issues will be considered in brief, 
sufficient to link up with the framework of the thesis. 
l.F.l Dependency and underdevelopment.
The first two issues taken together have been
controverted by a large body of evidence accumulated over 
the years.Since independence, political leaders, business 
and other interests have frustrated attempts and demands 
of the industrialized countries which would have resulted 
in total subservience.114 This has been possible, if not 
inevitable because independence conferred on the states 
territorial powers and necessarily relative powers over 
the economy and coercive instruments. More so, the wish 
and desire of the local class to reverse and attenuate 
discriminatory colonial practices in economic 
opportunities can not be underestimated. The instruments 
used have ranged from Nigerianization, indigenisation, 
nationalization to privatization, as will be shown. These 
have fostered industrial growth, albeit on a limited 
scale.115 *
Such capitalist industrialisation has been initiated and 
directed in Nigeria by a combination of bureaucrats, 
military elites, traditional rulers and other
professional elements who have common attachment to 
private property, economic privilege and social
11«. Kasfir.N.(1983) "Relating Class to Stats in Africa* in XXI Ths Journal of
Comnonvaalth and Comparativs Politics 3,.1> Sklar.R.S.(1988) "Postimperlalism, A 
Class Analysis of Multinational Corporate Expansion* in 9 Comparative Politics 1.
115. The process of industrialisation of third world countries has been documented in
detail by Warren,B.(1973) "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation’ in 81 New
Left Review 3. Especially on Nigeria see,Forrest,T.‘State Capital, and Class
Formation in Nlgerla'ln Lubeck, P.M.(ed.) The African Bourgeolslei Capitalist 
Development In Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast.pp. 307-342.
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stratification.116 It is these groups of people who before 
and during colonial times constituted the petty 
bourgeoisie. Because of increased economic opportunities, 
high urbanization, education and communication they have 
blossomed to the bourgeois status.117
They have over the years swollen in number and become 
more aware of their class position as we will see later. 
However, the argument is not to deny that the fundamental 
economic dependence has been altered. Rather the 
assertion is that the above measures have resulted in 
"the tightening of nexus"119 between the foreign and local 
class in such a way that a kind of mutual security and 
dependence now exists. Therefore the "doctrine of 
domicile".119 seems to better reflect the reality of the 
relationship between them.
The doctrine posits that multinational corporations can 
no longer treat host nations as transmission belts, but 
rather as partly autonomous actors with powers to impose 
constraints on external interests. In the circumstance 
the doctrine obliges compliance with local rules 
requiring them to ensure corporate good citizenship, 
observe directions on income maximization, obedience to
116. Warren, op.cit.42-43.
117. ibid.
118. Collins,P.(1976) "The Political Economy of Indigenizationi the case of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree* in 4 African Review, 493* Craf, W.(1983) 
■African Elite Theories and Nigerian Elite Consolidation) A Political Economy 
Analysis* in Barongo, Y. (ed.) Political Science in Africa-A Critical Review (Zed 
Press. London) 189.
119. Sklar,“Postimperialism..“op.clt. pp.84-8S> Kasfir,'Relating class..* op.clt.p.ll
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local laws and government pollcles.lt Is bargain of a 
sort.
The discussion so far has sought to justify the relevance 
to Nigeria of class analysis based on economic 
foundations.However, a revisionist tendency in Marxist 
literature envisages a much wider basis of class 
determination. Ossowski has argued that the orthodox 
criteria for class determination do not by themselves 
reflect the class structure in modern industrial 
countries.120 According to him bureaucratic socialism and 
corporate capitalism have engendered structures which 
imply the existence of two more determinants, that is, 
control over the means of compulsion and consumption.121
These political factors are in fact more relevant in non 
or less industrialized societies where economic criteria 
for class analysis is thought to be more problematic.To 
be sure, Mosca had, earlier on, presaged the generation 
of a dominant class on the basis of a political 
criterion.122 He saw the state as constituting a pivotal 
locus in the process of class formation and
domination.The state is constituted by a tiny minority- 
the political class- existing in every society. He noted 
in respect of the then emerging countries of Eastern 
Europe but now having greater validity to most third 
world countries that "rapid restocking of the ruling
120. Ossowski.S. (1963) Class Structure In the Social Conaciouanaaa, translated by 
Sheila Paterson (M.Y.)pp. 33 and 157.
121. ibid.IIS-«.
122. Mosca,G. (1936) The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah D. Kahan (Toronto, London,
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classes is a frequent and very striking phenomenon in 
countries that have been recently colonized". And 
forseeing a period of social upheaval (or coups? ) "there 
comes a period of renovation... during which individual 
energies have free play and certain individuals, more 
passionate, more energetic, more intrepid or more shrewd 
than others force their ways from the bottom of the 
social ladder to the topmost rungs". Those who ultimately 
gain access " will begin to acquire a group spirit.They 
will become more and more exclusive and learn better and 
better the art of monopolizing to their advantage the 
qualities and capacities that are essential to acquiring 
power and holding it".123
It is because of the centrality of power to class 
formation in Africa, as will be seen ,that Sklar proposed 
that "class relations at bottom are determined by 
relations of power, not production".124 This must be 
qualified as Kasfir did to the degree that a new 
commercial 125 and industrial class is forming independent 
of the state.
The argument in connection with the foreignness of Marx 
and his ideas oversimplifies the principles of historical 
materialism.lt is not a dogma whose validity lies on 
faith in Marx and his writings.124 Rather, it is a theory
123. ibid.50-69.
124. Sklar.(1979) ‘Nature of Class..* op.cit.S37
125. Kasfir,op.cit.13
126. Saa fn.113.
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of the practical experience of man as he progresses in 
the society.Marx developed it out of the specific 
historical struggle of the people at the time using a 
criterion whose basic premises, like those of natural 
science has universal appeal and application.127 Finally, 
lack of consciousness has also been a reason for denying 
the existence of classes in Africa.Consciousness is the 
"theoretical link in Marxism between determined 
conditions and determined response.128 It means a class is 
not a class until it becomes aware of its interests 
pitted against the interests of others and organized 
consciously and purposely to enhance those interests by 
attempting to overthrow the system of which it forms a 
part if that system is against its interests. A failure 
to become aware of that interest within the totality of 
social life manifests "false consciousness".129
Robin Cohen regards the concept as part of a whole "set 
of now largely sterile aphorisms".130 Wallerstein rightly 
noted that while consciousness is not an essential 
factor, it nonetheless automatically comes to the fore 
when objective conditions are right. "An objective class 
status is only a reality insofar as it becomes a 
subjective reality for some group or groups and if it 
'objectively' exists, it inevitably will be felt
127. Ibid, pp.5-7> Toyo.Bskor,(X983) "Non-Ethnocentric Flaws in Competing Non-Marxist 
Paradigms of Development* in Barongo op.cit.pp. 156-17« at 172.
128. Oilman,B. (1972) ‘Toward Consciousness, Next timei Marx and the working Class* In 
Politics and ZIISociety,l p.2.
129. Marenin, 'Essence..."op. cit.pp.211-238.
130. Cohen,R.‘Marxism and Afrlcat old, New and Projected* cited by Marenin in Barongo, 
op.cit.p.21«.
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subjectively".131 The rate of class formation may not be 
the same and neither is complete class solidarity 
necessary in all situations which involve class formation 
or conflict.132 It is important to note that what obtains 
in Africa less South Africa is mainly not class conflict 
but rather formation and consolidation at the bourgeois 
level through the processes analyzed by Sklar; Diamond; 
and Graf.133
Having considered the relevance and applicability of 
materialist approach to Nigeria. we now trace the 
structure and development of classes. Generally, the 
development of social classes reflects the changing mode 
of production. Each epoch in the constitutional, 
political and economic development of Nigeria registered 
a shifting pattern of class structure but only at the 
dominant class level. 
l.G.PRE-COLONIAL FORMATION.
Precolonial conquest did not create the social structure 
in contemporary Nigeria from nothing.Rather it carried 
with it forward the earlier socio-economic formations.134 
l.G.l The Northern Region.
The dominance of the Hausa-Fulani cultural group in the 
North,in terms of number, politics, economics and
131. Wallerstein, 1.(1975) 'Class Formation In the Capitalist WOrld System* in V 
Politics and Sociaty 3. 370.
132. ibid.
133. Sklar,' Nature of Class...* op.cit 531-552» Diamond,L.(1987) 'Class Formation in 
tha Swollen African State' in 25 The Journal of Modern African Studies 4»567» 
Graf. The Nigerian State...op cit.Caps.l, 4 4 8 .
13«. Shenton.R.w.(1986) The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (James Currey 
Ltd. London ) p.l
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organization has made historians focus more on their 
social formation.The pre-Jihad ( holy war of liberation ) 
structure was mainly a village community.lt was 
politically non centralized and agrarian in economy.135 
The main positions of authority beyond the household and 
lineage heads were structured on occupations,for 
instance, head of the farmers, hunters, etc but involved
little governing. However by the 15th century, as
urbanization and division of labour developed.
authorities emerged to head such bigger towns. Such
authorities were in the order of things taken up by
erstwhile heads of lineages. Between 15th -16th centuries 
a number of the urban commoners had begun to adopt Islam 
which they used as a legal framework for their non 
agricultural activities.136
The reaction of the ruling group was to attempt to blend 
the earlier customs with the newly introduced and adopted 
religion and law resulting in a syncretic practice.The 
idea was to maintain the allegiance of the communities 
belonging to both groups. But this practice led to a rift 
between the rulers and the increasingly critical literate 
Muslim scholars. Moreover to maintain its position, the 
former had increased taxation, resorted to the seizure of 
commoners' property and practised slavery. Consequently, 
these rapacious acts of the rulers alienated a large part 
of its constituency which made it easier to mobilize the
135. ibid.
136. ibid
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people under the leadership of a literate Fulani scholar- 
Shehu Usman Dan Fodio.The Hausa rulers were finally 
overthrown in 1804.137
The war which latterly established Fulani hegemony 
although justified in religious terms was in fact 
primarily concerned "with the relation of ruler to ruled, 
and royalty to commoner".138 At the initial post conquest 
period, leadership was conferred on the leadership of the 
jihad or those who earned respect through piety or 
military gallantry. This was however short-lived, as due 
to internal dissensions,the need to maintain control in 
the confederate political structure (the Emirates), led 
to the predominance of kin members and associates in 
political appointments.139 Moreover, the prior state 
apparatus of tax and tribute system, was only partly 
reformed and therefore provided opportunities for abuse.
Consequently, instead of transforming the corrupt Hausa 
system, the jihad shortly afterwards coopted and 
strengthened the institution through accommodating "state 
machines, institutions and structures which had been used 
by their predecessors to oppress the society".140 Prior to 
colonial rule therefore, the basic line of cleavage 
remained royalty and commoner, office holder and 
peasants.The basic issues around which class conflict
137. Mahadi,A.(1985) * The Jihad and its Role in strengthening tha Sarauta System in Hausaland in tha 19th Century.Tha Case of Kano" in Ada Ajayi.J.F. and Ikara.B. ads 
■volution of Poltlcal Culture in Niger la.(University Press Ltd.Zaria) ppll9-120.
138. Shenton.op. clt.p.j Hahadl,op.cit.pp.120-121.
139. Shenton,op.clt.p. 5
140. Mahadi,op.cit.p.124.
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could have centered were taxation and land tenure. But 
conflict was contained and mediated by the caliphate 
institution where petitions or grievances related to 
support for or opposition to the caliphate itself 
engendered by succession disputes.141
Finally, it is to be noted that, Islam which provided the 
ideological and legal basis for the jihad now served as 
the reason for the sustenance of the caliphate which had 
already lost its raison d'etre.It was this formation that 
colonialism foisted itself upon, and adopted almost 
wholesale.142
1.G.2 THE SOUTHERN REGION.
The Yorubas.
The west of Nigeria is mainly inhabited by the Yorubas 
while the central part houses the erstwhile powerful 
Benin Kingdom. Initially, the basic unit of organization 
among the Yorubas was villages comprising groups of 
kinsmen.143 In origin, they trace their descent to one 
mythical Oduduwa who is said to have lived in lie Ife, 
after which there were dispersions in consequence of 
migrations, wars and conquests. However, through 
aggregations of kinsmen, large towns are known to have 
been formed and the resultant emergence of political 
organizations144.They are said to be the most urbanized
141.Shenton, op.cit.p.B
142. For a resume of the reasons for the adoption, see Ubah.C.M. (1985) ‘Continuity and 
Change* in Ajayi and Ikara, op.cit.137.
143. Lloyd,P.C.(1962) Voruba Land Law ( Oxford Univ.Press.London.) P. 30.
144. Roberts, 8.(1969) Kingdoms of the Yoruba. (Methuen,London)pp.9-14.
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people in tropical Africa1«»" Each major settlement had a 
ruler called "Oba" along with a coterie of other 
subordinate chiefs» officials and priests who together 
provided spiritual and secular leadership.
The Oba is usually considered a sacred or divine king, 
the elaborate rites accompanying his coronation being 
testimony to this belief. He represented and personified 
the town,as well as reincarnating his ancestors, the 
mythical Oduduwa. However, in spite of the apparently 
enormous potential powers of the Oba, he was constrained 
by a council of chiefs and court officials whom he had to 
consult by tradition.146 The chiefs were usually recruited 
from two groups.The first group are the leaders of the 
descent groups which made up the town or kingdom. They 
are hereditary. The second, are the leaders of 
occupational groups, such as,those in charge of wars or 
public works 147.
The Oba in Council therefore constituted the ruling class 
in the pre-colonial period.lt was maintained through a 
variety of taxation: tributes, war booty, judicial fines 
( the Council being the highest court ) and contributions 
from chiefs who were expected to give half of what they 
received.14* Moreover, the Oba maintained a large number 
of slaves and subsequently servants most of whom worked
145. ibid p. 9
146. Ibid p. Ill
147. Lloyd, op.cit.39-40.
149. ibid. 40-45.
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on royal farms to augment palace income itself invested 
in trade and commerce.lt was the Obas who monopolized the 
latter as they supplied the Hausas and later, the 
Europeans with slaves and other goods. The Yorubas are 
generally agrarian, cultivating individual holdings in 
family lands. But due to urbanization, complex 
specialization had developed, the variety and complexity 
of skill manifested through works in wood, stone and iron 
carving,sculpture cast, etc.149
In land matters the Oba stood as a trustee. He allocated 
and revoked titles, received tribute or rent, etc and 
generally administered the lands.1*0 Although the Oba 
juridically acted in representative capacity and could 
not treat the land as personal property, but as Elias 
observed, N chiefs have all too often confused the two by 
claiming community lands as if they were beneficial 
owners thereof*-1*1 However, their juridical 
representativeness was an ideological cloak covering the 
monopoly of land by the Obas.That is why they seemed to 
be the most aggrieved when land ownership was reverted to 
the state in 1977
In the pre colonial period, there was a clearly defined 
social formation. The oba and his council constituted the 
ruling class justifying their hegemony through the 
ideology of the mythical Oduduwa. This dominant political
149. Crowder. M.(1966) Tha Story of Nigarla.(Fabar and Fabar Ltd.London.) Cap. IV.
150. Ellaa.T.0.(1971) Ntgarlan Land Law.(Swaat a Maxvall.London) pp.72-102.
151. Ibid.
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position was reinforced by the monopoly on trade and 
commerce, control over land and its use and a variety of 
other taxes. Any potential class conflict was mediated by 
fear or veneration of the sacred institution. Hence, the 
wars that ravaged Yoruba kingdoms arose mainly from 
succession disputes.
On the lower rung were the farmers, craftsmen, slaves and 
others engaged in non agricultural occupations. Finally, 
it is important to note that unlike the Hausa-Fulanis, 
and other cultural groupings in the North, the Yorubas 
had an early contact with Europeans through trade, the 
significance of which we will see below.
The I BO.
In the Eastern part of Nigeria, the Ibos constitute the 
dominant cultural group. There are a number of other 
minority groupings situated in the delta area.Compared to 
the Yoruba kingdoms and Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Ibos 
have a less complex and less stratified social 
formation. "The Ibos make no Kings" proclaims an Ibo 
proverb.152 Up to the 19th century, no group had achieved 
centralized authority. Political organization was 
characterized by an "excess of democracy" ,153.But unity 
and interaction was established at the levels of culture 
and commerce. The former was achieved through diverse
152. Dike Onwuka,K. (19S6) Trad* and Politic* In tha Niger Delta, 1830-1685) An 
Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria.(Oxford.Clarendon 
Press) p.26
153. ibid,p.37.
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forms of socialization such as inter- clan festivals, 
inter marriages, many communal markets, etc.
Apart from these forms of interaction, their largest unit 
of government was the village group. At the same time the 
Aro Chukwu oracle provided them with a sort of political 
and religious unity, although it was more an instrument 
for regulating trade, as will shortly be considered .
The complexity of Ibo social formation lies at the 
economic level.The greatest factor that conditioned them 
in this regard is the so called land hunger154 That means, 
pressed against limited and part productive land 
resources, they had to look for non agricultural vocation 
and outside their geo-cultural boundaries. This led to 
their dispersal all over Nigeria and abroad.The surplus 
of population and scarce land contributed to them having 
produced the greatest number of men for slavery during 
the slave trade era.155 Second, it led to the development 
of specialization of skill labour among the varius 
clans.For instance, some became the middlemen of the 
interior trade and others, mercenaries smiths and 
doctors, spies and diplomats.154 These highly developed 
networks of commerce and industry needed regulation and 
central political authority.
This political vacuum was taken up by a segment, the Aros 
exploiting the fear and veneration of the people for the
154. Dika, op. cit.p.28
15$. lbld,p.28l Crowdar, op.clt.80-81.
156. Dika.op.cit.pp. 28-29
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cult. The Oracle was claimed to reside in the Aro 
territory, to which pilgrimage was made from all over Ibo 
land. The Aros claimed to mediate between man and God 
through this cult. Pursuant to this role they established 
colonies or "free cities" along all the trading routes of 
the interior with adjudicatory structures to settle 
disputes and through it became the middle men in the 
interior between Europeans and local merchants.157 Save
therefore for the dominance of the Aros in trade and
commerce and the provision of authority mainly to
regulate the former, the social structure was not
hierarchical.
It must also be noted that they had an early contact with 
Europeans through Christian missionaries, commerce and 
education and the consequent imbibing of values that 
accompany them.
1.G.3 Other Minority Groups.
Existing alongside the large cultural groups are other 
minority groupings.In the North, the Tiv and the Kanuri 
are the major ones. Before colonial rule, the socio­
political structure of the Tiv was egalitarian, if not 
"anarchic".158 They lacked institutional authorities until 
the British created one, the office of Tor Tiv.159 *
157. ibid, pp.38-39.
158. Bohannan.L.and Bohannan.P. (1953) Tha Tiv of Cantral Nigeria (London) pp. 31-37.
159. Bohannan, P.(1958) “Extra-Procaaaual Evants In Political institutions* in 60
Amarlcan Anthropologist Ii6
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On the other hand, the Kanuri people had a social 
formation akin to the emirate structure.lt is based on a 
well known ancient kingdom,hierarchical in structure and 
hereditary in succession.160 In the central part of 
Southern Nigeria lies the Benin kingdom. Like the 
Yorubas, its people, the Binis, had a developed, complex 
administration of title holders and palace officials.Its 
monarchy was less constitutional than the Yorubas.161
In the Delta areas of the East are located other clusters 
of minorities- the Ibibio, Anang,Efik etc.Most of them 
like the Ibos were loosely organized along what
anthropologists call segmentary lineage systems.They also 
had an early contact with Europeans through trade along 
the coast.
1.H.COLONIAL PERIOD, 1861-1951.
European contact with and influence on the territory now 
comprising Nigeria began between 1500-1800. It was by way 
of trade along the coast rather than political
administration.162 In the North, first contact was with 
the Royal Niger Company.163 Consequently the incorporation 
of Nigeria into the international capitalist order did 
not just begin by flag hoisting. However, what concerns 
us here is its impact on existing social formation. For
160. Tseayo,J.I. "The Emirate System and Tlv Reaction to Pagan Statua in Northern 
Nigeria* in Williams, G. (ed) .Nigeria: Economy and Society (Rex Coll ins.London) 
pp.83-09.
161. Ryder, A.P.C.(1969) Benin and the Europeans,1485-1897, especially chapter one.
162. Hopkins, A. G. (1973) An Economic History of West Africa. (Longman. London.) Cap.3) 
Bkundare.R.O.(1973) An Economic History of Nigeria,1860-1960. (Methuen a
Co.Ltd.London) Cap.2
163. ibid.
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clarity of analysis, it will be discussed at two 
levels:the political and economic. 
l.H.l POLITICAL IMPACT.
The final conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 and 
the prior relinquishing of authority by the rulers in the 
South through a series of treaties meant the wholesale 
introduction of a new master on top^the existing socio­
political structure. Strategic considerations determined 
the fate of the latter. Since the aim of colonialism was 
to regularize trade at minimum cost, it simply coopted 
the structure on the ground through the " indirect
rule"164 system but inevitably as the superior partner.
However, its impact varied with the respective group's 
pre-colonial structure and the area's relative importance 
to the colonial economy.165 In the emirates, in terms of 
the colonial purposes, it was effective and functional
since the existing structure was already hierachical and 
functional. In Yoruba areas where traditional rulers were 
constitutional monarchs, it bloated their powers by 
reversing the prior system of limited accountability. The 
situation with the Ibos was even more conspicuous. 
Although they made no kings, colonial government created 
a whole new ruling class of "warrant chiefs".To provide 
an effective link with the people, the chiefs relied on
the coercive powers of the colonial administrators since
164. Hopkins, op.cit.Cap.4
165. Craf, Tha Nigerian atata...op.cit.p.•
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they lacked popular base and legitimacy.166 But the
restructured class pattern was more perverse at the
economic level, not surprisingly since that was the
raison d'etre of colonialism.
1.H.2 STRUCTURE AT THE ECONOMIC BASE.
We have seen that the factors of production, land and 
labour were under the control and monopoly of the 
ertswhile ruling class.This position was increasingly 
undermined in several ways. First, in the North, Lugard 
had earlier on sought to transform the society by 
converting the local ruling hierachy into a landlord 
class and slaves and other servants as wage labourers.167 
Apart from seeking to wholly privatise land, the release 
of slaves was meant to reduce the cost of administration 
which entailed maintaining them with their masters.
However, this proposal was not followed.Rather, the 
succeeding authority nationalized land on the ground that 
the rent which would have accrued to the landlord went to 
the state as tax.166 Furthermore, acquisition of land by 
colonial firms was restricted. This policy had profound 
effects, which were169: (a).It blocked the development of 
an indigenous capital through land- its accoutrement. 
b).It undermined the means by which the old ruling class 
related to the popular class, hence its authority.But
166. ibid, pp.8-9
167. Shanton, op.clt. Cap.3 
16«. ibid, p. 30
169. ibid, «5-46.
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this was rectified by converting and maintaining the 
former as state functionaries.c).The agricultural
producers, instead of becoming the agricultural
proletariats (work on the land for wages without 
ownership) which Lugard envisaged, became peasants 
(continued to effectively use the land they occupied as 
owners).
However, while the transition from local merchants to 
agricultural capital was blocked, the expansion of the 
former was not. Few Kano based local merchants became 
agents of foreign firms. The position of the peasants 
altered only in the sense that they had to produce more 
cash in place of subsistence crops to meet colonial tax 
requirements.170 But with regards to their position in the 
social formation, it was unchanged.
In the South on the other hand, private interests in land 
was introduced through a series of English Laws governing 
realty.171 And like the North, acquisition of land by 
foreigners was restricted. Consequently, traditional 
rulers were the immediate beneficiaries. Some other 
factors however affected their position which were 
commerce, religion, education and government.172 Western 
education begun in the 18th century with the primary 
purpose of providing clerics. It expanded as government 
became involved to produce clerks, artisans, etc for
170. ibid, 127-138.
171. For a summary, see, Proehl ,P.O. (1965) Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria, Laws and 
Policies.(Oxford Univ.Press) Cap.VII
172. Nduka,0.(1976) ’Colonial Education and Nigerian Soclsty’ in Williams,C.
Nigeria..op.clt.pp.91-105
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colonial services and requirements of foreign firms for 
secretarial staff.171 But the wages and the apparent 
prestige it brought to such employees increased its 
attraction and importance.
immediate beneficiaries included those close to 
traditional rulers and those from humble background. As 
the scope of education expanded, it produced the 
following consequences: a) The further profound
undermining of traditional political authority which 
depended on traditional economic relations based on 
control of land, supernatural sanction, etc. The younger 
generation who received western education depended less 
economically174 and spiritually on the older generation, 
b) Together with commerce, education determined social 
position and pre-eminence. They also affected the value 
system, personalities, etc of its beneficiaries
contrasting with those who did not. These are values 
associated with the dominant class in Nigeria today, c) 
The availability of opportunities in, and the prestige 
offered by colonial bureaucracy together with
discriminatory practices in favour of foreign traders, 
confined most Nigerians with high education both in the 
North and South to white collar jobs rather than in 
business.175
173. ibid p.92 >Ekundare ,op.clt.p.64 
17«. Nduka, op. cit.p.9i
175. Akeredolu-Ale,( 1976) "Private Foreign Investment and the underdevelopment of
Indigenous Entrepreneurship in Nigeria* in Williams,C. (ed.)
Nigeria..op.clt.sp.106-122) Blerateker,J. (1997) Multlnatlonale, the atate and
Control of Nigerian Economy.(Princeton).
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Thus, as well as making bureaucracy an objective dominant 
class position, it subsequently became the organ to form 
the economic base and therefore the source of intra-class 
squabbles as we will see below.
In the emirates of the North, initially the approach to 
education was different. First, missionary activities and 
education were constrained. Second,the purpose of
education when introduced was different. It was not to 
produce "slavish subservience or servile imitation of 
Europeans" nor mere artisans and clerks, "but rather co­
operative African administrators".174 Islamic education 
was promoted.The colonial administration established 
three types of schools. One was for the sons of chiefs, 
another for the children of MALLAMAI ( Muslim scholars ) 
to provide teachers for the first and secretarial staff 
for government. A third, a craft school was meant to 
attract "the right class of native artisans".177
On the first category, the colonial education officer 
wrote: "The object of this school is to train the sons of 
chiefs with a view to [making] them physically and 
mentally better fitted to assist Government in the 
administration of the country to bring them into closer 
contact with the Government, to acquire for them a better 
understanding of the policy pursued by the Government, to 
acquire for them an elementary knowledge of sanitation 
and hygiene and above all, to open their eyes to the
17«. rajana.A. quoted in Nduka. op.clt.p.94.
177. Whitaker. C. S..JR.(1970) The Politic* of Tradition.Continuity and Chanqe In 
Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966.(Princeton,N.J. Princeton Untv. Preas) p.341
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commercial possibilities of the country".17* This pattern 
was followed at the secondary school level through the 
establishment of the Katsina College in 1922.The purpose 
of the latter "was to provide as far as possible, all the 
essentials of a good English public school”.179 Not 
surprising, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello thought the colonial 
government "had in mind the special college for 
princes...in India.1*0
The early products were children and relatives of the 
emirs and other titled men or those whose fathers had the 
former as patrons or masters.1*1 Examples of the latter 
group are Alhaji Makaman Bida, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, 
Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule. Balewa later became the prime 
minister of Nigeria, while the rest, after stints in 
native authority administration like Balewa and their 
peers were ministers. On the whole, the products provided 
the first and second generation of civil servants in 
colonial and subsequent bureaucracy.1*2 They also formed 
the core of the dominant party in the North prior to 
independence, in the first republic and mainly in the 
second republic.The schools therefore offered the 
unprecedented opportunity for leading future officials of 
the ruling class in the emirates (and a select number of 
their wards) to socialize, and become conscious of their
17*. ibid.
179. ibid, p. 342.
180. Alhaji Sir Aluaadu Ballo,(1962) My Llfa, p.31.
181. Whitakar, op. cit.pp.336-337.
182. ibid, pp. 322-323 iSaa Padan, J.N. (1986) AHMADU BELLO SARDAUNA OP SOKOTOi valutl and laadarahlp in Nigarla.(Hoddar and Stoughton.London.)
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common group interests.183 This is evidenced in the 
formation of the Katsina College Old Boys Association ( a 
powerful group today in Nigeria).
Consequently, unlike in the South where the 
administration had no specific policy on the local ruling 
class , that of the North was tailor- made to reproduce 
the same. But in all the regions, less in the North, the 
class structure widened to include those in bureaucracy 
and those successful in commerce through middlemanship. 
The importance of state bureaucracy continued to grow as 
the sustenance and privileges of the chiefs and 
beneficiaries of western education depended on it. Thus, 
its control after colonial rule would become crucial, if 
not decisive since it was the determinant of everything 
including the very survival of the traditional 
establishment.
In the South, the struggle to control the state machinery 
was the source of tension between the rising educated 
elements and their traditional rulers. Also between the 
former and the traditional rulers in the North who 
continued to be the dominant class.The purpose of 
constitution making ever since, as we will see throughout 
this work, has been the rationalization of this tension 
resulting from struggles over access to and control of 
bureaucracy rather than considerations for the welfare of 
the general population. Finally, the criteria for class 
identification at this stage are traditional rulership,
183. Whitakar. op. cit.p.342
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education and wealth114 Specifically, the ruling class 
were : Zn the first and superior category, a) educated
expatriates— administrators, missionaries, military
officers and policemen.b) foreign business stratum; in 
the second category but in a subordinate position, a) 
localized indirect rulers, b) indigenous subordinate 
officials serving colonial bureaucracy and multinational 
firms.1”
l.I THE PERIOD 1951-1966.
The preceding section examined the impact of colonial
rule and western education on the old class structure.In 
the North attempts were made to preserve and reproduce 
it, while no such policy obtained in the South. But the 
traditional order in the latter had not totally lost out 
to its emerging and educated elements. Whether the system 
survived and the form it took would depend on the
political, constitutional and economic arrangements made 
in the transition to independence.
The period up to 1922 was one for colonial
consolidation.1”  The Clifford constitution introduced 
in that year spurred the few educated elements to grumble 
for positions in the colonial government. A petition for 
reform, sponsored by the West African National Congress,
184. Graf, 'African Elite Theories...* op. clt. p.l90i Ankkpo. M. (1985) 'Nigeria’s 
evolving Class Structure* In Ake.C. (ed). The Political Economy of Nigeria.!Longman.London. Lagos) pp.33-52.
185. Graf,(1918) The Nigerian State...op. clt.p.lO.i Nsimiro, 1.(1985) 'Class and Power 
in Post-Independence Nigeria>1960-1975* In Kayode.M.O. and Usman.*.B.eds The 
Economic and Social Development Nigeria.(Gaskiya.Zarla) 186*
186. Bias.T.0.(1967) Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws and Constitution.(Stevena and
Sons,London) Caps XX 6 XV.
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"a concerted effort of the urban middle class in West 
Africa who were dissatisfied with the existing system" 
was rebuffed by the Governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh 
Clifford, as "loose and gaseous talk".1*7 Reflecting on 
the category of the petitioners,he said: it came "from a 
self-educated and self-appointed congregation of 
educated African middlemen...a handful of men ...born and 
bred in the British administered towns situated on the 
seashore ...men whose eyes are fixed...not upon their own 
tribal obligations and the duties to their natural rulers 
which immemorial custom should impose upon them, but upon 
political theories evolved by Europeans to fit..wholly 
different situations".1M
However, in the gradual progress to independence, the 
interests of these elements and the traditional rulers 
had to be reconciled. In fact it subsequently became the 
preoccupation of decolonization rather than any 
principles of government or constitution.This was 
reflected in two contending schools of thought at the 
time.
One view, held by colonial officials in the North 
favoured a separate constitutional and political 
development for each region while an alternative opinion 
sought to jettison separation and urged developments that
187. Odumosu,0.1.(1963) The Nigerian Constitution! History and Development.(Sweet and 
Maxwell .London).p.15 18
188. Ibid,pp.15-16
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would ultimately secure political unity 1,9. The latter 
view prevailed for reasons to be considered in the next 
section. It resulted in constitutional arrangements 
begining with that of Richard in 1946, of Macpherson in 
1951, and culminating in the independence constitution of 
1960 aimed at "securing greater participation [and 
management] by Africans in the discussion of their own 
affairs".190 And more importantly, rationalizing the
conflicting interests of the contending parties.
It is important to note two factors which had a bearing 
on the class structure. First, the galloping rise of the 
beneficiaries of education in the South, had resulted in 
the introduction of franchise earlier. The latter was 
introduced in the 1922 Constitution but hedged by inter 
alia, property requirements with regards to both voters 
and contestants.lt progressively opened up until it 
became a direct universal adult suffrage in the 1959 
elections.191 In the North on the other hand, only 
universal male adult suffrage was available.192.Even in 
the latter, elections continued to be conducted indirect 
through the Native Authorities, the main administrative 
arm of the emirates.
In the South, the effect of the franchise was the 
democratization of the native authorities and further
189. ibid, p.42
190. Being one of the objectives of the Richards Constitution of 1946.
191. Elias, op.clt.4S-S0
192. See notes 186 t 187.
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reduction of the residue of powers of the traditional 
rulers. This was so especially after 1951 when the 
constitution of that year effectively introduced self 
government and the consequent ascendancy of the educated 
elements through the ballot. Moreover, the existence of 
colonial legislation empowering the governor of a region 
to depose or suspend any chief "in the interests of peace 
or order or good government" served as a reminder of that 
ascendance.193 In fact the deposition of the Alafin ( 
King) of Oyo in 1954 for alleged conspiracy against the 
regional government and party "created the impression 
that no chief could stand against the government and 
survive" .194
The cases of deposition in the North served a different 
purpose. They were usually done by one of their own to 
purify the system in its overall interest.195 Again the 
1951 and 1954 constitutions had established firm and 
strong regional structure and a weak centre.This was 
complemented by the fact that the North had secured a 
concession to have 50% of the seats in the Federal House 
of Representatives. These factors bolstered the power 
structure in the North since it was institutionally 
situated to protect itself at the centre against 
threatened onslaught by western educated men from the 
South some of whom had openly declared their wish to
193. Sklar.R.L.(1963) Nigerian Political Partlas, Pow«r in an amargent African Nation 
(Princ«ton,N.J.) pp.-235-242.
194. ibid.
195. Padan,op.cit.l95 » Whitaker,op.cit.58-59.
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dismantle the emirate.196 Moreover, its position at the 
regional level was unassailable having been secured by a 
party established for that purpose.197
It was the manoeuvres for position and challenge to this 
entrenched position of the northern segment of the 
fractionalized national ruling class that led to the 
series of crises which brought the first republic down.198 
In the struggle for position and hegemony, diverse 
strategies, cleavages, and tactics have been used. During 
the period prior to independence and in the first 
republic, the most potent cleavage was ethnicity. It was 
used more in the South 199 and less by the major 
politicians in the North who rather employed the ideology 
of regionalism under the slogan of "Northernization".The 
latter served both the ideological needs of the emirates 
as well as the objective desire of Northern politicians 
to catch up with the south in development.200
The creation of states since the military putsch of 1966, 
from 12 in 1967 to the present 21 seems to have 
undermined ethnicity as a credible ideology by 
structurally releasing the minority groups from the real 
or perceived domination by bigger nationality groups
196. Awolowo.O.(1966) The People's Republic (Ibadan.Oxford Univ.Press) p.273.Awo opined that ‘education, modernization. .-will in time kill this (feudalism) evil.But we 
would considerably hasten its demise*.
197. Whitaker,op.cit.312-324.
198. Diamond: Class, Bthniclty.. op.clt.
199. Awolowo,op.cit.Cap. 10: Sandbrook.R.(1974) Proletariats and African Capitalism: The 
case of Kenya (Cambridge) p.n.
200. Paden, op. cit.314-343.
65
especially of the North. There are attempts to replace it 
with religion as will be considered below. But the point 
to note is that, the fact of military intervention to 
resolve intra-class struggles has brought in its train a 
shift in the pattern of class structure. 
l.J CLASS STROCTPRE, 1966 - 1989.
From 1966, the class situation has been described as "a 
triangular elite alliance"201 of the military, civil
service and various business groupings. with the
military as the dominant partner. Since then. it was the
latter who determined and enforced the economic.
political and constitutional agenda and also receiving a 
salary eight times the national average.202 in addition to 
elevating itself as the primus inter pares in the class 
order, because of its desire for the efficay of
political, economic and technical institutions, the role 
of bureaucracy was enhanced.203 Especially since General 
Gowons' post war policy of reconstructing and 
reconciling the nation, the hitherto marginalized 
managerial and professional stratum, became elevated.
Correspondingly, the relative position of the political 
class formally took a deep dive until between 1979 and 
1983 during the brief period of civil rule. It took an 
even deeper dive following the 1983 coup 204 * and
201. Turner,T.(1978) ‘Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup* In Pantar-Brick,K. ed. 
Soldlars and Olli the Political Transformation of Nigarla.(Prank Cass, London) 
P.166
202. Graf, Tha Nigerian Stata...op.clt.54.
203. Bianan, H.t ritton.M."Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants* in Pantar-Brick 
op.cit.27
204. Tha coup was part of tha intra-class tussle as it was hatched by a combination ofthe military,industrialists and politicians- Othman.S.(1984) ’Class, Crises and
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particularly after 1985 when the older generation of 
politicians have either been banned or disqualified from 
participating in any way, in Nigeria's future political 
affairs as will be discussed below. Finally, the 
ascendancy of the military has also had a major impact on 
the traditional power structure.The latter has been 
thought of as impeding the growth of a national economy 
and political system, requiring the generation of 
awareness away from primordial family and clan ties, 
etc.2”
Consequently, a major reform was lauched in 1976. But it 
was headed by a title holder, now the Sultan of Sokoto, 
the most revered traditional ruler in Nigeria. More over, 
most of the inputs were provided by the traditional 
rulers who were not expected to commit class suicide.206 
However, the reform partly and formally removed them from 
the formal structures of power by first replacing the 
Native Authorities with a system of local government 
constituted through direct elections. Eventually, the 
various Houses of Chiefs in the regions were abolished.
But the tenacity and duality in the evolution of this 
power group must be noted. Markovitz 207 urges us to
the Coup:the Demise of Shagari'a Regime" in 83 African Affairs 3331441-461. This 
view seems to be supported by the letter written on behalf of the Committee of 
Concerned Cltisens by Dr.Dattl Amed, "Our Pact with Awo" in Usman,Y.B.(1978) The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria,1977-87 (Vanguard, Kaduna.) pp.134-139.
205. Graf.The Nigerian State..» Panter-Brick,"Introduction" in Panter-Brick.ed.
a.clt.pp. 253-256» Cboyega,A .B.6 Oyediran.O."A View from Ibadan" in ibid,257-269» lyu,A.¥."As Seen In Kaduna" in ibid,pp.270-287.
207. Markovlts,I.L.(1977) Power and Class..op cit.p.158
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"distinguish the evolution of chiefs along two 
lines: as a pressure group-one among many 
others,such as the civil servants- and as ongoing 
elements of the ruling class- that is, not as one 
among many equally powerful competing interest 
groups but as the political ....arbitrators of 
society. As members of the latter dominant stratum, 
the chiefs might not exist as chiefs, for ruling 
might very well necessitate radical changes of 
appearance and expertise.What matters are not so 
much the formal instruments of power, but the 
relative position of dominance vis-a-vis other 
social strata".
This relative dominance is maintained through the use of 
some continuing resources, such as: (a) providing 
linkages between public authorities and the population 
effectively administered through district and village 
heads.(b) assistance in tax collection.(c) involvement in 
land allocation and administration especially in rural 
areas.(d) as patrons, confering titles on individuals in 
public or private sectors.208 For instance, in 1978, 6 of 
15 commissioners in Kano State were title holders showing 
the continued hold of the traditional institution over 
the social order and the coincidence of their interests.
The strength of their position is evidenced by the fact 
that the stability or otherwise of a regime in Nigeria 
seems to depend on the extent to which it coopts or 
marginalizes the interests of the traditional 
establishment. A regime that does the former has better 
chances for stability. For instance, an attempted coup in 
April 1990 cited as one of the reasons for the coup, the
208. Mavhood.p.(1983) "The place of Traditional Political Authority in African 
Pluralism'' in 31 Civilisations li209.
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non-appointment to the Sultanate of the son of the last 
Sultan.209
The preceding discussion has shown the relative shift in
the nature of the class system at the political and
constitutional levels.lt must now be complemented by a
brief account of the corresponding development at the
economic level to obtain a complete picture.
l.K.CLASS FORMATION AND CONSOLIDATION AT THE ECONOMIC 
LEVEL.
Between 1951 and 1966, the indigenous dominant class were 
noted as lacking internally generated wealth.210 The 
merchants could not make substantial economic foothold 
because colonialism mainly promoted foreign merchants. 
However, the greater participation of the local elites in 
government, introduced by the 1951 constitution, marked 
the begining of the growth of indigenous capital.For this 
purpose, the ideology and instruments used were 
indigenization, nationalization and now privatization.
Specifically, within the period, indigenes were 
preferentially assisted through award of contracts, tax 
reliefs and technical advice of varying kinds as well as 
various forms of collaboration with foreign firms.211 The 
main beneficiaries at this stage were the local private 
sector and the politicians. The source of funds for these 
schemes was the marketing boards established during the
209. Financial TiMi, Monday April 23, 1990 p.3
210. Graf,Tha Nigarian Stata..op. cit.pp.17-23.
211. Osoba.S."The Nigarian Powar Ellta..." in Gutkind and Watarman, op.olt.368-382
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war to stabilize trade but regionalized in 1954.212 The 
funds enabled the various governments to establish banks, 
finance and insurance companies, property,etc. But 
through these and other development agencies, loans were 
secured and purchases made in private companies which led 
to the situation where the affairs of these institutions 
were bound up with the party and leading politicians in 
power .21J
After 1968, funded by an increased revenue from oil, the 
government became heavily involved in the economy and 
industrialization to minimise the domination of the 
economy by foreign firms. Before that, a policy shift in 
favour of the indigenous class was heralded by the 
establishment of the Expatriate Quota Allocation Board.214 
It sought to indigenize the management of foreign owned 
or controlled enterprises.This was followed by the 
Companies Act 1968 which required the local incorporation 
of all foreign companies in business in Nigeria.
However the most profound policy shift and implementation 
was introduced through the Indigenization Decrees of 1972 
and 1977 in pursuance of the policy announced earlier
212. Nixon,R.N.(1970) "The Role of the Marketing Board* in the Political Evolution of 
Nigeria" in Richer,C.K. and Lledlom.C. eds, Growth and Development of the Nigerian 
Economy (Michigan State Univ.) pp.156-162; Helleiner,G.K. “The Fiscal Role of the 
Marketing Boards in Nigerian Economic Development" in ibid. pp.119-152.
213. ibid, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into allegations reflecting on 
the Official Conduct of the Premier of, and certain parsons holding ministerial and other pibllc offices in the Eastern Region of Nigeria,London,H.M.S.0.1957,Cmnd 
51i Diamond,L. "The Social Foundations of Democracy«The case of Nigeria",PH.D 
dissertation, Stanford Unlv.,1980,pp.556-582.
214. Rlmllnger.G.(1973) "The Indigenzation of Industry" 7 Quarterly Journal of 
Administration pp.205-215
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on.215 In the latter the government had declared its plan 
to acquire strategic industries, participate in and 
involve Nigerians in industrial development.The 
indigenization decrees required foreigners to relinquish 
shares wholly or partly in specified enterprises.21* To 
provide funding for the scheme, several financial 
institutions were established or strengthened.To 
complement this scheme the various governments but 
especially the federal, expanded the public sector. 
However, our interest in these developments, lies in the 
beneficiaries of the schemes.
Tom Forrest has shown that except the New Nigeria 
Development Company (NNDC), most of the parastatals and 
projects have not balanced their capital base let alone 
made profits 217.The various commissions of inquiry which 
investigated the assets of quite a number of them 
corroborate this fact.211 What emerged as a general 
pattern has been the conversion of board membership and 
distributorship of the institutions as sinecures and 
sources of patronage.This has been dispensed by those in 
control of or connected to the state machinery.That is, 
they have been means for the private accumulation of
21S. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National developaent Plan, 1970- 
197«.(Lagoa, 1970) p.289.
21«. Collins.». (1977) ‘Public Policy and the Developaent of Indigenoua Capitalism The Nigerian Saperlance* in XV Journal of Co— onwealth and Cooperative Politics,2il27- 
190.
217. Forrest, ‘State Capital, Capitalist...* In Lubeck,op.cit. 
21$. ibid.
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wealth through contracts, commissions, consultancy and 
corruption.219
With regards to indigenization, its beneficiaries are 
known to be si.In public companies, shares were bought by 
serving and ex-officials through savings but mainly loans 
secured for that purpose. Some of the loans were got 
through dubious methods.220 For instance,a Federal 
Commissioner was assisted by a company to acquire loans 
in a commercial bank with which he bought shares in the 
company. Numerous such cases are mentioned by Mohammed 
Ismaila and collusion of state officials with foreign 
firms by Biersteker .221
2.The beneficiaries in Kano State, represent a second 
category.222 There, some leading businessmen bought entire 
private enterprises. For instance, Alhaji S.Dantata-a 
beneficiary of middlemanship during colonial period, 
Alhaji I.Wada,etc. Others were state commissioners, 
members of the traditional ruling families, bureaucrats 
and those well connected in public or private sector 
employment. 3. Lagos presents a third group.223 The buyers 
were the foreign companies' major indigenous distributors 
or competitors.For instance, well known industrialists
219. ibid.
220. Mohammed Ismaila, The Nigerian Enterprises Decrees (1972 and 1977) and Indigenization in Nigeria, PH.D Thesis submitted to the Unlv. of Marwick, 1985, 
p.189.
221. ibid.184-190, Biesteker,T. J. (1983)'Indigent sat ion in Nlgeriai Renationalisation or 
Denationalization- Zartman,I.W.(ed.)in The Political Economy of Nigeria 
(Praeger,N.T.) 185-206.
222. Collins, -Public Policies..* op.cit.
223. ibid
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such as the Odutola Group, Chief Fajemirokun,etc. Some 
well connected ex-politicians and others in public and 
private sector also benefited.
Mention must be made of the lot of lower level workers. 
The 1977 Decree sought to remedy the "omission” in the 
earlier decree. Pursuant to the requirements of 
egalitarianism, 10% of the shares in a company were to be 
set aside for its workers, of which at least 50% must go 
to non- managerial staff. 224 But its implementation was 
"at best patchy and more usually either slight or non­
existent".225 26 However, their unawareness and non 
involvement in the exercise mediated any possibility of 
strike.
The preceding survey shows that the main beneficiaries 
were state officials, serving retired or dismissed; 
traditional rulers, military men, mostly retired or those 
connected to them and the foreign partners whose position 
became more entrenched.However, in spite of incentives to 
boost indigenous capital, the latter is still 
unproductive, corrupt, parochial and dependent on state 
for resources.224 Moreover, there is contradiction between
224. S.II(l)(d) Of The 1977 Decree.
225. Issaila, op.clt.p.241.
226. Karenin,0.(1988) "The Nigerian Stata as Process and Manager- in 20 Comparative 
Politics 2)215-232 i Patton, R.Jr.(1988) ■Bringing tha Ruling Class Back in 20 
Comparative Politics 3)253-264 » Bker,V.(1981) "On tha Origins of Corruption) 
Irregular incentives in Nigeria* in 19 Journal of Modern African Studies 1)173- 
182.
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the existence of a Nigerian bourgeoisie and absence of a 
"clear development of class based politics".227
This apparent contradiction has been explained in terms 
of the existence of "drone capitalists" who are able to 
satisfy their consummerist appetites from oil 
wealth.These factors prevent them from shifting to 
productive activities.22* It is within this context that 
President Babangida's economic policies must be 
understood as a class action and consolidation. Its major 
planks are the privatization and liberalization of the 
economy.
According to one school of thought 229 230, if the state 
relinquishes control of the economy, it would obviate the 
existence of a parasitic bourgeois class and facilitate 
its development outside the state arena. This in turn, 
will make unnecessary the "over politicisation of social 
life" and minimize the current high premium on political 
power.220 By contrast, another view urges the involvement 
of the masses as the means of controlling corrupt, 
fractious bourgeoisie.221
227. Joseph. R.A.(1983) 'Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria* in XXI Journal 
of Coamonwealth and Comparative Politics,.21-38 at31.
228. ibid p.26
229. Diamond (1988) 'Nigeria* ..op.clt.i Almond,*the Development of...* in Weiner and 
Huntington, op.cit.
230. Ake, Political economy of Nigeria, op.cit.
.Usman and Osoba,minority Constitution, op.cit.> Graf,W.(1989) "Issues and 
Substance in the Prescription of Liberal-Democratic Forms for Nigeria's Third 
Republic* in 88 African Affairs,350.» Onl.O. and Onlmode.B. eds(197S) Economic 
Development) The Socialist Alternative.(The Nigerian Academy of Arts.Sciencse and
Technology).
74
It is to be noted as will be seen in succeeding 
discussions that the nature and direction of the economy 
has hardly been a subject canvassed in constitution 
making in Nigeria. Following this tradition. President 
Babangida introduced economic programmes liberalising the 
economy. These involve the privatization and
commercialization of specified public enterprises 232 . 
Earlier curbs on foreign investment have also been 
eased.since 19 8 9.233 Finally, it is evident that the 
members of the dominant class fall into five broad 
categories with varying levels of strength among
themselves. They are the political class, top 
bureaucrats,military officers, traditional rulers, 
members of the professions and the management class in 
the private sector. 
l.L.Fusion of Elites.
The discussion has focussed on the internal
contradictions of the ruling class.But that does not 
necessarily imply they have kept apart.On the contrary, 
there has been a "fusion of elites"234 in the most crucial 
political, economic and ideology generating institutions 
and structures.They interact and identify their interests 
through diverse socializing processes. At the political 
level, Sklar has shown that the executives of the three 
major parties in the first republic and occupations of 
the parliamentarians were an amalgam of professionals,
232. Decree No.25-Privatisation and Coanerciallzatlon Dacraa 1988.
233. Financial Timas, Jan.17th, 1989.
234. Sklar,'Nature of Class..."op.clt. p.537.
75
educators and business men, 235 while the traditional 
rulers mediated and transferred its colonial role to the 
new partners at the unofficial dimension. 236 A not 
dissimilar pattern continued in the second republic.237
At the economic level, the fora for socialization and 
lobby are manifold. A number of organizations exist 
representing the interests of businessmen and 
professionals such as law, medicine, senior bureaucrats, 
accountancy, etc with opportunity for multiple 
membership as obtains in and connects them to capitalist 
systems. Examples are; the Manufacturers Association of 
Nigeria which was a major force behind the indigenization
exercises.238 Others are. the Nigeria Chamber of
Commerce;the Nigeria-America Chamber of Commerce; the
West African Chamber of Commerce, etc.
The boardroom of multinationals provide a major forum for 
the aspiration and interaction of the most influential of 
them as Appendix A(l-3) illustrates. Appendix A, Table 1 
shows former key top government officials taking up 
directorships/chairmanships in major MNCs after retiring 
or leaving the bureaucracies. Similarly, Appendix A, 
Table 2 illustrates the involvement of the nation's major 
traditional rulers with the MNCs largely as expected due
235. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parti*»..op.cit.482-486.
236. Ibid, cap.X >Pad*n, op. clt.pp.X78-219
237. Diamond,L.(1983) "Social Chang* and Political Conflict in Nig*rla'» Sacond Republic" in Zartman,X.W.ed.The Political Economy of Nigeria (Praagar N.Y.) pp.25- 
8«.
238. Mohammed Ismaila ,op.cit.319-320
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to the influence they could wield in securing the 
business in terms of patronage and security. On the other 
hand. Appendix A Table 3 is an illustration of how the 
various dominant groups including retired senior military 
officers converge in the boardroom of MNCs. The 
directorships are also constituted such as'to reflect the 
diversity of the state or ethnic origins of the 
contending elites to complement the requirement of 
federal character in the formal sector as we will see 
below.
At the ideology generating level, two institutions 
serve the purpose: the Institute of Management, Badagry, 
Lagos and especially the Nigerian Institute of Policy and 
Strategic Studies, Kuru-Jos. President Babangida
acknowledged this fact when he rightly noted that the 
"National Institute has served this country in the unique 
capacity of being at once ,the intellectual incubator, 
think tank and health farm. Annually, a group of senior 
mid-career military and police officers and chief
executives in both the public and private sectors come 
here, live together for almost one year learning 
together, analysing issues and policies, comparing notes 
and starting life long friendships". The role of 
government is to "create the conditions which will permit 
the development of a truly national elite". And "if its 
alumni are to succeed in carrying the whole nation with 
them, they must be able to embrace others who share with 
them common vision and ideas but who are not privileged
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to have attended the institute". Furthermore "in addition 
to widening the conceptual horizon of the elite, it 
should assist him to cultivate an international outlook, 
bearing in mind the fact that the fortunes of our country 
and those of the wider world have become intertwined".239
It is therefore quite clear that the Nigerian 
dominant class are quite conscious of their class 
position and because of their utility to each other, are 
determined to remove the contradictions which undermined 
their political unity. In conclusion, in the analysis of 
class politics in constitution making in Nigeria, Beard's 
category of "fluid capital" in the U.S.A.is similar to 
the upper crust of federal and state public services and 
the armed forces. Their economic background lies less in 
share acquisitions (although an important factor as well 
) than in directorships and the sale of consultancy 
services.240 This means, these groups may continue to 
dominate the process, maintain colonially created 
structures with cosmetic reforms to further reconcile 
their historically competing interests and evolve a 
system of accountability which allows only one segment of 
the dominant groups to oversee the acts of another 
without linkage to the wider public.
239. Speech by Preaidant Babangida at NIPSS, op.clt.
240. Riamr.D. Economic Implications ot the Hew Constitution. Conference on the Hew 
Higerian Constitution 3rd June 1909 p.S
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CHAPTER TWO.
2. BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTION MAKING, 1862-1967.
The preceding chapter sought to introduce the criteria
for determining as well as identifying the dominant 
interest groups which existed in Nigeria during colonial 
rule and at the various phases of constitutional and 
economic development in the post independence era.
This chapter seeks to highlight the background thinking 
insofar as it existed and is accessible, to the various 
constitutions or constitutional attempts within the 
period 1862-1967. The idea is to provide a link between 
two separate schools of writings covering the period
using official data to which most of them lacked access. 
The first of the two main strands adopts a historical
perspective to discuss the wider question of whether and 
when Britain had an official policy with regards to
decolonization.1 The second thrust is represented by those 
who follow the common law tradition of concentrating on 
the juridical aspect of constitutional and political 
developments with little regard to the underlying 
influences.2 Similarly, there is a general assumption and 
assertions by the latter group of writers that the 1951 
Constitution was the product of widespread consultation
1. Th» discussions in this area art vast and bewildering.But tha colonial offic# 
thoughts ara opanad up In i Pearce, R.D.(1982) Tha Turning Point In Africa.
British Colonial Policy 1938-1948. (Prank Cass. London); Nordman, R.C.(1976) 
Praluda to Dacolonisation in west Africa: tha Davalopmant of British Colonial 
Policy, 1938-1947. unpublished Ph.D thesis, Oxford.; Morris-Jones. w.H.t Fischer, 
C. ads (1980) Decolonisation and After, tha British and French Bxparlanca (Frank 
Cass, London).
2. Tha main writings in this raspact ara: Odumosu.O.I.(1963) Tha Nigerian 
Conatitution, History and Developawnt (Sweat t Maxwell.London); Esra,K.(1960) 
Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge Unlv.Press, London);Elias,T.O. (1967) Tha Developaient of Its Laws and Constitution; Nwabuese,
B.0.(1982) A Constitutional History of Nigeria (C.Hurst. London)
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which began at the grassroots level, thus departing from 
its predecessors following - the declarations of colonial 
officials to this effect. It is also assumed that the 
nationalists at the time provided important inputs in 
shaping the fundamental structures of that and subsequent 
constitutions leading to independence. Irf the following 
discusions, a more realist picture of what transpired 
would be shown using evidence from official records to 
which earlier writers had no access. The objective is to 
show that there was neither a real widespread 
consultation nor serious inputs from the nationalists on 
the basic structures of the constitutions from 1951, the 
period when the principle of consultation was adopted as 
a policy by the colonialists.
Another objective of this chapter yet again is to show 
that constitution making within the period covered was in 
fact mainly for the benefit of one or the other or a 
combination of the dominant interests, with the majority 
of Nigerians and the issues that concerned them remaining 
marginal. References to the people were mainly for 
legitimating purposes.
The rather large period can be divided into three 
phases.The first part, 1862-1946, covers the period of 
colonial consolidation with little or no regard to the 
possibility of self rule to the colonies.Constitutional 
developments were the single handed experiments of the 
governors in the field.The second phase, 1947-1960 
involved rapid constitution making following the decision
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to décolonisé and which necessarily brought in the 
Colonial Office.The final phase represented the stage 
when the fragile colonial arrangements were sought to be 
internalized, albeit vainly.
2.A.THE GOVERNORS' CONSTITUTIONS, 1862-1946.
British administration in Nigeria was established in 1861 
by virtue of occupation, a recognised principle of 
international law following a cession Treaty between 
Docemo, king of Lagos and his officials on the one hand 
and British officials on the other.The area covered by 
the treaty comprised the Port and Island of Lagos.3 
Following it, a colonial government was set up under 
Letters Patent4 by virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts 
of 1843 and 1890.It appointed a governor, a small 
advisory Executve Council comprising the main British 
officials in the field and a legislative council with 
composition similar to the executive council.5
Subsequently, the Settlement of Lagos was converted to a 
Colony6 and as further series of treaties were concluded 
with the chiefs in the interior, a Colony and 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria emerged in 1906.7
3. Before this date, it was ruled from Gold Coast by virtu* of th* Letters Patent of 
24th January. 1850.
4. 13th January. 1862.
5. They were th* colonial secretary, the senior military officer In charge and any 
other person whose advice the governor needed-the Royal Instructions to th* 
Governor of 13th March,1862.
6. Letters Patent, 13th January,1886.
7. Letters Patent of 13th January,1906.
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Correspondingly, -an earlier— Royal Charter granted to the 
National African Company limited to administer the 
Northern part of Nigeria was revoked and the British 
government took over its direct administration with 
effect from 1 Jauary, 1900-8
The principal agencies for British administration were 
the Governors in Council in the Colonies and High 
Commissioners in the Protectorates.The theoretical 
differences in form lie in the legal instrument 
conferring on them a constitutional basis-an Order in 
Council for a Protectorate, Letters Patent and Royal 
Instructions to the Governor in the case of a Colony.9 An 
important implication of the difference is that a 
Governor in Council was expected to be restrained by the 
devices embodied in the essentials of the British 
constitution, for instance, the rule of law, separation 
of powers,etc.A protectorate, because it was a newer 
device did not have those warnings and safeguards against 
absolute rule.10
However, in the inter war years and generally in
practice, the distinction was blurred as initiatve and 
policy rested in the governor and the High Commissioner 
alike.There were several reasons for this.First, in this 
period the colonial office had no guiding principles for 
colonial administration similar to the Durham Report,
8. Northern Nigeria Order In Council. 1899.
9. Nlcolmon, I.P.(1969) The Administration of Nigeria. 1900-1960. Men, Methods and 
Myths (Clarendon Press. London).
10. ibid. p.35
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1839 by which self goverment could be devolved on white 
settlers whenever practicable.11 African policy was the 
preserve of colonial governments with the secretary of 
state exercising supervision only. Secondly, having 
extended the principles of Trusteeship12 to other Afican 
dependencies, the colonial officials became concerned 
only with administration rather than government and 
consistent with it strengthened indirect rule13.The latter 
was the British practice by which it ruled through the 
Native Authorities administered by the traditional 
rulers.
It was within this atmosphere of absence of articulated 
official policy that the colonial governors were left to 
their own devices especially in the inter war period. In 
keeping with this freedom of initiative, two important 
policy decisions adopted and concretized regarding the 
territory now comprising Nigeria formed the nuclei around 
which its constitutional development continued to 
spin.These were the adoption of indirect rule with its 
four pillar structure and the amalgamation of the two 
regions in 1914 as a country-all accomplished by Lord 
Lugard who became the Governor-General of the merged 
territories.14
XI. Through It.eh* Cap« Colony became self governing in 1872, Natal in 1893 and 
Southern Rhodesia in 1923. See Pearce, op. cit.p. 4
12. Art. 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations justified the occupation ofpeoples unsettled by the world war IX under the pretext and Injunction that the 
well being of such peoples fore a sacred trust of civilisation.
13. Pearce, op. cit.p.7.
14. Indirect rule as a general principle of administration was not invented by Lugard, 
but its application to Northern Nigeria was. Perhae, ( 1960). LUGARD. the Years of 
Authority 1S98-194S (Collins. London) p.142. The four pillars were l.the Native
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2.A.1 BACKGROUND TO THE AMALGAMATION OF NIGERIA.
Until 1 January, 1914, 15 the two major segments of 
Nigeria were administered separately.However, the return 
of Lugard changed all that. His initial appointment as 
the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria was not a 
merely fortuitous appointment, but rather a clear sighted 
placement of a specialist to perform a specific role. It 
was mainly the result of pressure exerted by the
Lancashire Chambers of Commerce between 1890-1910 
concerned with the need for emphasis for the development 
of trade, communications and health in West Africa 16.It 
was not therefore surprising that upon his return to 
Nigeria these were the issues which pre-occupied him
most.
In a memorandum to the secretary of state,17 Lugard
outlined the reasons for his wish to merge the
administrations of the two regions.But it is to be noted 
that the necessity of merger was not original to Lugard. 
Before him. Morel 18 had made a case for it. It was 
however the former who had the power and the opportunity 
to accomplish it. First, according to Lugard, the
policies of the two administrations were 
divergent.Whereas the North had a native policy
implemented through the native chiefs and whose aim was
15. Th# merger date was agreed upon to allow (or departaiental restructuring and the 
consolidation of official Instruments,etc- CO 583/5/32311 minute, Lugard to 
Harcourt of 16/9/1913.
16. Nicolson, op. cit.p. 27.
17. CO 583/5/16460, ENCL.I Lugard to the secretary of state.
18. Morel, E.D.(1911), Nigeria, Its Peoples and Its Problems (Smith, Elder 6 co, London) pp. 187-193.
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primarily administrative, that of the South was 
commercial and directed essentially to the development of 
natural resources and trade. Consequently, there were no 
common laws or Gazettes. Again, the two administrations 
had no sympathy for one another.For instance, despite 
direct taxation, the North was starved of funds while the 
South, without such oppressive taxation had sufficient 
money to spend on development projects and those "not of 
paramount urgency". The North could not balance its 
budget and the British tax payer had to pay for even the 
barest necessities of administration.
The economic buoyancy of the South was secured through 
custom and excise duties on imports through the coast, 
and the exploitation of its natural resources. Finally, 
the administrations differed in their railway policies 
resulting in unnecessary, wasteful competition instead of 
complementing one another.
Having outlined the reasons for the merger, the 
constitutional and administrative structure he proposed 
were not signifiant departures from the previous 
arrangement.Thus, as an official noted, the great 
advantage of the scheme was that it was for 
administrative purposes which "involve little change from 
the pre-amalgamation arrangements and can modified or 
developed at any time as circumstances require".19
19. Minuta by Harcourt to Lugard on 2/9/1913..
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But the following change« may be noted.First, the 
existing legislative counci'l with responsibility for the 
colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria was confined 
to Lagos. The original aim was to reduce it to a 
municipality without doing it formally to avoid public 
protests 20. A Nigerian Council was proposed to comprise 
officials and unofficials (those not directly employed in 
government most of whom were European businessmen in 
Nigeria and cooperative local notables in chieftaincy, 
the professions and business) from the colony and 
protectorate but without any executive, legislative or 
financial authority.lt was a debating society which an 
official thought should be constituted by a separate 
instrument to avoid amendments to Orders in Council as he 
saw a bleak future for it.21
Lugard had earlier on described as "insuperable” the 
obstacles to creating a legislative council with 
unofficial representation. These were: In regards to the 
Europeans, the more important heads of firms resided 
outside Lagos and in fact doubted if such mere paid 
agents/clerks could be considered true representatives of 
commercial interests in Liverpool.Further, due partly to 
poor transport system, they would suffer loss of time in 
having to attend meetings.
In relation to the native members, the difficulties were 
even greater.1 The emirs could not speak English 2.They
20. COSB3/3/164601 Command by tha chiaf sacracary on 21/6/1913
21. CO 583/6/28338, alnuta by Rislay, on 17/9/1913.
86
could not leave their emirates where they engaged in 
actual administration to attend meetings.3 The emirs were 
in acute divergence in religion and social status from 
the natives of the coast with whom they would mingle.4 He 
doubted the utility of the contributions of the educated 
natives in view of the Lagos experience where they spent 
time opposing each other's views in the council.5 
Finally, "it is a cardinal principle of British colonial 
policy that the interests of a large native population 
shall not be subject to the will either of a small 
European merchant class or of a small minority of 
educated and Europeanized natives who have nothing in 
common with them and whose interests are often opposed to 
theirs".22 For these reasons, the emirs in the North were 
shielded, educated elements and representatives of 
commerce, both Europeans and local agents were alienated 
from the constitutional structure.
The scheme that emerged from Lugard's constitutional 
engineering was nebulous and regarded as partly 
temporary. 23 However, the ambiguity notwithstanding, he 
evinced concern for unity, hence he recommended the terms 
"Northern and Southern Provinces (newly introduced in the 
South) to avoid confusion and hasten the demise of 
jealousy between the two regions as previous names tended 
to retain the previous identities".24
22. CO 593/5/16460, »CL.2, Report by tha Governor on 15/5/1913.
22. CO 593/3/16460, conanti by tha C.8. of 21/6/1913.
2«. CO 593/5/36162 of 1/10/1913-Nlnuta, Lugard to Harcourt.
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Immediately after the merger, the public debts of both 
administrations were fused to create a central charge 
together with their reserve funds and financial year.The 
railway and harbour projects were pursued with vigour. 
But on the whole the reform injured the feelings of the 
European commercial class and the few edûcated elements 
in the coast. It was left to the succeeding governor to 
assuage or inherit and retain such ill-feelings.
2.A.2 THE CLIFFORD CONSTITUTION, 1922.
After Lugard's retirement in 1919, Sir Hugh Clifford 
succeeded him as the governor. It is generally agreed 
that during most of the inter war, Britain's policy of 
indifference to the future constitutional development of 
the colonies continued and initiative for most of the 
time resided with the men in the field.
In spite of Sir Hugh Clifford's aristocratic background,2* 
he was at odds with indirect rule whose motive he noted 
was the preservation of the traditional society and 
maintenance of the prestige of the British political 
officers.26 * He also saw the amalgamation as a matter of 
convenience for Lugard and economy for Britain, which 
explains the absence of a mechanism for co-ordinating 
institutions from the centre. At the same time, he held 
the educated Africans in low esteem, especially the
25. Callay, H.A.(1971) -Sir Hugh Clifford 1866-1941* In Conn. L.H.t Duignan.P.eds African Proconsul»! European Governor! In Africa (The Free Preaa. London.) p.209.
26. Clifford in Cookey.J.S. (1980) "Sir Hugh Clifford as Governor
Evaluation* 79 African Affairs pp.531-S47 at 539.
of Nigerlai An
concept of the few ruling the mass of the peoples of the 
interior without the sanction of traditional authority.27
But he desired an institution through which African 
opinion and information might be sought.Hence, the Lagos 
Town Council was reorganized on an elective basis.
Lugard's Nigerian Council was soon as predicted replaced 
with a Legislative Council which according to Sir Hugh, 
was to satisfy legitimate aspirations as well as 
fulfilling useful and practical purposes.28 Further_more, 
a limited franchise was introduced by which Lagos and 
Calabar were to elect three and one members to the
Legislative Council, respectively. But the qualifications 
for both voters and contestants were so heavily
circumscribed that only about three in forty or one in 
ten adult males could vote in Lagos and Calabar
respectively.29 The qualifications ranged from property or 
gross income of £100 to non conviction for specified
offences which generally related to offences against the 
state 30- a device for keeping in check political
agitators who were in any case few at the time. But on 
the motive of the franchise, Clifford noted that although 
it offered "the most fundamental extension of 
responsibility to educated Nigerians before world war
27. Galley op. cit.
26. Despatch, Clifford to S.S.on 7/2/1922.
29. Elia», T.O.,(1967) Nigeria, the Development of it» Law* and Constitution 
(Clarendon, Stevens.) p. 48.
30 ibid. pp.33-48.
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II... It was not done Cor ideological reasons, but simply 
to improve the workings of Nigerian Government".31
For the same end, the European business community were 
brought into the constitutional fold through a system of 
nominations into the Council.In retrospect, he espoused 
the point in a frank talk to the business community in 
Lagos. He said:"I regard it as essential that the 
commercial and banking members of the Legislatve Council 
should be consulted on all matters affecting economic and 
mercantile interests, and that as far as possible, they 
should be taken frankly and freely into the confidence of 
the government concerning all such questions and with 
regard to its policy and its management of the public 
finances of the dependency".32
However, the limited constitutional reforms were crippled 
by three factors. The Colonial Office in London had 
serious reservations regarding the criticism of the 
highly functional indirect rule and would not allow its 
reform as yet.Second, there was no reason to suggest that 
the circumstances which led to indirect rule, that is 
shortage of staff and economy of colonialism had 
changed.Third, it is doubtful if Clifford actually 
desired a fundamental restructuring of the system.Rather 
his concern was to enhance efficiency for colonial ends, 
as he disclosed to the European business community. 
Moreover, there was no serious political agitation at
31. Clifford In Cailay, op. cit.p.285.
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this stage to force concessions .The few who complained 
for positions in the colonial hierarchy were in fact 
lacking in any serious political base hence Clifford had 
no qualms in dismissing them as a "self selected and self 
appointed congregation of African gentle men.." when 
they clamoured, inter alia, for greater representation in 
the Legislative Council.33 But the scheme he introduced 
ensured that henceforth, the relationship between 
nationalism and colonialism would be regulated by 
constitutional change.34 *
Between Clifford's and the next major constitutional 
experiment-Richards ' of 1946, there was a long lull.Two 
succssive governors-Sir Donald Cameron and Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon governed in the prelude to and during the 
crises and the dislocations of the second world war, 
consequently had little opportunity for constitution 
making.But their views on the great issues, that is, the 
position of the native authorities and the mode of making 
concessions to the increasingly vocal educated men, were 
constantly avowed.
In particular, the views expressed by Bourdillon provide 
the insights and thoughts behind the Richards' 
constitution of 1946, echoing the changing local and 
international climate, the development of colonial policy
33 Colaman, J.11.(1963) Nigeria. Background to Nationalisa (Unlv. of California 
prass,Berkeley) p.191.
34. Pearce begins the period of such regulation from 1935- Pearce, R.0.(1981)
'Governors, Nationalists and Constitutions in Nigeria, 1915-51* in 9 Journal of
Imperial History, pp.289-307.
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in general and its translation into action via the 
constitution in Nigeria.
2.A.3 BACKGROUND TO THE RICHARDS' CONSTITUTION, 1946
Between the years 1938-1943, the idea to decolonise
Africa had begun to take shape with increasing
elaboration. It is however outside the scope of this work 
to inquire into the factors that led to the decision.35 
But it set off a deliberate process of decolonization 
using the constitution as the main mechanism. At the same 
time, the manner in which the constitution was introduced 
stoked the already tense relationship existing between 
the educated Nigerians and imperialism.36 The significance 
of the procedure was underpinned by Governor Bourdillon's 
earlier promise that Nigerians would be consulted on any 
constitutional proposals put forward.37
Two central problems were identified as the fundamental 
obstacles that must be met in the constitutional 
evolution.38 First, was the geographic size and the 
demographic heterogeneity of the country which 
necessarily required a great deal of constitutional 
novelty. Second, and more acute was the need to avoid a
35 The factors arc examined ini Pearce, op. clt.i Flint, J.(1983) “Plannad
Decolonization and its Pallura In British Africa* 82 African Affairs, 328-412; 
Call, J.w.(1980) "On tha Eve of Decolonisation; the Colonial Of flea's Plans for 
the transfer of Power in Africa. 1947* in 3 Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 3(234-257.
36. Flint views the relationship as one of 'close harmony and cooperation*- Flint,
J,E.(1981) 'Governor versus Colonial Office; An Anatomy of the Richards 
Constitution for Nigeria, 1939-1945* Historical Papers/Communications, Canadian 
Historical Association, pp.l2S-143.
37 Sir Bernard Bourdillon was the governor of Nigeria between 1939-1945. CO 
583/261/30560-Note of discussion with Bourdillon, 2/7/1943.
38 Bourdillon, (1939) Memorandum on the Future Political Developmenmt of Nigeria. 
(Gov. Printer, Lagos). CO 583/244/10481, pp 8-6.
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bifurcation between the conservative and less educated 
(in western education) indirect rulers mainly of the 
North and the so-called detribalized, semi-Europeanized 
intelligentsia largely based in the South. The shape of 
constitutional reform henceforth, unlike before would 
depend on the judgements of the colonial service and the 
colonial office whose views were at times divergent, if 
not conflictual, on both the philosophy and method of 
reform. That is, whether reform was to be mainly through 
the Native Authorities (N.A.) or to jettison the latter 
and evolve positive partnership with and promote the 
educated elements.This set the tone and purpose of 
constitutional development of Nigeria including the post 
independence period as we shall see.
Sir Bernard Bourdillon was unequalled in his agitation 
for reforms that would coopt Africans in government. The 
overall idea was to anticipate nationalism, direct and 
control it through reforms such that any changes 
introduced would be viewed as an act of generosity rather 
than an inevitable surrender to pressure.39 However his 
persistence and outright "beg to be allowed to prepare a 
draft despatch"40 did not appeal to Oliver Stanley, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Bourdillon's 
position was weakened by the fact that he was about to 
leave the office, and it was thought that such a despatch 
should come from the in-coming governor- Arthur Richards.
39 Ibid, (1942) Further Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria 
(Lagos).
«0. CO SS]/241/30S3,Sourdlllon to Stanley . 3/7/1943.
93
Bourdillon could however write a confidential memorandum 
embodying his ideas which he did.41
First, the underlying principle of constitutional 
development would be guided by "slow growth and gradual 
development" maintained through indirect rule, 
fortunately uncomplicated by the absence of alien 
population.42 Secondly, the mechanism would be a royal 
commission that would tour Nigeria and invite public 
opinion on the proposals as he promised. Specifically, 
Bourdillon's proposals were to meet four objectives. The 
Legislative Council was to be widened to provide a link 
with the N.A. and through it the educated elements and 
peasant producers. By this means the N.A. and elective 
principle would complement each other. Similarly, the 
North which hitherto was not represented in the central 
legislature, although the latter provided for its budget, 
would be brought into its fold. He sought to blur the 
distinction between official and unofficial members of 
the legislative council. Unofficial majority was resisted 
in the past because it negates the principle of good 
government, that is, power without responsibility. 
Moreover, the governor could frustrate such unofficial 
majority through the use of his reserve and discretionary 
powers to override them.
41 CO SS3/261/30S60 Stanley to Bourdlllon, 10/7/1943.
43. ■ourdillon, 'Memorandum on th«..* op. cit.p.2
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To overcome this difficulty# there would be an unofficial 
majority at the centre but to be elected mainly through 
Regional Councils# itself constituted by the N.A.s who 
hold positions of responsibility. Again# since they would 
be directly affected by a large part of the decisions in 
which they partook, they were unlikely to form a 
permanent opposition. The base of the central council was 
also to be widened by the inclusion of representatives 
of special interest groups such as transport owners, 
produce traders, tin miners# etc together with the usual 
European members representing shipping and commerce.
At the regional level# a Regional Council was to be 
established which together with the central council would 
make the views of the mass of people in the provinces 
more readily available to the government. Its composition 
would be determined on the basis of a hierarchy of 
village, district, divisional and provincial councils# 
(in effect the N.A.s) consistent with Hailey’s report of 
1941.
Bourdillon's proposals were received in the colonial 
office with a mixture of scepticism and criticism. First, 
the procedure he sought# that is the use of royal 
commission provided no guarantee that the commission 
would recommend what the government desired.43 In regard 
to its substance, the main criticism was that it provided 
little for the educated elements. It widened 
representation to include the N.A.s who did not ask for
43 Plint, "Governor varaui...* op. cit.p.131.
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it but denied it to the educated people who did.44 As 
Bourdillon's proposals did not wholly appeal to the 
colonial office, it became the lot of his successor. Sir 
Arthur Richards to introduce another bearing to the 
experiment.
Sir Arthur Richards was appointed governor of Nigeria 
when there was a flood of activities in the colonial 
office following the anouncement of policy on Africa. 
After a frosty exchange with A.B.Cohen and Stanley in the 
colonial office regarding the directions and emphasis of 
reform, Richards was given the go ahead to prepare 
constitutional proposals. The latter, when produced, 
turned out to be modifications of Bourdillon's proposals 
cast through the lens of Lugard with whom he maintained 
constant touch to the dislike of the colonial office.45
In Richards' scheme, the central council would be 
composed differently. Each Regional Council would 
nominate a prescribed number of members: the North,8 
shared equally between a new House of Chiefs and 
Assembly. The west,3 ;the east,4 and Lagos,2. The 
governor would nominate a member for the Cameroons, 2 
Chiefs for the West and 3 Europeans to produce an 
unofficial majority, including the Europeans. The 
hitherto circumscribed franchise for Lagos and Calabar 
was omitted.Regional Councils were to be constituted
4« CO S83/261/30453. Not« on Bourdillon’s proposals., by Parkinson, oct. 1943» Ibid, 
Memorandum by A.B.Cohen, 14/10/1943.
45 Flint, ’governor versus..* op. cit.p.131.
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through nomination by the ttiA.s three years after but to 
be temporarily done by the governor. The North had a 
second chamber- the House of Chiefs with a final vote on 
budget and other Bills. In each region there was a tenous 
unofficial majority, one above the official.
In view of the new thinking in the colonial office, it 
was no surprise that most officials received it with 
bewilderment and cynicism.46 The various objections of the 
colonial office can be crstallized into three but the 
common theme was "presentation".47 At the time of his 
proposals, it was an election year in Britain, hence, 
Stanley desired a scheme that would look progressive and 
acceptable to the British public. Specific areas of 
difficulty were as follows. First, it was important to 
concede a complete African unofficial majority, however 
marginal, in all the legislative houses. Second, at the 
least, the highly limited franchise must be retained if 
it was not improved upon. Finally was the problem of 
meeting Bourdillon's committment regarding consultation 
which was not considered. Later, he thought it could be 
fulfilled through a special meeting with the Emirs in the 
North, more important chiefs in the West and for the 
East, to speak informally with the unofficial members in 
the Legislative Council.4*
46 Various minutas and rna mo by Cohan, Hallay,ate in CO $83/286/30453. 
«7 ibid.
48. ibid, Notas of a naatlng hald on 2/11/1944.
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On all the issues raised, modest concessions were 
extracted from him in London. Even so, his draft when 
presented needed "drastic re-arrangement" and 
modifications to redirect the philosophy of the reform 
from its reactionary to a progressive look.49 It was also 
important to make it look even-handed. For instance a 
longish statement espousing democracy in Islam and by 
implication, the emirates which claim to be based on it, 
was replaced with one that one sought to promote the 
unity of Nigeria; provide adequately within that unity 
for the diverse elements which make up the country; and 
to secure greater participation by Africans in the 
discussion of their own affairs.50 This work, refined 
substantially in the colonial office was published as 
command and sessional papers in Britain and Nigeria 
respectively.51
The reactions in Nigeria as expected was mixed. The 
objection from the South, especially the N.C.N.C.52 was 
sharp and opportunistic in contrast to the more measured 
but critical views of the former leaders of the N.Y.M.5J. 
On the whole, the grounds of criticism pivoted on the 
procedure and substance of the proposal. The former 
because Bourdillon's earlier promises had raised
49. Hint "Governor versus * op. cit.
50. These ara widely used as tha catch phrasas of tha Richards' Constitution.
SX Cmd.6599, Proposals for tha Ravision of tha constitution of Nigeria, 1945, 
Sessional Papar No.4 of 1945.
52. Tha National Council of Nigeria and tha Cameroons lad by Or. Nnamdi Azikiwe.
S3 Nigeria Youth Movement, one of tha pioneer parties in Nigeria.
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expectations and the latter, despite the embellishments, 
was less favourable to the educated elements.
Apart from these the N.C.N.C. seized upon the occasion to 
denounce some ordinances proclaimed over a long period, 
most of which dealt with nationalization of land in 
Northern Nigeria and restrictions on acquisition of 
native lands in both regions whose primary objective was 
to secure for the state, its rents but with the indirect 
effect of minimizing unbridled plunder by the commercial 
firms.54 On his part, Awolowo was content to point out 
that "it retains some of the objectionable features of 
the old, contains unsavoury characteristics of its own 
and falls short of expectations".55 But the often noted 
complaint was one made by H. 0. Davies one of the major 
politicians of the time where he criticised the provision 
which only allowed Nigerians the "discussion" and not 
"participation" in the running of the country's affairs.56
The divergence in reactions were more notable in the 
North. As expected since reforms would strengthen their 
hands by giving them more formal powers, the Emirs hardly 
said anything. On the side of the progressive educated 
men of the North, Imam's article is instructive.57 * He 
raised the fundamental question of the mode of filling
s7! Irving, Forthsytl), R.(1916) Titles to Land in Nigaria (Stevens, London).iSir Percy 
Girouard,(1907) Memoranda on Land Tenure and Land Revenue Assessment in Northern 
Nigeria.
55 J.O.Awolowo, who latterly became the leader of one of the three aujor regionally 
based parties.Ouoted in K. Ezra, op. cit.p.77.
56. Cited by all the authors in fn.l
57 Abubakar imam, ’Nigerian Constitutional Proposals* in African Affairs, January,1946.He subsequently became the leader of opposition in Northern Mouse of Assembly
In 1959.
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the northern quota in the central legislature -whether 
they would simply be appointed by the Emirs or not. 
Second, he wished that real opportunities should be 
created for the educated men of the north. Third, he 
noted that the N.A. system was closed to the common man 
and minorities hence, advocated a system where their 
voice could be heard. Finally, that since imperialism had 
removed any previous safeguard (if one existed) against 
oppression and selfishness of the emirates, it became 
imperative to provide for it in the constitution. It was 
in fact this article and partly W.A.S.U.58 that provided 
criticism and serious alternative suggestions on future 
constitutional developments, from the nationalists.
There was little to suggest that criticisms from Nigeria 
were considered in the final analysis, the claims of 
Creech-Jones to this effect notwithstanding.59 Rather, 
subsequent changes were in fact concessions made to 
Creech-Jones, the Labour Party's main colonial critic and 
in view of the impending election. Consequently, the 
franchise requirements for Lagos and Calabar were reduced 
from £100 to £50. Official representation was reduced and 
representation of members of commerce was modified to 
provide nominations for interests "not otherwise 
represented".60 This all party rapport ensured that a 
change of government in 1945 did not result in a further
58 West African Students Union-thelr criticism and suggestions publishad in tha Wast 
African Review, Juna, 1945, pp 103-109.
59 Craach-Jonas (Sacratary of Stata for tha Colonies under Labour party succeeding 
0.8tanley) in Hansard,1945-46, vol.416, pp.159-16?.
60 CO 583/286/30453, Stanley to Creech-Jonas, 23/6/1945.
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review of the proposal.In the same vein,it had earlier on 
received a unanimous approval in the Legislative Council 
in Nigeria.
The 1946 constitution therefore departed from its
predecessors mainly in the active involvement of the
colonial office and the definite attempt to give it a
progressive face. But in terms of the beneficiaries, the
same thread runs through them all, the traditional rulers 
via their organ, the N. A.s.It may also be noted that the 
various constitutions so far have derived little 
influence from within Nigeria in determining their 
principles, shape and directions. We shall see whether 
and how far this trend will be maintained or discontinued 
in succeeding stages.
2.B.THE MACPHERSON CONSTITUTION, 1951: CHANGE OR 
CONTINUITY?
The imposition of the Richards constitution and its 
deficiencies sparked off intense political activities in 
Nigeria. The element of regionalism it introduced and the 
political activities especially in the South engendered 
anxiety in the North. Also, it led to greater feuds 
between the Ibo and Yoruba elites in the South leading 
eventually to the emergence of the Action Group to 
represent Yoruba interests.61 The political atmosphere in 
Nigeria henceforth became less congenial to the leisurely
CO 537/3556/307727. Nigerlai Political Summaries, 15/12/1948.Asikiwe had to call 
in tha S.S.a C.S to intarcada in the disputa between hla group and the emergent 
Xoruba group-lgbe Orno Oduduva.The troubla * extend» only to the educated elements and the uneducated labourera, whether Voruba or Ibo, are little attested by it • 
noted the report.
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evolutionary constitutional-progress the colonial office 
had hoped for.62
Correspondingly, 1947 onwards represented a period when a 
new group of democratizers took over in the colonial 
office.They were built around the archetypical anti- 
Lugard Andrew Cohen and his Labour minister and friend, 
Arthur Creech-Jones, the duo bent on restructuring 
indirect rule.61 By this date the colonial office had 
concretized its thoughts with specific reform proposals 
for self government.
The constitutional aspect of it was unfolded during an 
African Governors Conference in 1947.64 The plan broadly 
envisaged an accretion of responsibility to unofficials 
in the executive, widening of the electoral system and a 
progressive transfer of power to Nigerians on a 
parliamentary model. However, the entire plan predicated 
on two important and one less important, reforms.The 
former were the Africanization of the civil service, and 
the democratization of the N.A.by its conversion into
62. Robinson,R."Sir Andraw Cohan:Proconsul of African Nationalisa,1909-1968 • ' In Dan 
a Dulqnan,op.cit.359-262t Bowdan.J.H.(1980) Davalopnant and Control in Brltlah 
Colonial Policy, with rafaranca to Nigoria and tha Cold Coast,1935-1948. 
unpublishad PH.D thasis,Univarsity of Birainghaa.
6). A. Cohan was haad of tha African Division in tha colonial offica, 1946-51.-
Robinson, R. ‘Sir Andraw Cohan: proconsul of African Nationalisa, 1909-1968* in 
Can and Duignan op. cit.3S3-362.
64. CO 847/36/47238/1 (47),A.G.C.2 on tha confaranca papars.
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local governments.65 The latter was economic progress 
within the colony.“
It was within this period o£ activity that Macpherson 
wrote to Cohen that he and his chief commmissioners had 
completed discussions on inter alia, constitutional 
reform in Nigeria.*7 The overall objective was twofold. 
First, to give the Regional Houses increased autonomy, 
legislative and financial powers envisaged to strengthen 
rather weaken the unity of Nigeria. Second, to give 
unofficial members of the legislative council greater 
part in policy formulation and responsibility for 
departments. The relationship of N.A. to the legislature 
and the position of chiefs would be determined according 
to each region which would be given the opportunity to 
express their wishes and the course to follow.
He emphatically stated that it was not to be an official 
plan but rather to serve two purposes. To acquaint the 
officials with official thinking so that they can "give 
some unofficial guidance to the public debate at all 
levels, which we are anxious to encourage". Also to allay 
officials' fears that the colonial office was caving in 
to "talkative" politicians. Although the essence of the 
reform was to establish a measure of collaboration with
65. A.Creech-Jones,"The ruci of African Local Administration In Colonial Policy* In 
3-6 Journal of African Administration, I pp 3-6. i Call, * On th Cvs of..‘op. 
clt.p.23
66. This follows tha embracing of trustaashlp mora seriously following tha World 
Colonial Chartar-saa Cad.666, Coaaantay on world Colonial Chartart Cad 6713. Colonial Oavalopaant and Walfara Programme and tha Acts of 1940, 194S. 67
67. CO S37/462S/304S3, Memorandum, Macpherson to Cohan, 29/1/1949.
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the educated elements, they were to have little say in 
determining both its agenda and procedure.
The running theme of the procedure for achieving these 
ends was guided formal public discussion at all levels. 
He suggested a Select Committee of the Legislature to 
make recommendations for constitutional change. It was to 
comprise key official members together with all
unofficials.68 Preliminary debates would be introduced 
first in the regional houses, followed by one in the 
legislative council to sound public opinion in the main 
urban areas.The process was to be repeated to make final 
recommendations. To ensure that government hand was not 
seen guiding the process, officials were to avoid making 
public statements but participate fully in informal 
discussions.
Cohen agreed in broad terms to the substance and 
procedure of the proposals.69 But the first hurdle, an 
official noted was to get Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C. to 
agree to the scheme because the former had preferred a 
constituent assembly (C.A.) or a committee with 
representation based on linguistic groups, which he was 
sure the Legislative Council would refuse.70 On this Cohen 
requested that the committee must not be a C.A., a 
position he noted was shared by the secretary of state. 
Also it was "important that the great bulk of the country
68. The officers war« the Chief secretary, the Chief Commissloners, the Attorney- 
General. the Financial Secretary and Cons*issloner of the Colony.
69. ibid,Cohen to Macpheraon, on 10/2/1949.
70. ibid, H .M.Foot to Cohen, 21/2/1949.
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with its moderate ideas should not get the impression 
that anything like a constituent assembly is to be 
established".71 The idea was to ensure that the government 
got what it wanted.
The scheme, having been broadly approved in the colonial 
office, was anounced in the Legislative Council and set 
off preliminary public discussions. But these, as 
expected seemed confined to Lagos, with little impression 
made elsewhere and even in Lagos, general public opinion 
was not formulated.72 But most parties and journalists 
criticized the proposed procedure, although agreeing to 
the idea of sounding out public opinion. Following this 
trend and to ensure that a firm grip was had over the 
process, Macpherson suggested the Select Committee not as 
a review group, but "to advise how the constitution 
should be reviewed". This was widely accepted and 
unanimously approved and established by a resolution of 
the House on 11th March, 1949.
Its terms of reference were to make procedural 
recommendations .Thus, the test of its success was not in 
providing answers to the substantive questions but 
"whether all sections of the population are given full 
opportunity to express their views on all the great 
issues involved".73 He wished that public participation 
should pass through village and divisional meetings,
71. Ibid, Cohan to Macpharaon.
72. ibid .Lattar, Macpharaon to Craach- Jonas, 24/3/1949
73. ibid, Spaach in tha Laglslativa Council by tha Hon. C.a to tha Government, on 
11/3/1949.
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provincial and regional conferences as well as 
representatives of organizations. In spite of the concern 
with procedure at this stage he however set the principal 
questions although neither the Committee nor Ivim were to 
propose answers to them. They of course turned out to be 
the main issues on which discussions centered, circulated 
around by way of questiorfaire.
Meanwhile because of the central role envisaged for the 
members of all the Houses in the country in the impending 
dicussions, their term was extended.74
This ensured that the collaborative unofficials, called 
stooges by the nationalists, through whom the process 
would pass, retained their positions. The report of the 
Committee when presented was only a slight modification 
of the procedure advocated by the government.75 It 
recommended hierarchical consultation and discussions at 
three levels- Provincial, Regional and Central 
Conferences and finally a General Conference.
These recommendations were approved in London and 
conveyed in a broadcast in Lagos76 setting the stage for 
series of meetings and conferences dominated and guided 
by a combination of senior colonial officials, 
traditional rulers through the N.A.s and regional 
councils in the North and West. In the East and the 
cosmopolitan areas of Lagos and the Colony, where
7«. ibid,F22 Macpherson to Creach -Jonas, 24/5/1949.
75. ibid,Nigeria) Raport of tha Saiact Comslttaa, 22/3/1949.
76. ibid.FlO Cohan, Telegraa on 31/3/1949) ri7. Governor's broadcast of 6/4/1949.
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traditional institutions were less influential, the role 
of officials and sympathetic unofficials was more crucial 
in marginalising Azikiwe and his supporters.
2.B.I. PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCES.
There is very little in the records in respect of who 
participated and the issues raised in the village and 
divisional meetings and provincial conferences.As one 
official noted, such meetings were not expected to deal 
with complicated constitutional issues, but only to serve 
two purposes.77 First, before subsequent conferences, they 
would give an indication of how and by whom the provinces 
wish to be represented in their regional houses. Second, 
it was expected to have an educative effect on the public 
regarding those and other political matters.
In the North, it was certain that the procedure advocated 
by the Northern Nigerian Congress, for the common people 
to choose their representatives for the series of 
meetings and conferences, was not followed.78
The first progress report noted a good start.79 In all the 
regions, the C.C.s consulted with the residents and 
unofficials of the regional houses regarding detailed 
procedure in the province and regional conferences. It 
also reported that with slight regional variations, all
77. Report by the Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, 1/6/1949.
78. Initially controlled by the moderat educated Northerners, later became the pro­
emirate Northern Peoples Congress party-NigerIan Citisen, 1/7/1949.
79. Progress Report frost the Officer Administering to on 6/7/1949.
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arrangements Cell within the framework set by the Select 
Committee and agreed to fully by the unofficials .
In the North as expected, the proceedings of the regional 
conference constituted by regional council members was 
smoothly conducted.'0 Its recommendations were formulated 
in a positive form such that if it appeared that members 
were unanimous or near so drafts were made in a manner 
that was most likely to be acceptable to the general 
conference. Clear differing views, were to be framed to 
show that although without full agreement, it had a 
measure of support, sufficient to form basis for 
discussion in a plenary session. In regard to the 
officials their role was "almost entirely limited to 
assistance in supplying information, methods of procedure 
drafting, explanations,etc".
In the West, the conference, presided over by the Oni of 
Ife aroused little local interest and "at no time were 
there as many as twenty African spectators".'1 Awolowo who 
partly participated in the first day took little further 
part in it being absent for most of the time and "his 
stock slumped very remarkably in consequence".'2 More 
remarkably, he declined to serve on the small but 
extremely important committee that was to draft regional 
recommendations. The draft committee itself in
formulatng the proposals for Western Region, used a
80. Daspatch No. 1490 of 6/7/1949 fro« tha O.A.G. to S.S. on tha Sana day. CNCL.X.
81. ibid, ENCL.XI Oni of Zfa it a major traditional rular among tha Yorubaa.
82. Laadar of tha Action Croup, tha major Yoruba domlnatad party in tha Waat.
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summary sent by the Chief Commissioner which deliberately 
classified the subject in line with the sections of the 
Eastern Region recommendations to facilitate the work of 
the General Drafting Committee. But this fiddling did not 
prevent the report from noting that a few of the 
contributors against the advice of the majority made 
"extreme" recommendations which, if implemented/ would 
result in immediate self-government. The reason, it noted; 
was the psychological impact of the earlier and "more 
reasonable" Eastern proposals, the West trying to prove 
that it is not the reactionary region people thought it 
was.
The report on the Eastern Conference exposed more starkly 
the intrigues practised.83 First, there was only one 
administrative officer throughout the conference and the 
drafting committee, unlike "^ the North. It was a tactical 
manoeuvre to work behind the scene by maintaining minimum 
visible presence. The reason was that it is the home of 
Azikiwe, the N.C.N.C.and his group of "vituperative" 
newspapers.
Having tactly organised themselves, noted a participant, 
unofficials secured a majority on the committee and "used 
the open discussion on the first day to tear the Freedom 
Charter to shreds".84 The latter was earlier on launched 
by Azikiwe.
83 . ibid.ENCL.VII, written by Stevens, D.O.
84. ibid
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The lack of credibility of the Charter and its 
unpracticability by seeking to organise states on 
linguistic basis helped in its easy destruction, having 
been rejected even in Azikiwe's Onitsha home town earlier 
on.85 In consequence, the products of the conference were 
highly mellowed and moderate in relation to the noted 
extreme stance of Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C., so much as to 
make it worthy of emulation for the West, albeit by 
stealth.
In the Lagos Conference, a motley crowd of all shades of 
opinion were gathered. They included representatives of 
N.Y.M.and N.C.N.C.»Lagos chiefs, branches of principal 
trade unions, and main tribal unions.86 Subequently, 
Azikiwe and some NCNC representatives withdrew following 
a decision by the full conference that decisions would be 
recorded by resolution taken on majority vote.87
The Colony Conference was formed with little difficulty. 
But great anxiety and interest was generated by its 
composition because of cross-cutting feuds among 
political parties, Yorubas and non Yoruba unions the last 
considered as "foreigners" by the former,etc. But they 
were persuaded by the officials that such "attitude was 
unreasonable".88 Representatives sought enlightenment on
85. Progress Report from O.A.C.to S.S., 6/7/1949.
86. ,, .. .. ,, ,.17/5/1949.
87. Telegram from Governor'* deputy to the S.S. on 10/7/ 1949 In reoply to question* 
in the House of Commons on procedure, withdrawals,etc.-Telegram from S.S.to
O.A.G.,9/7/1949. 8
88. Progress Report from the Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria to Sec. 
of State, 17/5/1949.
110
some substantive issues. "It is doubtful whether more 
than a few understood the proposals but after some 
discussion, they received general approval”.89
At the joint conference, in the prevailing atmosphere of 
restraint, reason and common sense there was little to 
encourage extreme views and novel conceptions, noted an 
official.90 The intrigues in nominating its
representatives to the drafting committee and General 
Conference is instructive. According to an official, 
while one of the representatives was a local lawyer, the 
other "was not a fortunate choice. He is not a member of 
a N.A.and is believed to be a political opportunist with 
few firm convictions". The third nominee, "a literate and 
intelligent chief...owed his nomination to a political 
manoeuvre to ensure the support of Lagos chiefs" while a 
fourth, a trade unionist was "intelligent and clear 
thinking...politically independent [and] out of touch 
with the extremists of the rank and file of the trade 
unionists".The sixth nominee was "a retired senior 
officer...He is widely respected... The final nominee was 
one who succeeded in the intrigues of Lagos politics".91
Such graphic anatomy of the characters of the members 
were not made in all regions. But it is unnecessary for 
the North where the colonial officials had no fears from 
the traditional rulers who were in control of the process
8?! ibid. FN.73, BNCL.VIII, Report by rowlar, W. 13/8/1949.
90. ibid.
91. ibid
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in alliance with the former, partly so in the West and 
already, the picture in the East has been given.
2.B.2.THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE.
In criticising the intrigues of colonialism, it is easy 
to overlook any positive aspect of its work.Such positive 
effects may only be unintended consequences or that 
colonialism may have been the original source of the 
problem.In performing the task of overseeing the 
constitutional process, no where was the apparent 
neutrality of colonial officials essential than in the 
drafting committee. By its terms of reference,92 it was 
the melting point of all the preceding conferences. 
Representatives of all the regions converged in it with 
their diverse views and conflicting mandates. Its main 
and formal task was to prepare draft recommendations 
based on the regional conferences for the consideration 
of the General Conference. It was also to set the agenda 
for the Conference. But the real job was more than the 
presentation of a summary of differences which mainly 
they were. It was to attempt to present a single 
statement. In a note on the proceedings of the Committee, 
one of the officials lamented the difficulty of their 
task because of acute regional disparities^.3 "that at the 
closing stages of its work, only official presence kept 
the Committee going because of implacable positions
92. CO 537/4625/30453, Report of the Drafting Committee on the Constitution
(DCC,henceforth). 93
93. ibid, Williams,A.A.Note on the Proceedings of the D.C.C.,15/12/1949.
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maintained by the delegates. It was however able to 
produce proposals for the Conference.
In the interim period between the drafting and the 
general conference, the colonial office begtin to express 
views in confidence regarding some of the issues raised 
in the various conferences, possible outcome of the 
debates in the impending conference, the issues still in
contention. those that may be withheld from the
Conference, etc.94 For instance. Cohen95 excluded the
extension of franchise to elect representatives to the 
central legislature. He prefered the continued use of 
electoral college with an improvement on the existing 
system. Similarly, Foot suggested to the members of the 
drafting committee that an Expert Panel on revenue 
allocation should not report to the General Conference as 
initially proposed.96 Rather it was to be a parallel body 
only to inform the Conference of its proceedings and vice 
versa.lt removed an expected acrimony if matters of 
revenue sharing were to be debated in the full glare of 
the Conference.
In a meeting of senior officials the colonial office 
noted its own limits and the possible directions it might 
effect changes.97 But everything was to be done with
57! CO 537/4625/30453/49 containing various correspondences among senior state 
officials.
95. ibid. Cohen to Macpherson, 20/12/1949.
96. ibid FN.66.
97. ibid. Note of Two meetings held to discuss the Review of the Nigerian 
Constitution, 9/1/1950. Present were the S.S., .theMinlster of State, Sir T.Lloyd, 
Sir k.Roberts-Wray>A.B.Cohen, J.A.Peck, L.B.Gorsuch and R.J.Vile.
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utmost caution. First, it was important for the Nigerian 
government to know the views of the secretary of state to 
avoid fundamental divergence between them. Second, the 
Nigerian government was to state its views in the 
Legislative Council but restricting itself to those where 
there is agreement with that of the Council. Controversy 
was to be avoided.Third, although it would be difficult 
for London to modify substantially the proposals which 
emerged from Nigeria, any such changes must not cause 
difficulty for the government in Nigeria. Fourth, it 
predicted opposition from the House of Lords because of 
too much focus on constitutional progress to the neglect 
of economic development. Finally, it was possible and 
even expected that the nominated members of the 
Legislative Council might be able to persuade the 
Conference to recommend a small number of nominated 
members in the new constitution to represent commercial 
interests. Against this background of official plans, the 
Conference begun in January, 1950.
2.B.3.THE GENERAL CONFERENCE.
This was expected to have 53 delegates comprising 28 
unofficial members of the Legislative Council and 25 
Regional delegates.98 But three of the latter did not 
attend, the most conspicuous of them being Azikiwe^ who 
was said to have left for the U.S.A.
98. CO 537/5786/30453. Pt.I, F9A A.A.William», Extract from Intelligence Report on 
Nigeria, 3/2/1950.
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In a progress report to the colonial office, it was 
noted that only few important amendments were made to the 
draft.”  "On the whole,we feel that in spite of the great 
anxieties still ahead, we have emerged so far with a set 
of recommendations more in line with what we wanted than 
even the most optimistic would have dared to hope a year 
ago".100 Obviously one of such useful recommendations was 
one for commercial interests which was carried through 
with ease because of "the personal qualities of 
Mr.Rogers, who has for several years been a nominated 
member of the Legislative Council, than any balanced 
conviction on the merits of the issue itself".101 But if 
colonial officials were happy with the outcome there was 
little public enthusiasm in the conference. Curiously, an 
official could not help lamenting as "obviously a matter 
of acute disappointment to many delegates that more 
public interest was not shown".102
At the end of it, two major issues remained intractable- 
the size of representation for the North in the central 
legislature and the status of Lagos. The suggested 
solution was to remove these and subsequent processes out 
of public debate.103 Therefore, instead of presenting the 
recommendations to a plenary sitting of the Regional and 
Central Houses respectively as earlier agreed, it went to
99] Ibid, F3 Talngram, Macpharson to S.S., 28/1/1950.
100. Ibid F8, root to Cohan, Fab. 1950.
101. Ibid FN.90
102. Ibid .
103. Ibid r«l Macpharson to Cohan.on 26/5/1950.
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their Select Committees. Those Committees comprising 
unofficials and presided over by an official were more 
manageable and sympathetic to official views. Moreover, 
it had the merit of making those matters and discussions 
less open to the public, allowed easy compromises and the 
pressure on members to make firm commitments would be 
removed.
Once it went around the Committees as planned, the 
secretary of state broadly approved the recommendations 
subject to the resolution of the outstanding issues and 
other matters of detail.104 It thereby ended official 
"public" involvement in the process. Henceforth, it 
became the formal turn of the imperial government to 
provide the "details" and make other modifications but 
always in such a manner as not to be noticed in Nigeria 
to avoid difficulties for the government.105 However, 
apart from rationalising the rather discordant proposals 
and attempting solutions to outstanding issues, the 
colonial government was confronted with what it called 
European commercial interests.
2.C. EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.
In the preceding process, through the consummate
cultivation of collaborative moderate and conservative 
forces, the European commercial interests were advanced 
and protected in an oblique and long term manner. The 
only exception was the recommendation for special members
10«. in a Despatch N0.464A of 15/7/1950.
105. CO 537/7167B/30453/11 • Various correspondences on this.
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in the Legislature expected to be filled by commercial 
men. Again, although colonialism was necessarily for 
economic purposes, the relationship between government 
and commerce with regards to method was by no means 
healthy and predictable. Contact with commerce had been 
"frequent and friendly, but informal and irregular".104
This kind of relationship based on mutual understanding 
is workable only with a sympathetic government, hence 
the quest for conservative forces. But individuals may 
also be fickle and therefore less reliable. There is more 
reliability and certainty in systems and relatively 
autonomous structures. It is for these reasons that 
European firms doing business in Nigeria at that time 
sought constitutional and other structural guarantees for 
their investments.
Soon after the Nigerian end of the constitutional process 
finished, the U.A.C.Ltd wrote seeking audience with the 
secretary of state so that "whatever changes might come 
about, conditions were not created which are likely to 
prejudice established enterprises and conduce to the 
withdrawal of existing capital or discourage the advent 
of new capital".107 After a sympathetic hearing, the 
secretary of state assured that he was in general in 
favour of the closest coordination between commercial 
interests and Nigerian government. But the machinery to 
secure it was for the government of Nigeria to
106. F41 Nacpharson to Cohan on 26/5/1950.
107. CO 537/5789/30453/11, Lattar of 9/6/1950.
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consider.However, if further consultations became 
necessary with him on constitutional points before "the 
decisive phase was reached", he might see them.108 Through 
various correspondences, they sought three pronged 
constitutional and extraconstitutional
safeguards.First,increased representation in the central 
legislature and representation in the regional houses. 
Second, a non discrimination clause in the constitution. 
Third, an economic Advisory Committee.
1. REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSES.
On the request for increased representation in the 
Legislative Council the governor was at first reluctant 
fearing that it might be accused of bad faith in Nigeria 
if more was added at that stage. He noted that the 
initial success was in fact the sole effort of Rogers as 
only one firm replied when he consulted them on it.109 
However, the matter was taken up informally in the 
sessions of the respective Houses together with request 
for same in Regional Houses. This informal procedure, 
thought of as more effective, succeeded.110
The Europeans wanted the representation exclusive to 
them, but the governor had a better and more conciliatory 
idea. He secured a provision broad enough to include 
indigenous commercial interests, much to the chagrin of 
the Europeans. The provision empowered the governor to
108. FllGorauch to Mellor, 15/3/1951; F24,Note of meeting with representatives of the 
major flrmss-UAC Ltd.i British Bata Shoe CO., J.Holt a Co., Shall and Cadbury Ltd.
109. Ibid, Latter, Deputy Governor to S.S.,24/7/1950.
110. F16, Telegram, Macpherson to S.S..17/8/1950.
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appoint special members to represent interests or 
communities not otherwise adequately represented.111 
However, the point of note is that all the special 
nominated members irrespective of race were expected to 
be representatives of commerce.112 
2. NON-DISCRIMINATORY CLAUSE.
Here, the firms sought a constitutional protection that 
was short, simple and general in tenor prohibiting any 
future discrimination, mainly in trade, against non 
indigenes. They cited as precedents the Ceylonese and 
Gold Coast constitutions.113 There was no shortage of will 
and energy in the colonial office and government in 
Nigeria in considering this request. The obstacles to it 
were however enormous bearing in mind the consistent 
concern to cultivate and build on the goodwill of 
selected Nigerians. Two factors were to be decisive in 
considering whether to risk it through or not.114 The 
first is difficulties to Nigerian government in having 
such a clause. 2 The second was the availability of 
adequate safeguards to the firms against discrimination.
To the first, difficulties could arise because there 
existed a large body of legislation based on racial 
discrimination most of which the government wished to 
maintain. Examples were, those protecting the rights of
111. Macpherson to Nellor (rap. of UAC) ,16/8/1951) F24, Macpherson to T. B.William, 
17/6/1951,8.70 of tha Order In Council, 1951 No. 1172 of 1951.
112. CO S37/7167B/30«53/ll.Dlscusaiona In tha C.O. between April and August, 1951 and 
various correspondences with the goverrusent In Nigeria within this date.
113.8.50(2) (3) of the Gold Coast Constitution, 1951.
114. Ibid
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natives from acquisitive foreigners in respect of land, 
taxation-where only the natives as defined were 
assessable etc.115 Secondly, it could be the subject 
matter of legal wrangling in the courts which was not the 
best medium to resolve such disputes as it would 
publicise the issues. Finally, the Ceylonese and Gold 
Coast provisions were inapplicable to Nigeria because the 
former was based on religious non discrimination which 
was not relevant to Nigeria then, while the latter was 
found to be ineffective in practice. On whether the 
existing safeguards were adequate, the answer was more 
open. Existing safeguards were the reserve and general 
discretionary powers of the governor, the use of 
Europeans on various advisory boards and the nominations 
into the legislature. But there was no guarantee that
such structures would not be pulled down at the slightest 
opportunity.
Eventually, the colonial office settled for the 
suggestion by the governor to insert the clause in Royal 
Instructions to the Governor.116 It required that any 
legislation imposing racial discrimination on one
community be reserved for His Majesty's pleasure.Thus, 
the colonial government was able to settle an issue of 
major interest to its constituents without the knowledge 
of its Nigerian collaborators and its critics, as it did 
in most contentious issues- through the back door.
115. Native Land* Acquisitive Ordinance (Cap.14«)i S.3, Direct Taxation Ordinance 
(Cap.S4) and other statutes on Immigration.
116. CO 537/7167B/30453/11/51,Cohen to Nellor,28/6/1951.
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3. AN ECONOMIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
When the idea for this committee was suggested, the 
imperial authorities in Nigeria and London showed little 
enthusiasm for it. The secretary of state declined to be 
drawn into it by noting that it was outside the 
constitutional review and that in any case it was a 
matter for the discretion of the governor.117 On his part, 
the governor being reluctant, shifted responsibility to 
the firms for the details and structure of the committee. 
This was in marked contrast to the great deal of energy 
and interest shown by the authorities in the previous 
scheme.
The firms wanted a committee established by ordinance 
rather than the constitution to ensure continuity and 
place it "outside politics".118 Its objective was 
comprehensive and wide ranging. It was to examine and 
provide a check on "over-optimism or lend support to well 
founded schemes.Jt would provide a means of protecting 
the government and ministers from organised agitation on 
any particular problem and from that type of insidious 
personal and family pressure which is common in Africa 
and the East..." (italics mine). In addition to being an 
avenue for Africans to acquire experience, it was to be 
one to press on "Africans possessing extreme views...that 
such affairs should be examined objectively..."119 Heads
117. CO 537/5789/30453/11. Foot to Cohen of 16/10/1950i Ml. Gorauch to Mellor of 
15/5/1951.
118. Mol lor to Ag.Governor, 13/12/1950 following a moating of the Governor with the 
firms in London on 31/10/1950. |M3, Mellor to Gorsuch ,3/4/1951.
119. ibid. Mol lor to Ag. Governor.
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of departments would-be required to consult the committee 
on specified matters and in* particular circumstances, for 
instance, when new policies were to be introduced through 
legislation or administratively. In other cases, 
consultation would only be recommended. Membership would 
be multiracial and appointed by the governor through the 
normal administrative machinery, but were expected to be 
exclusively people with commercial experience.120
Having had the details and arguments, the governor made 
short shrift of them in a language that did not conceal 
his distaste for the scheme.121 The governor classified 
his objections on constitutional, political and practical 
grounds. He envisaged a constitutional conflict between 
the functions of the committee and those of the Council 
of Ministers since a constitutional body can not be 
obliged to consult one established outside the
constitution by ordinary statute. Similarly, it would be 
politically difficult to get such a legislation passed in 
Nigeria as the government would face the charge and risk 
of side tracking representative institution. Further, the 
African members of the committee would be viewed as 
stooges, thereby handicapping it ab initio.Finally, if 
the members were to be chosen solely on academic 
qualifications or experience, they all would come from 
Lagos and could result in political storm in the regions. 
The practical reasons were the absence of Africans with
120. Ibid. Ha Infact luggastad tha naaws of Gbadaaosl, A. Ma)ai Oba Adala II ( king of 
Lagos), Obaaalkl and 0)ukwu, tha who's who In buslnass In Lagos so sm of whoai wars 
in tha lagialatva council.
121. CO S37/71C7B/304S3/11. Macphsrson to S.8.,30/7/1931.
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experience while the few Europeans with it carried the 
danger of conflict of interest in the advice they may 
offer. Having failed to see any redeeming features in it, 
in conclusion, he was "absolutely convinced that the 
proposal would be constitutionally wrong, politically 
unwise and practically impossible".122 Obviously, the 
source of the governor's lack of sympathy for the idea 
may lie in his view of the firms as Fagan incarnate, who 
were either naive or indifferent of the governments' 
delicate rope walking.Typical of British decolonization 
in contrast to the French and others, they did not want 
to be placed in a situation where forced hasty retreat 
was inevitable. More^over, there were in fact adequate 
safeguards both in the short term, in the concessions 
already made and in the long term, through friendly 
contact and promotion of pliant conservative interests in 
the emirates and the intelligentsia.
The governor's position was accepted in the colonial 
office subject to moderation of the tone of the letter. 
It was considered "too forceful and likely to upset the 
firms considerably".123 Finally, after mellowing its tone, 
senior officials in London successfully persuaded the 
U.A.C. officials to take a sympathetic view of the 
obstacles. The resolution of these issues paved the way
122. ibid.
123. Minut« by R.R.Vil*. 3/8/1951.
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for the conclusion of the final draft of the 
constitution.124
In conclusion, the governor sent a memorandum to the
colonial office. accompanied by a draft of the
constitutional proposals suggesting the need for the
latter to make a formal official statement on the
process. It was to explain to the public the necessity of 
any changes made along the lines suggested in the draft 
despatch to make the process appear as a piece of cloth 
wholly cut out by Nigerians with only the buttons fixed 
by the British. The despatches containing the 
constitutional proposals as agreed to by Lagos and London 
were made in retrospect with the governor's coming after 
that of the colonial office to prevent it being seen as 
another governor's sole work.125 Finally, the copies of 
the constitution meant for Nigeria were printed in London 
but on Nigerian account in Lagos.
2.D.THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, 1954-1960.
In his biography, Awolowo declared, "until 1951...the 
question as to what type of constitution Nigeria should 
have was not at all an issue in the country's 
politics".126 This view is also supported by Alhaji Ahmadu 
Bello when he noted that "by no stretch of imagination 
could it be said that there was any strong, still less
124. Not*« of Mating batwaan Cohan and Vi la, 14/8/1951.
125. Daapatch No. 147A of 15/4/1*51 and Daapatch No. 17A of 15/5/1*51 in that official 
ordar.
126. Awolowo.O. Autobiography, (Cambrldga Univ.Praas, London)p. 160.
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universal feeling in the -matter".127 But that was the 
document where imperial government dictated both the 
agenda and procedure as we saw in preceding discussions.
When the Nigerian government was told to ignore the 
General Conference recommendation to review the
constitution after five years,12* little did the colonial 
office anticipate that the pace and tempo of events in 
Nigeria would soon force such a review.129 Accounts of
such events have received extensive coverage, hence, its 
details need not detain us here. Zn the main, they ranged 
from struggles for power and position by individuals,120 
inexperience in parliamentary practice, to the tenous 
position of the central institutions created under the 
constitution to foster unity by gradual confidence 
building among the squabbling elites.121
Consequently, after barely two years turbulent operation 
of the 1951 constitution, the secretary of state annouced 
in the House of Commons that the three regions could not 
work together effectively in a federation as closely knit 
as provided in the constitution 122.The object of the
127. Ahatadu Bollo, My Lifa (Cambridge Univ.Praia. London)p.67.
12*. Mots in deapatch froa tha S.S. to the governor-Nigeria Gasatta Extraordinary,
Mo.35, Vol. 38 of 5/5/1951.
129. OlIvor Lyttlaton, Sacratary of Stato-atataoant in Parliament, Hanaard, Vol.515, 
cola. 2253-2266.
130. Tha crlala in tha Eaat raaultad froa tha atruggla bewwen Asiklwe, tha aajority 
party laadar who could not aacura a aaat in tha cantral lagialatura and hia 
daputy, who wax tha parliaaantary laadar in tha Eaatarn Houaa of Aaaaatoly-aaa K. 
Bara, supra, FM.l, pp.156-175.
131. Tha motion which sought salt govariuaant in 1956 by tha Action Group party and its 
modification by tha Northarn Paoplas Congrass and rasultant hackling and violanca 
on northarn awabers was indication of tha unraadinasa and auapiciona of tha 
ragiona for a strong cantral authority.lt was also avidanca of diffarantiatad 
lavals of political development. 132
132. supra PM.116.
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review was threefold. First» to secure greater regional 
autonomy.Second, to remove the intervention powers of the 
centre in matters that can be regional .Finally, to secure 
the common economic and defence requirements of the 
regions. To achieve these ends, the imperial government 
was to cooperate as closely as possible with the leaders 
of the people in all the regions. As a first step, the 
latter were to be invited to London to consider the 
desirability of redrawing the constitution.This time 
around, the government was to make a definite 
collaboration with all the immediate critical interests. 
No attempts were made to upstage any segment of the 
dominant groups by any ideological reference to popular 
consultation hence, the tactics in subsequent processes 
would be less underhand I' Two reasons may be offered for 
this.
First, the constitution had established an obvious 
regional structure and fostered clear identifiable 
leaders and political parties in the regions. Second, the 
necessary foundation had been laid for the long term 
advancement and protection of European commercial 
interests. It would not risk upsetting what had been 
achieved by clearly being partisan at this stage. The 
best security was to cooperate with those known regional 
leaders to concretise and possibly advance on extant 
achievements. The important thing was to keep the 
initiative and control the process.
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On the part of the nationalists, they were either late or 
unwilling to embark on novel concepts or both.It must be 
stressed that although the activities of those held out 
as nationalists may have contributed to the formal 
termination of colonial rule in Nigeria, their
contributions to the constitutional processes and its 
institutions were almost negligible. At critical stages 
as we saw, those generally held out as major king-pin 
nationalists in the decolonization period were either 
upstaged by colonial officials or abstained at critical 
times, a strategy of doubtful value. Rather, they seemed 
content to go along with the British to advance and 
consolidate the 1946 and 1951 arrangements to make their 
regional political havens constitutionally safe. 
Consequently, the 1953 and 1954 conferences resulted in a 
full clad, loose federation with strong regions based on 
British Parliamentary system.133 The subsequent 
conferences of 1957 and 1958 largely dealt with matters 
arising, in particular, control of the police, structure 
of the public service, revenue allocation, administration 
of justice and structure of courts, etc.134 Similarly, 
attempts to allay the fears of minorities by creating 
more states were thwarted because the emirates of the 
North resisted break up.135
133. Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in London, July/August,1953- Cmd.8934; Report by the Resumed Conference held in Lagos, January/Pebruary,
1954- Cmd. 9059. Thses conferences have been extensively discussed-see, Ezra.ibid) 
Elias, The British Coaseonwealth..op. clt.i Odumosu, op.cits.
134. Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference, held in London, Nay/June, 1957- 
Cauid 207.
135. Taylor, C. (1961) "The Independence Constitution of Federal Nigeerla* in 60 The 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 111-16.at p. 5.
127
Thus in negotiating independence, a constitutional 
system with inputs based on the experiences of the 
indigenous institutions or elsewhere, e.g.the U.S.A., 
France, etc were neither canvassed nor in fact
encouraged.136 In the North, insofar as the emirates were 
the colonial successors, it was an ironical return to the 
pre-colonial stage without the tenous system of control. 
It was partly so in the West until the educated men 
finally triumphed over traditional institutions through 
universal franchise.In order to catch up with rest of the 
country, in the East, where the Ibos make no kings, a 
House of Chiefs was created bringing it into line more 
with the situation in the West. Consequently, through the / 
constitution, a combination of traditional rulers and 
educated men — but in an acute state of conflict and 
tension-succeeded colonial rule in 1960.
However, despite the apparently delicate negotiations and 
its risk aversion, the British were able to exact 
important economic "concessions” mostly one may say, by 
stealth. These may be classified as immediate and long 
term economic benefits.
2.E.ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS EXACTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
a). Immediate Economic Benefits.
In view of impending independence, arrangements for 
pensions, additional benefits and allowances were made 
for the staff of the colonial service. Little regard was 
had to the usual requirements of age and period
136. Mackintosh,J.P. (1966)Nlgerian Government and Politic*, Cap.l
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qualifications for those facilities.137 The financial 
arrangements were anything but extravagant having regard 
to the fact that they were in Nigeria to serve 
colonialism primarily. Moreover, except those due for 
retirement, their services continued whenever they were 
posted to, presumably with further pension!
b). Short Term Commercial Protection.
The safeguards for protecting commerce in the short term 
were extended. But at the insistence of the delegates of 
the East and West, the provision for special members in 
the House of Assembly but not the House of Chiefs was 
dropped from their regional legislatures. It was retained 
in the North and at the centre.138
But the gains made were vitiated by the accretion of the 
governor's reserve powers empowering him to delay 
specified bills for the consideration of the government 
in London. These included: 1 Bills inconsistent with 
Treaty obligations. 2.Bills which would affect 
prejudicially the rights of property of Her Majesty’s 
subjects who were not resident in Nigeria or their trade, 
transport or communications.139 3 Bills that might
prejudice stockholders in relation to loans raised on 
behalf of a region or involve a departure from the 
original contract in regard to the loan.140 In other words
137. Statutory Init[UWnti,llTo No.1653, The Nigeria (Ratlramant Benefits) Ordar In 
Council, 1960 consolidating all previous legislations based on the various 
conferences since 1953.
138. Clause 11, Cmnd. 207.
139. ibid, clause 10 (d).
140. Ibid, clause 11.
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loans or contracts entered- into on behalf of a region 
could not be reviewed by that region without imperial 
authority, however onerous the agreement might have been. 
C). LONG TERM COMMERCIAL PROTECTION.
We have seen that through an assidous control of the 
constitutional process, in alliance with the local 
dominant forces, imperial authority removed the sting in 
decolonization in Nigeria. Similarly, the people holding 
the so-called extreme views were not particularly helpful 
because the choice offered were hardly credible as we 
saw with Azikiwe's Freedom Charter. Again, at critical 
times, as we saw, Azikiwe and Awolowo literally abandoned 
the process even though Awolowo acknowledges 1951 as a 
critical constitutional year.It was therefore no surprise 
that imperial authority secured all it wanted. This was 
capped in 1960 by converting an omnibus private letter 
written by the British High Commissioner to Nigeria to 
the Prime Minister of Nigeria, into a national agreement 
between Nigeria and the U.K.141
The letter begun with a reminder of the status of Nigeria 
as a Commonwealth member which meant that Nigeria would 
take over all obligations and responsibilities, rights 
and benefits of any valid international instrument 
Britain entered into which affected Nigeria. They were 
estimated to be 340 by I9 6 0.142 A number of inferences may
141. Federation on Nigeria, International Rights and Obligationsi Exchange of Letters 
between the Government of the U.K. and the Government of the rederation of Nigeria. Cmnd 1214 (Nov. 1960.London).
142. C. Taylor, op. elt. p.13.
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be drawn regarding its procedure and substance. Under the 
1960 constitution, international agreements must involve 
the parliament before they can be valid .Consequently, a 
representative institution was side tracked thereby 
depriving it of the opportunity to know and appraise such 
treaties. Moreover, since officials constantly claimed 
to be concerned with democratic procedure, it was in fact 
setting an opposite precedent. Again, the letter was 
written and opportunistically presented on 1st October, 
1960, the day Nigeria became independent. It is normal 
that within that short period, the engagements and 
euphoria of the occasion would not enable the prime 
minister to conduct important state business, much less 
to acquaint himself with those volumes of treaties.
With regards to the substance, the most significant 
consequence was the constitutionalization of all the^ 
agreements with the British and European commercial firms 
protected during colonial rule by the governor's reserve 
and discretionary powers. Consequently, through an 
inelegant procedure, they became Nigerian agreements 
without the opportunity to examine their merits and 
utility to the country as was thought in a seminar, 
I960.143 It was within this setting that Nigeria became 
independent in 1960 to begin another era of uncertainty, 
crises and constitution making without the not impartial 
imperial umpireship.
143. ibid.The seminar was held between 8-15th August 1960, funded by the Ford
Foundation and organized jointly by thje Supreme Court and the Nigerian Bar 
Association.lt drew a top cream of the legal profession in the World,both trot 
the bar and bench.
131
2.F.CONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPTS, 1960-1967.
Nigeria became independent under a constitution that was 
a bundle of compromises over a period of time first among 
colonial officials and subsequently, between them and 
representatives of regionally based parties. Three years 
later, the Nigerian legislators ended the country's 
Dominion status and converted it into a republic within 
the Commonwealth.14« In legal parlance, the source of 
their legitimacy was never in the people through a 
popularly elected constitutional convention or in 
ratification by the electorate or legislative bodies 
directly elected. Rather, legitimacy resided in two other 
sources: representatives of the federal and regional 
parties, the former, mainly elected through electoral 
colleges which were in fact the N.A.s. The second source 
was the formal and informal acts of the imperial 
authority guided mainly by its own economic calculations 
since 1900.
Consequently, except the officials and political leaders 
who participated in the drafting and negotiations, its 
provisions were little known to the generality of 
Nigerians. As one observer lamented, the constitutions 
were mainly concerned with powers and rights of those in 
government without a corresponding obligation to the 
common citizens in whose names everything was claimed to 14*
144. Sessional Papar NO.3 of 1963. Tha juriaprudential iasua of autochtony laconaldarad In Ellaa, op. clt.p.l21t Ojo, A.(1967) Conatltutlonal Law and Military
Rule In Nigeria (Moya t Sona) P.10.
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be done.145 There were also little concern with and 
therefore no provisions to check abuse of power.
Two years after, the bundle of compromises were too 
tenuous and control of political power too important to 
secure the trust and allay the suspicions of the educated 
forces among themselves in the South. The same mistrust 
persisted between them and the emirates and their allies 
in the North.146 As noted in chapter one, the very 
survival of some of the interest groups became tied to 
the state and a fortiori those in control of it, since 
colonial rule. In the absence of the distant and 
apparently conciliatory hands of imperial authorities, in 
1966, a group of soldiers thought the better solution was 
to kill those they perceived as the chieftains of the 
feud. Most of the victims including army officers were 
from the North, less from the West and lesser still from 
the East where most of the perpetrators of the first coup 
came. Eventually, the tenous constitutional democracy 
caved in to a military rule.147 The latter itself is not 
exempt, but rather is an integral part of the feud 
within the dominant forces in the bid to control state 
power and the patronage, privilege and preferences that 
go with it.148 Moreover, it lacks the mass following, the
145. Ayua,I.A.(1985) 'Constitutional Developments in Nigeria sine* the Color'al Era" In 
Atanda.J.A.t Aliyu, Y.A., Proceeding of the NaCional Conference on the Nigeria 
since Independence, Vol.l (Zaria, 1983.) p.41S.
146. A factual and analytical account of these eveents are made in Odumosu, O.I.op clt 
iDiamond,L. Class, State and Democracy in Nigeria, supra, Cap.l.
147. Legalised by Decree No. 1 of 1966, suspending the provisions that were inconsistent with militate rule. The legal implications are discussed in OJo,
A.(1971) "The Search for ii Grundnorm in Nigeria- the Lakanmi case’in 20 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly.H117-126.
148. Usman, Y.B.(1966) "Nigerla-Shortcomings of Military Rule'in 26 African Communist, 
pp.58-61, makes the relevant point that those soldiers lack the mass following, 
discipline and force of revolutionary Ideology. Also, the point is made regarding
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force and discipline of revolutionary ideology. But 
before it plunged Nigeria into a civil war, the military 
made two main attempts at constitutional reconciliation.
A). THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW GROUP, 1966.
According to General Ironsi, (first military head of 
state) "rigid adherence to Regionalism was the bane of 
the last regime and one of the main factors which 
contributed to its downfall".149 He promised that these 
and other issues would be examined by various study 
groups. Constitutional changes "will be undertaken with 
the consensus of various representatives of public 
opinion". In due course, a constituent assembly would 
examine the constitutional proposals followed by a 
referendum before the new constitution comes into force.
The Constitutional Review Group was duly set up with 
terms of reference which inter alia were the reverse of 
Stanley's object of review in 1952. It was, in particular, 
in addition to identifying the defects of the 
constitution, to "ascertain to what extent the powers of 
the former regional governments fostered regionalism and 
weakened central government".150 Soon after, the General 
himself aborted the take off of the Group and true to the 
importance of speed in military action, made a 
constitutional overkill by abolishing the regions to
the decisiveness of the idioyncratic personal rivalries of the coup makers and 
their opponents-Decalo,S . (1976) Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven, Yale 
Univ.Press).
149. General Ironsi, (1971) 'Press conference of 21 February,1966* in Klrk-Greene,A.H.M.Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, A Documentary Source Book, 1966-1969 
Vol.I (Oxf.London).
150. ibid.'Terms of Reference of the Constitutional Review Group* pp.158-159.
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unify the country.1,1 But U>e damage done and the ensuing 
uncertainties could not be-cured by Ironsi's courting of 
traditional rulers, directly or through his governors.152 
It eventually led to the loss of Ironsi and others' lives 
in another coup in July, 1966.
The succeeding regime continued with the effort for 
constitutional solution through an Ad Hoc Constitutional 
Conference it established.153 The latter was the result of 
a meeting of regional governors' representatives earlier 
on where they tried "to consider some grievances between 
the leaders of the country". The meeting was itself
sequel to consultations by the governors with chiefs and 
"leaders of thought" in all the regions.154
B). THE AD HOC CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.
General Yakubu Gowon (second military head of state)
after noting how politics had been "thoroughly debased 
and commercialized" stated the object of the Conference. 
The violent reaction in some parts of the North
"following the tendencies to extreme unification..points 
to one and only one thing. That a country as big as 
Nigeria and comprising such diversity of tribes and
cultures, can not be administered successfully under a 
Unitarian form of government" unless through
151. ibid, “The Regions are Abolished) ironsi's Broadcast to tha Nation banning 
poliyical paries and Introducing Decree No. 34.of 24/5/1966*.
152. ibid Major Hassan Katsina's addres to the Emirs and Chiefs on l/6/1966i 16/6/1966i 
Ironsi's address to the National Conference of Traditional Rulers,
Ibadan,2B/7/1966, pp.191-191.
153. ibid,‘The Moment of Truth* Cowon Opens the Costitutional Conference in 
Lagos.12/8/1966, pp.216-219.
154. ibid. ‘Recosmendations made by the Representatives of the Regional Military 
Governors' Meeting on 9/9/1966*. pp.208-209.
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suppression.155 It was also-to consider the distribution 
of powers between regions- and the centre, territorial 
divisions, mode of constituting legislatures or a "form 
of association with an entirely new name yet to be found 
in any political dictionary in the world but peculiar to 
Nigeria".
Its terms of reference seem to be a re-run of the object 
of review in 1952 without the reference to the new 
formula. This underlines the continuity of the problems
constitution making had confronted since 1900. In
addition to the long term consideration of a
constitution. it was as well mandated to provide an
interim arrangement for administering the country. After 
several sittings where representations were made on the 
basis of regions through delegates, the Conference 
submitted progress reports containing some interim 
agreements.156 The latter were basically a re-ordering of 
the subjects on the legislative lists of the 1963 
constitution.
However,the work of the Conference was aborted following 
the withdrawal of the members from the East upon the 
instruction of the governor. He gave as the reasons for 
his action, the renewed violence in Kano against the 
Ibos, demand for compensation for the Ibos and the non 
implementation of some agreements by the federal
155. ibid, Gowon, "Th» Moment of..*
156. Ibid. pp.233-258.
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authorities.157 Subsequent attempts to resolve the impasse 
in Aburi-Ghana resulted in further mutual recriminations 
and controversy regarding the nature of agreements 
reached, mostly in camera and the different versions of 
which is beyond the scope of this work.158 Constitutional 
lawyers and politicians involved in searching for a 
formula to reconcile these forces would not have the 
opportunity again until after a civil war, 1967-1970 and 
another coup that overthrew General Gowon in 1975.
157. Ibid,■Resolution of Eastern Consultative Assembly,7 October,1966" pp.256-57.
158. Some of the versions are contained in documents in Kirk-Greene, ibid, pp.312-372.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.INTRODUCTION: THE THIRD PHASE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGINEERING, 1975-1989.
In truth, Nigeria went through three phases of 
constitutional development. The first two covered in the 
preceding chapter, involved the period 1900-1946 when the 
governor was mainly the constitution maker. On the other 
hand, the constitutions made or attempted between 1947- 
1960 reflected a progressive implementation of colonial 
policy through the constitution, with limited aid from 
the indigenous elites. It resulted in a bundle of 
compromises at two levels. First, among colonial 
officials themselves, between them and the indigenous 
elites. Second, among the regional chieftains of the 
latter to whom formal structures of power were handed 
over in a calm atmosphere in 1960. In this way, colonial 
structures were passed on to the country unquestioningly 
including the international commitments made to benefit 
the metropolitan power.The constitution sought to 
rationalise the contradictions among the local elites all 
in vain as it crashed under its weight.
Thus, 1960-1974 was a period of crises and waste during 
which the colonial heritage was sought to be internalized 
with limited success in so far as the basic social, 
economic and political structures established by 
colonialism remain undisturbed.This historical context 
relating to the impact of previous constitutions is 
necessary to a proper understanding and assessment of
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constitution making and the- identification of any shifts 
or continuities in the effoTt to secure constitutionalism 
in Nigeria.
However, there is a major difference between the
environment of the colonial period and immediate past on 
the one hand and the later period on the other which 
should be reflected at the constitutional level. First, 
at the practical level, there is no direct imperial 
hegemony except the military, (who share some of its
features) to limit the range of options. Second, the 
practical experiences of the crises of the sixties and 
the civil war were there to learn from and improve upon. 
Third, the enormous revenue from oil ensured availability 
of the funds required to finance development projects to 
arrest illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, disease, etc 
given the appropriate constitutional framework, 
orientation and leadership. Finally, and more importantly 
theoretical and practical pitfalls could be minimized 
because the strengths, contributions and weaknesses of 
three perspectives which dominated the constitutional and 
political economy of Africa since the sixties into the 
eighties have been laid bare1.
Briefly, these theories and prescriptions were: First, 
the law and development school emphasized institutions, 
law and order and expected Africa to continue to follow 
the course of development in Western Europe and America
Mamdani,T.,et al,(1988) Social Movements, Social Transformation and the struggle 
for Democracy in Africa. CODBSRIA, working Paper No.1-provides a short and precise 
sumnary of these schools. Also Ghai, Y.P.(1987),"Law, Development and African 
Scholarship* 50 The Modern Law Review,pp. 750-76.
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in this regard. Second, the dependency theory arose as a 
critique of the former, but heavily preoccupied itself 
with the external aspect of the crisis of Africa. Third, 
is the mode of production thesis which shifted the 
argument from the unilinear external perspective of
dependency to a study of the internal contradictions of 
the "centre" and "periphery".In constitutional terms, the 
effect of the last two schools of thought had been the 
adoption of statism, generally inspired by the so- called 
African authenticity and the Soviet-China non-capitalist 
development.2 Finally, the activities of the students of 
legal pluralism and other ethnographic researches 
contributed in raising critical issues concerning some 
aspects of the organisation of African societies.3 They 
focused on Africa's internal institutions that partly
survived colonialism with important implications for 
constitution making given the persistent call for African 
solutions to its problems.
Given this fairly clear theoretical environment, a
constitution maker may assess Nigeria's problems as 
merely "shortcomings of political procedure, techniques, 
style and the personality of the actors"4 and concentrate 
on creating or strengthening existing institutions to
2. Shivj1,I.(1989) Keynote Address to the African Regional Institute of the American 
Council of Learned Societies' Comparative Constitutionalism Project, held in 
Collaboration with the South African Political Economy Series/Afrlean Association 
of Political Scinces, South Africa, May 22-25, Harare, Zimbabwe. Also as Seminar 
Paper In School of Law, University of Warwick, July, 1990.
3. A major text on this is Benda-Beckman.P.von, woodman, G.R.et al (1988) Between 
kinship and the State, Social security and Law in Developing Countrles.(Foris, 
Holland t U.S.A.)
4. Usman, Y.B.(1979) For the Liberation Of Nigeria.(New Beacon Books Ltd., London) p.
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foster an intra elite consensus and corporatism, as in 
the past. Meanwhile, the status quo would remain 
unassailed, if not strengthened.
On the other hand, the historic opportunity may be seized 
upon to break new ground and reverse the continued 
marginalization of the majority of the population. Rather 
than concentrating mainly on limited forms of liberal 
democracy, a framework would be laid to create the 
conditions necessary for popular democracy, for instance 
the competent use of franchise, debate and discussion of 
crucial issues, accountability, etc.5 But the ultimate 
central objective of a new constitutional frame must 
include the following:6 1(a) to restructure the economy 
so as to reduce to the minimum the extant huge gap 
between the general public and those in control of public 
institutions and business.(b) Secure equitable 
distribution of resources in the various sections of the 
country and sectors of the economy.
2).To jettison the widely propagated belief that 
political activity is mainly concerned with contest for 
material resources and public status among the areas, 
nationalities, families and individuals. The holding of 
public office be dissociated from the current practice of 
private accumulation through huge official and unofficial 
remuneration.
5. Therban,C.(1977) "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy* in 103 The New 
Left Review ; Bangura, Y.(19S8) "The Crisis of Underdevelopment and the Transition 
to Civil Rule: Conceptualising the Question of Democracy In Nigeria" Africa 
Development. 13 Review of African Political Economy 1: 33-50.
6. Usman, op. cit.p.100
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3) Foster a popular system of participation through which 
the common man can understand, guide and discipline its 
representatives.
4) Re adjust exploitative external relations "to internal 
demands for popular transformation and development, as 
against the bourgeois strategy of adjustment of internal 
growth to the constraints of the world wide expansion of 
capital”.7
These objectives are attainable in the long term only 
through a practical and responsible citizenry. Such a 
citizen is built on the pillar of political education 
beginning with simple things as orientations about 
government, common political and economic knowledge, 
notion of and conscious sharing of institutions.8 Others 
are, knowledge about the significance of voting, 
campaigns, mass meetings, casting of ballot and political 
and economic practices defined as corrupt, etc. The 
constitutional context for realizing these can be secured 
through providing a special role for working class and 
students' movements, intelligentsia genuinely sympathetic 
to the cause of mainstream of the population, co­
operatives and fostering consciousness and activity in 
the citizenry. The aim is not so much social engineering 
as to "underline actual forms of organisation ...that
1. Amir, S.(1987) -Democracy and National Strategy in the Periphery- 9 Third Word 
Quarterly,4 1129-1156.
8. Hayward, M.Fred,(1973) "Political Participation and Ita Role in Development : Some 
Observations Drawn From the African Context* 7 The Journal of Developing Areas, 
591-612.
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have actually emerged [oc_ existed) in the historical 
development of popular movements in Africa".9
The orientation of a constitution largely depends on 
those controlling its process. Constitutions, noted 
McWhinney,10 tend to reflect the personality or general 
intellectual (and economic) background of its drafters.lt 
has already been noted in chapter one how Charles Beard 
and other writers thought of the American Constitution of 
1787 as a document that rationalized the broad economic 
interests of its makers. The rest of the thesis covering 
this phase will consider the philosophy and orientation 
of the constitutional process within the theoretical 
grounding of the first chapter.
In attempting the discussion along this line, certain 
caveats and constraints are noted. First, not all the 
participants in the process have economic history or are 
accessible. The existing system of patron-client 
relationship requires in most cases a period of initiaton 
for confidence and loyalty building. The situation is 
further complicated by the tendency to cluster shares and 
directorships in single influential patrons for easy 
access to public and private patronage. Again, 
information on those currently in government is not 
accessible. It is for this reason that some writers have 
used the income and occupation of some of the
9. Mamdani, at al. op. clt. p.16.
10. Mcwhinney, E. (1966) Fadaral Conattutlon (or a Multinational world. (Sijthoff- 
Laydan) p.7.
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participants to - determine, the class basis of the 
process.11
It is also to be borne in mind that the lack of 
solidarity among the dominant groups has been the reason 
for the crises and instability in Nigeria, hence, the 
fact that they take divergent views on some issues should 
not come as a surprise. Finally, in class analysis, the 
role of thinkers and intellectuals is problematic.12 This 
general position is exemplified by the existence of 
minority reports as we will see, written on the basis of 
fundamental disagreement with the position taken by the 
majority of the members on crucial issues. The authors of 
the minority report are people sharing similar objective 
privileged position with most of the majority but 
fundamentally differing in their subjective views. Thus 
it has been noted that "one can not simply infer a 
stratum's political orientation on the basis of its 
apparently privileged position vis-a-vis others". 
Within the context of this introduction, we now consider 
the constitutional process that heralded the Second 
Republic in 1979.
Sae Onimode. B. and Osagie, B.(1977),'Economic Aspect of cha Draft Constitution" 
New Nigerian Newspapers, 8/1/197? t 10/1/1977. Sklar had used this approach as 
early as 1963 in a seminal work on tha power structure in Nigaria-Sklar,R.L.(1963) 
Nigerian Political Parties, power in an emergent African country.(Princeton)
Hindess.B.(1987) Politics and Class Analysis (Oxford, London).
13 Sandbrook, R. and Arn, J.(1977) The Labouring Poor and Urban Class Formation! The 
Case of Greater Accra ( Monograph Series, No.12, Canter for Developng Area 
studies, Montreal, Mcgill Univ.,) p.7.
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3.A.THE CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMITTEE, 1975-1976.
The making of a new constitution was part of the 
transition programme to civilian rule announced by 
General Murtalla Mohammed after overthrowing General 
Yakubu Gowon in a coup in July, 1975. Gowon had reneged 
on an earlier promise to hand over to civilians in 
1976.14 In the transition scheme, a Committee would 
produce a draft constitution by September 1976; local 
Government would be organized and elections held on a non 
party basis. The latter would in turn, partly constitute 
the electorate for forming the Constituent Assembly to
adopt the work of the Draft Committee. Finally, an 
existing ban on party activities would be lifted to usher 
in series of elections to form the State and Federal 
Governments. The assassination of Murtalla did not 
prevent the fulfilment of this programme by General 
Olusegun Obasanjo who succeeded him.
It may be noted that while the Committee had begun its 
work, the Military Government created seven more states 
and established a new federal capita-Abuja. The role of 
the Committee and the subsequent Constituent Assembly was 
therefore minimized in these matters.
3.A.1 Appointment and Composition of the Committee.
The 51 member body was handpicked first on the basis of a 
geographical criterion (2 per state) while the rest were 
learned men in disciplines considered to have direct
14. Pantar-Brick,K.(1978) -The Constitution Drafting Committaa" in Pantar-Brick, <ed)
Soldiers and Oil, tha political transformation of Nigoria. (Prank Cass, London) p.
291.
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relevance to constitution making- history, law economics 
and other social sciences, -especially political science. 
Eminent Nigerians with some experience in constitution 
making were brought in to complete the spectrum"*15 
Specifically, they were exclusively from the professions 
of law, business and academics or university 
administration and politics. Of the 50 (Chief Awolowo 
having declined to serve) who participated, 24% were 
legal practitioners; 44% were academics and university 
administrators. In all, 24% of the entire membership had 
served as ministers or commissioners in either the civil 
government of the first republic and or the subsequent 
military regimes now engaged in private vocations.16
The available specific economic interests of some of the 
members is however quite revealing. Of the lot, 36% were 
directors or chairmen in companies that were either 
wholly indigenous or linked to multinationals and 
constituting the largest group. Specifically, those 
linked with international finance account for 66.7% of 
the whole. The Chairman of the Committee and a prominent 
Sokoto prince held directorships and or chairmanships in 
a record of at least ten companies each most of which 
were subsidiaries of multinationals. The Head of State at 
the time of the process. General Obasanjo subsequently
ls. Address by Hia Excallancy, the lata General Murtalla R. Muhammad, In the Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee (hereinafter called the Committee) .Vol.I, 
p.xllll, 197«.
16. Report of the CDC, Vol.ll ( containing the Sub Committees' work) (Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1976) p.S for the list of members. For analysis, see Osoba, 
O.,(1979) "The Nigerian Constitution and the working Class* in 1 Positive Review,
3:5-42. Data extracted from: Nigeria Company Handbook, Information on major 
companies in Nigeria (Research and Data Services Ltd.Lagos, 1986)i Who's who in 
Nigeria 19S3 (Daily Times, Lagos)! Who's Who in Africa (1982).
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retired to a multi-million naira agro-based and 
merchandise business which existed when he was occupying 
the office. Similarly, his second in command,Generaly 
Shehu M.Yar'adua, retired to business in finance,
construction and shipping.
It is therefore clear that the CDC and its appointors 
were a composite fusion of interlocking sectoral
interests with a fairly comprehensive coverage of the 
overall ideological and value commitments of the dominant 
ruling class17. The high component of those who served in 
past administrations and past constitutional processes 
would ensure continuity of those values, as we will see.
In stark contrast was the absence in the Committee of 
effective, critical representation from the lower segment 
of the population such as workers, students and others in 
subsistence farming or petty trades. It was not omitted 
by inadvertence. General Murtalla had earlier on defended 
the omission on grounds of convenience. "It is not 
possible within such a small group to include all shades 
of opinion and all interests. Nor is this necessary. It 
is enough to ensure that all the broad areas of interest 
and expertise are brought into the Committee...”18 The 
concrete effect of this one-sided representation will 
become obvious in the procedure adopted by the Committee 
and the determination of concrete issues.
17. Osoba, op. clt.p.9.
18. Address by Gen. Mohammed, op. clt.p.xllli.
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3.A.2 Terms of Reference and Procedure.
The Committee first met on 18th October, 1975 when 
General Murtalla made an inaugural speech to spell out 
important guide-lines after which the Committee would 
produce a first initial draft constitution for public 
comment and discussion . A running theme in the speech 
was the creation or strengthening of institutions and 
procedures in the constitution to change the behaviour of 
political leaders. "This administration believes strongly 
that the provisions of the constitution can be used for 
removing or minimizing some of our basic problems" and to 
transform politics from "its previous scenario of bitter 
personal wrangles into a healthy game of political 
argument and discussion"*19
In concrete terms, the constitution should aim to provide 
for the following: i) To eliminate cut throat competition 
where the winner takes all.ii) Jettison institutionalized 
opposition to the government in power and develop 
consensus politics and government predicated on a 
community of all interests and not parochialism, iii) 
Defuse tension through a decentralized power structure 
and functions, iv) Create means of securing a free and 
fair elections, vi). Depoliticise the census, which has 
been a source of difficulty in the past because of its 
linkage with revenue allocation significantly based on 
population and a host of other factors.
l*. ibid.
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On some matters, the speech disclosed that the Military 
Government had committed itself and were therefore not 
negotiable. These were: a) A federal democratic system of 
government and fundamental rights. b) A stable 
constitutional government that secures maximum 
participation and consensus. The government also 
considered the mechanics for attaining some of the 
objectives. They were: a) "genuine and truly national 
political parties" whose number should be reduced 
according to a criteria to be determined by the 
Committee. In view of disillusion with political parties, 
the Committee was free to devise means of forming 
government without parties, b) An executive presidential 
system where the latter would be elected on the same 
ticket with the vice-president and their mode of election 
broad enough to "reflect the federal character of the 
country". In line with the corporatist strategy, the 
composition of the cabinet was to reflect the same, c) An 
independent judiciary, corrupt practices tribunal and 
ombudsman to stamp out corruption and provide avenue for 
redressing grievances against public institutions, 
e).Restrictions on further states creation. These 
conclusions were commended to the Committee for "careful 
consideration".
Taking notice of an on going debate in the country on 
ideology. General Murtalla counselled the Committee 
against adopting one. "Past events have...shown that we 
can not build a future for this country on a rigid 
political ideology. Such an approach would be
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unrealistic. The evolution of a doctrinal concept is 
usually predicated upon the general acceptance by the 
people of a national political philosophy and 
consequently, until all our people or a large majority of 
them have acknowledged a common ideological motivation, 
it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular 
philosophy or ideology in the constitution"20.There was 
no suggestion of who and how such a national philosophy 
will evolve since it does not come simply out of the 
blue. Except those aspects on which the government was 
committed, the guide-lines were not strictly directives, 
although the Committee was not expected to ignore them, 
in any case it had a large room for exploration, apart 
from being issues with which most of them were 
comfortable.
After debating the inaugural address and "the basic 
causes of instability in Nigeria during the civilian 
regime and possible constitutional remedies", it invited 
memoranda from the "general public" through press and 
radio advertisement.21 Since there were no translation of 
the subject of advertisement into at least the major 
languages, it must have been intended for those literate 
in English and who could afford to buy radio sets or 
newspapers or had access to those who had. The 
contributor must also be determined to perform his civic
20. Ibid.
21. v o i . i ,  p . l .
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duties to produce the required four copies. Oral evidence 
was thought of as unnecessary.
The memorandum was to address all or any of the general 
or specific issues outlined in the advertisement. The 
issues were in fact the Government's guide-lines 
reordered. Consequently, the range of options or 
alternatives that might be available were neither 
presented nor canvassed. Again the Committee imputed a 
certain knowledge of the essence of a constitution to the 
contributor. It is to be noted that a ban on parties and 
political activities was still in force, which means 
there was no organisation with the material, intellectual 
and human capacity to reach out to the public and explain 
the object of the entire exercise.22 *
In the end, the Committee acknowledged receipt of 346 
contributions, of which 15 were in Hausa, none in Ibo or 
Yoruba and other minority languages. The 15 Hausa
contributions did not (as gleaned from the titles) 
address the issues in the manner designed by the 
Committee. In fact one of the contributions was addressed 
to "maigirma" (the big man), indicative of the ordinary 
man's idea of the exercise. On the whole, except the 
judges, religious bodies made the largest group
contributions, followed by public authorities most of 
whom were local governments. Among the individual
22. For the importance of parties during this kind of exercise see, Ghai,Y.P. ( 1988)
Law , Politics and Government in the Pacific (Inst. Of Pacific
Studies, Univ. of South Pacific).
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contributors were ex-President Azikiwe, ex-Premier 
Osadabey and some of the Committee members.
There is little in the Reports of the Committee 
acknowledging the limited public contributions and their 
utility.23 The mild cynicism for public contribution 
which runs through the entire exercise seems to be 
informed by two assumptions. First, the majority of the 
members assumed constitution making to be an intricate 
legal exercise which ordinary folks could not be expected 
to understand. Secondly, following the Head of State, 
they thought of themselves as sufficiently representing a 
cross section of opinion and so were familiar with the 
problems of all as to render wide consultation otiose 
24.This attitude also seems to have guided the way a 
Minority Submission by two of its members was given short 
shrift, even though it was submitted not very late.24 5
To facilitate its work, the Committee set up six subject 
sub committees whose members were assigned according to 
their expertise or political experience in the fieldof 
assignment*26 * The latter's recommendation once approved 
in plenary sessions were sent to the Sub Committee on 
Legal Drafting. In turn, the latter, composed entirely of 
lawyers, apart from putting the recommendations in
23. Pantar-Brick. K.,(1978) "The Constitution Drafting Committee* in Pantar-Brick, 
op.cit.p.296
24. Osoba, 0. and Usman, Y.B., (1976) A Canaral Report on the Work of the Constitution 
Drafting Coiwnittee, A Minority Submission p.3> Pantar-Brick, op. clt. 296.
25. Osoba and Usman, ibid.
26. williams, F.R.A., (1986) "The Making of the Nigerian Constitution" in Goldwin and
Kaufman, op. cit. p.403.
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lawyer's language, co-ordinated the work of various sub 
committees. It was the final draft of this Sub Committee 
that was approved in August 1976 by the full Committee 
and together with the Report of the Sub Committees, 
submitted as its Report to the Head of State.27
The Committee noted the expression of wide ranging views 
by its members and that no member agreed with every 
recommendation.Depending on the perception of interests, 
decisions were made by majorities, some very thin, others 
overwhelming.2® However, there is no Hansard of the 
proceedings to disclose the nature of coalitions and on 
what issues. In considering some of the major themes that 
pre-occupied the Committee, emphasis will be on their 
philosophy and orientation rather a clause by clause 
approach.29
3.B. National Goals, Development And Human Rights.
At independence, constitutions tend to be concerned with 
the tensions of the moment and a pre-occupation of those 
seeking to succeed the imperial power. The constitutional 
development of Nigeria was no exception. The
constitutions were hardly "fundamental agreement of the 
whole people as to how they wish to be governed"^ apart 
from being the basic rules for governance. However, 
subsequent processes provide a unique opportunity to
27. sae Vols.I t II, op. clt.
28. Vol.I p.ill.
2®. Such a clausa by clausa approach was adoptad by Dant, M.(1977) Improving Nigeria's 
Draft Constitution (Dark Horsa Publications; also a discussion by Pantar-Brick, 
op. clt. 30
30. Dent, ibid p. 1
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restructure the foreign imposed system and provide a 
charter for government, leadership, popular participation 
and development. That is, to provide the necessary link 
between democracy and development.
It is in this light that the Committee aptly noted that 
past constitutions and governments were too concerned 
with power, rights without duties, provision of
opportunity for the acquisition of wealth and prestige of 
those in office to the neglect of the basic needs of the 
people for food, clothing, health and education.31 In 
this respect, it recommended that the new constitution 
should be a charter of government. The latter would 
assume definite duties and ensure participation of the 
citizens in government through referendum and elections 
"in accordance with the provisions of this constitution". 
The overall objective is "Liberty, Equality and
Justice".32 On these noble goals of the nation, agreement 
in the Committee was unanimous.33 The Sub Committee on 
Fundamental Objectives, etc which considered the matter 
was guided by the constitutions of Ghana, 1960 and those 
of French speaking African countries, most of which were 
framed in the sixties.
However as those ideals are not self-executing, the 
procedure and institutions for realizing them was 
problematic. It brought to the fore the real value
31. Vol.II, p.35.
32. ibid. Art». 1 * 2 .
33. vol.l p.vil.
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commitments of the members.First, the mode of enforcing 
the socio-economic provisions contained in the directive 
principles of state policy was simplified to a zero sum 
argument on justiciability. The Sub-Committee had 
recommended a half way house of enforcing it through a 
declaratory judgement to determine the consistency or 
otherwise of any administrative action or legislation 
with it.The intended effect of this was political rather 
than judicial as it provides a ground for impeaching the 
authority concerned.34 The Sub Committee also recommended 
the establishment of task force to determine the 
feasibility of enforcing them "at any time as our 
circumstances and resources permit"3  ^ indicating that it 
had not in fact convinced itself of the propriety of its 
recommendation in this regard.
The middle ground measure was itself expunged by the 
majority members on the argument that it would foster 
confrontation between the judiciary on the one hand and
other arms of government on the other.36 However, the
main political and ideological underpinning for the
rejection could not be disguised in the rest of the
reasons advanced. The majority of the full Committee 
asserted that the fundamental objectives were "new and no 
one can be too confident of the most appropriate method 
of ensuring their observance". That if they turn out "to
34. Vol.II. Art*. 2-4.
35. ibid. p. 210.
36. Vol.l p.vil.
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be unsuitable or ineffective, it would require a
constitutional amendment to deal with the situation”.37
In charting the specific socio-economic rights the Sub 
Committee relied on the Indian and Pakistani 
constitutions as models and was aided by the U.N.Covenant 
on Social and Economic Rights. But this positive use of 
existing progressive constitutions and the U.N. 
recommendations was limited by the lack of will to 
improve on them. Those constitutions were made in the 
1940s and much has been done, especially by the Indian 
courts to give it reality.Some of those decisions could 
have been considered by the Committee to reflect the 
current position in India.38 Moreover, the U.N. Covenants 
are only declarations of principles and ideals allowing 
individual countries the latitude to adopt suitable 
mechanisms for achieving them. In any case, Nigeria is 
not yet a party to the Covenant which came into force on 
3rd January, 1976.39
It is rather curious that a set of principles which 
existed for several decades is described as "new" today. 
Of course it is new to Nigeria, but that is what the 
constitution making is all about-chart a new course! On 
the question of the objectives provision becoming 
unsuitable at some point, it is indeed hard to imagine a
” . ibid.
38. sea Sudardhan.R.(1990) "In Ouest of State; Politics and Judiciary In India" In 1 
The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics XXVIII 45-69; Baxi,
U.,"Taking Suffering Seriously; Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India" 29 ICJ Review, p.37-49
39. New International (1987) (Freedom to and Freedom From; the Two Faces of Human Rights) p.9; Brownlie, 1.(1981) Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford) 118-149.
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situation when the right to shelter, adequate food, old 
age care, etc will become unsuitable, quite apart from 
the issue of enforcement in the courts.
Redress through the courts in their current typical 
common law tradition and procedure is undoubtedly the 
lesser, more restrictive and short term of the ways of 
realizing the objectives. Bearing in mind the Nigerian 
condition- of high illiteracy, poverty and rural based 
population, the constitution must concentrate on creating 
the conditions that will popularize the objectives. They 
are to be given
"the widest possible publicity at all 
levels of government; in towns and 
villages; in schools and tertiary 
institutions; in churches [and 
mosques] and other organizations so 
that our people will become fully 
aware of them, discuss them and 
obtain a clear sense of the direction 
in which our country is heading. It 
should give each man and woman a 
clear appreciation of the need for 
him or her to participate fully in 
the building of our new 
nation...firmly based on equality and 
social justice".40
Consequently, the suggested solution of the majority 
members of the full Committee, empowering the National 
Assembly to establish by law, authorities to promote and 
enforce the principles was clearly a way of avoiding the 
issue in view of the restricted category of people who 
under the constitution qualify for elections into the 
Assembly, as we will see later. As it stands, the
40. Constitutional Planning Committee of Papua Now Cuinaa, writing on a similar
subject— sao Pinal Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, 1974 Part I, 
p.2/2.
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efficacy of this section predicates on three variables.
First, the political will of the government to comply;
second, the creation of a public opinion which values and
insists on their application, and finally a judicial
system with the orientation and ability to convert such
de facto and de jure clauses into a due process contrary
to the intentions of the framers of the constitution
following the approach of some Indian courts.41 42
3.B.1 Human Rights and Duties.
According to Learned Hand, "liberty lies in the hearts of 
men and women...When it dies there, no constitution, no 
law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies 
there, it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save 
it".42 The roie 0f the constitution, laws and courts is 
not to create, but to give reality, dimension and 
substance to these basic rights.
In Europe, these rights have been explicitly identified 
and elaborated in a certain form-political and civil 43 
However, as noted earlier on, concrete socio-economic 
forms have been provided through legislation creating 
social and welfare institutions. On the other hand human 
rights as a constitutional element was introduced in 
Nigeria by the British on the eve of decolonization to 
allay the fears of minorities.44 Its form as sanctified
41. Baxi, U.,-Taking Suffering..' op. clt.i Dent, op. cit.p.S.
42. Hand L.,(1952) The Spirit of Liberty (N.Y.).
43. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (1963), (Manchester.
44. Cmnd. SOS, The Minorities Coanlssion.
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by the Law of Lagos 196145 followed the civil and 
political categories as restated in the European 
Covention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.
The majority of the Committee had little difficulty in 
adopting the recommendations of the all lawyers Legal 
Drafting Sub Committee where "most of the debate" took 
place.46 It may be surmised therefore that it was this 
Sub Committee that rejected the justiciability of the 
socio-eonomic rights as proposed by the Sub Committee on 
Fundamental Rights, et al.The reason for its rejection 
was that they are rights which depend on "the 
availability of resources and in the final analysis... to 
the obligation or duty of government to provide the 
facilities".47 Their proper place opined the majority is 
in the fundamental objectives and directive principles of 
state policy. Having rejected labelling it as rights, 
the mechanism for its enforcement as recommended, free 
legal aid and a commission on fundamental rights which 
would follow through the legal process on behalf of an 
indigent citizen, fell by the way side.However, the false 
basis of the Committee's antipathy or scepticism to the 
cost of welfare principles was exposed by the fact that 
the Military Government was in the process of introducing
The ICJ, Lagos Conference on tha Rule of Law, 1961-see Brownlie, op. cit.pp.426- 
437.
« .  Ibid.
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a free universal primary education and abolishing most 
tuition and boarding fees in higher levels.48
Having stripped the concept of rights of enabling 
content, the position under the independence constitution 
was adopted with minor changes. It went on to list 
extensive exceptions, providing for the suppression of 
some under an automatic or declared emergency and for the 
derogation of others by laws "reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society".49 This stood in stark contrast to 
the elaborate provisions which secure private property, 
prompt payment of compensation in the event of 
nationalization and guarantee of speedy access to a 
judicial tribunal to determine same in the event of a 
dispute. Its essence according to Nwabueze (who was one 
of the members) is to restrict the power of the state to 
take compulsory possession of property "lawfully" 
acquired.50
A major omission regarding this subject is the silence of 
the draft on the correlated duties of citizens. This is 
because to realize rights in the wider sense, the 
citizens have to take positive steps to create the 
resources necessary for its realization and be active in
4B. Pantar-Brick, op. clt.303.
49. For the position under the 1960 t 1963 constitutions, see Proehl.P.O. (1970) Fundamental Rights under the Nigerian Constitution, 1960-1965. Occasional Paper 
no.8. (African Studies Center, Unlv. of California L.A.).
50. Nwabueze, B.O.,(198S) Nigeria's Presidential Constitution, 1979-1983.(Longman, 
London).
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its defence. The more balanced and recent constitutions 
of the Pacific countries followed this.51
The framework and effect of the provisions on fundamental 
rights and objectives is to restrict the category of its 
beneficiaries to those with the financial, intellectual 
and information resources. The fact that only the 
coalitions of the dominant forces of the socio-economic 
order have these resources while the majority of the 
population have not need not be restated as we consider 
another elite arrangement in the constituion.
3.B.2 NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND FEDERAL CHARACTER.
The desire to foster and enhance unity in a plural 
Nigeria has been a central theme in the Reports and one 
on which the largest proportion of time was spent in 
debate.52 53Unity and stability are desired consequences of 
national integration, consequently, they constitute one 
of the national goals defined in the Reports. In the 
words of the main Report, "the need for such provisions 
in the Nigerian constitution is all the greater because 
of the heterogeneity of the society, the increasing gap 
between the rich and the poor, the growing cleavage 
between the social groupings, all of which combine to 
confuse the nation and bedevil the concerted march to 
orderly progress"5^ (emphasis mine).
51. For instanca, Vanuatu constitution, (1983) Part 2 in Pacific Constitutions, Vol.2 
(Pacific Law Unit, Pot Vila and tha Inst, of Pacific Studias, USP ).
52. Williams, op. cit.p.403.
53. Vol.I p.vl.
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The broad objectives were first stated in the motto, 
"Peace, Unity and Progress". Accordingly, free mobility 
of people and services, inter marriage and the formation 
of cross-cutting associations is to be encouraged. The 
state shall guarantee full residence rights to citizens 
in all parts of Nigeria and foster a feeling of belonging 
and involvement.54 These broad principles were to be 
achieved through several devices. First, in the formation 
of political parties, the name, emblem or motto is not to 
contain an ethnic or religious connotation or give the 
appearance that its members and activities are confined 
to only a part of the country. Again, its executive 
committee must belong to not less than two thirds of the 
states of Nigeria. The Committee assumed that real power 
lies in the executive of a party which is not borne out 
of the experience in most party regimes including 
Nigeria.
It also implied state citizenship which obviously 
contradicts the general goals of securing a Nigerian 
identity as against parochial tendencies The idea of 
suppressing national groups in the interest of a bigger 
nation is itself fraught with dangers as the experience 
from USSR, East and Central Europe testifies. Finally, 
the Committee proposed the banning of associations of any 
kind from canvassing for votes, rather than confining it 
to religious and ethnic based ones, if at all necessary. 
On the whole, as it relates to parties the approach was
5*. These objectives are better elaborated in the Sub Committee Report, Vol.II, Art.3.
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wholesale assimilationist rather than pluralist,55 
desiring groups to submerge their identities and claims 
to that of the intrusive nation.
A second major aspect regarding integration is
the mode of electing the president which
required support in almost two thirds of all
states of the federation. Finally, and more
significantly, because it sapped the energy of
the members a great deal more, was the "quest
for [elite] ethnic balance"56 or ethnic
equitability5  ^ which went under the slogan
of"federal character".In its final compromised
form, the formula requires that
"the composition of the government of the 
Federation or any of its agencies and the 
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out 
in a manner as to reflect the federal 
character of Nigeria and the need to promote 
national unity, and to command national 
loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be 
no predominance of persons from a few states 
or from a few ethnic or other sectional 
groups in that government or any of its 
agencies"58.
Accordingly, the president is enjoined to appoint a 
minister each from among citizens belonging to a state, 
with similar requirement for other federal agencies and 
the various state apparatus. This formula was a 
compromise between those who sought a full scale ethnic
55. Palley, Clair«,(1978) Constitutional Law and Minorities, MRG Report no.39 (or the 
variety of choices available to a plural society! A plea for a pluralist approach 
in a heterogenous society Is made by Lustgarten, L.,‘Liberty In a Culturally 
Plural Society’
56. Diamond, L.(1987) ‘Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian 
Republic’,86 African Affairs, 343
57. Pyfe, C.,(1988) XXVI "African Horton as a Constitution Maker’ The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparartive Politics, 2<167.
5B. S.8 (2) of the Draft Constitution, Vol.I.
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based patronage and those who counselled against using a 
person's ethnic or linguistic affiliation as the primary 
definition of his quality as a human being.59
Two important points may be noted here. First, the 
formula creates and entrenches an insidious principle of 
hierarchy of citizens through the concept of belonging to 
a state, thereby undermine the essence of national 
citizenship. As Usman50 rightly noted the first class 
citizens are those in a state who can claim to belong to 
a community indigenous to the state. The second class are 
those who although claiming to belong to one state, live 
in another and will on that account suffer pervasive 
discrimination. A third group are those who although are 
citizens of Nigeria, can not with certainty lay claim to 
a community indigenous to a particular state. Thus, in 
trying to provide for elite ethnic balance, it 
constitutionalizes an unhealthy concept of state / 
citizenship. It would complicate the already delicate 
practice of discrimination in the enjoyment of services 
against those not resident in their states of origin such 
as differentiated admission and tuition in schools, non­
award of scholarships, etc.
The second strand of the problem is the emphasis of the 
principle on personnel in the public service, instead of 
amenities and services. It assumes that such power 
sharing simpliciter will foster a sense of belonging and
59. Vol.I pp.vlii-lx.
60. Usman. For ths Liberation..op. clt.p.118.
164
that such appointees will act on behalf of group 
interests.61
However, the fact of the matter is that federal character
represents an optimum culmination of the gradual 
historical process as we saw since colonial rule to 
establish corporatism and consensus at the dominant elite
level. This is clearly reflected in the way the other
problems identified by the Sub Committee , namely. the
increasing gap between the rich and the poor and the
increased polarization of social cleavages were glossed ✓ 
over. Those are in reality the crucial issues which need 
urgent attention rather than elite power sharing. Writing 
on a similar goal, a similar Committee in Papua New 
Guinea provided thus:
"No particular area or grouping of people 
should be developed at the expense of 
another materially or in other ways. There 
should always be an equitable distribution 
and balanced sharing of all the benefits and 
opportunities the nation has to offer. For 
this type of development to come into being, 
it is necessary for such conditions to be 
created and to obtain throughout the nation 
at all times as to be conducive to that 
development...Thus co-operatives and general 
purpose corporations should be actively 
encouraged or promoted..."62
The Committee was however at pains to acknowledge the 
need for broad representation of the various peoples but 
without elevating it to a matter of major constitutional 
principle.
Olagunju, T. (1987) 'Federal Character and National Integration* In Ukwu,
I.U.ad..Federal Character and National Integration (NIPSS, Kuru, Nigeria).
*2. Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, 1974, Part I pp.2/3 a 2/7.
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3.B.3 THE ECONOMY AND IDEOLOGY.
A constitution as already noted embodies a set of values 
which may be explicit as in communist/socialist regimes 
or implicit as in capitalist states. In the making of 
constitutions therefore, conflicts and interests will in 
all probability arise regarding which values to enshrine 
and their formulation. Moreover, the existence of the two 
major modes of organizing the economy, capitalism and 
socialism, is likely to bring the argument into sharper 
focus. Specifically, in a federation three major economic 
issues will have to be considered in the process.63 The 
first is fiscal powers and revenue allocation, second, is 
the allocation of powers over control of economic 
activities between the centre and the states. Finally, 
and more important is the determination of individual 
property rights and the overall economic direction of the 
country. In a sense, the form of the latter, determines 
the position of the first and second, consequently, 
effort will be concentrated on the third.
The relevant Sub Committee wanted a socialist order as a 
long term goal, based on "public ownership and control of 
the means of production and distribution". This is said 
to be "the only effective answer to the conditions of 
under-development, inequality and exploitation that exist 
in the country today".64 However this view was not 
acceptable to the majority in the full session. A number
63. Toyo, Eskor, 1977 "Workshop on the Draft Constitution for Nigeria'ln Proceedings 
of Workshop on tha Draft Consrtitutlon held at the Unlv. of Malduguri undar the 
auspices of the Department of Law, 23-27 May.
64. Vol. II p. kill.
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of reasons were advanced by them for rejecting the 
proposition. First, Nigeria [not Nigerians] had always 
had its own ideology-mixed economy which must not be 
abandoned in favour of one "conceived in a foreign 
political and social climate". Second, the Nigerian 
constitution should be flexible. Third, that it is not 
possible to accumulate wealth and mitigate material 
inequality at once and therefore warned against arousing 
public expectations that can not or rather will not be 
met. The majority further employed arguments relating to 
the alleged paucity of bureaucrats in Nigeria to 
implement socialism and also noted the efficiency of 
agriculture and industries in capitalist societies in 
contrast to socialist regimes.
It then concluded that Nigeria should maintain a "mixed 
economy in which the public sector plays a large and 
leading role and able to determine basic prices and to 
mitigate the harsher effects of private competition but 
at the same time also allows room for private 
initiative"*65 The final provision therefore enjoined the 
state to control and operate the major sectors of the 
economy and protect individual rights to participate in 
spheres not under its control.66 The major sectors are 
those already exclusively controlled by the government 
unless it is changed by legislation.
65. VOl.I p.KlV.
66. S.10(b)(c) of tha Draft Const.
167
Necessarily at this juncture, the government was enjoined 
to ensure that there is no concentration of wealth or 
economic activities in a few hands. Finally, the 
Marketing Boards which in the past had partly shielded 
the farmers from the vagaries of the market and middlemen 
were abolished limiting the government to regulating 
transactions in these commodities to give effect to 
"freedom of trade and commerce throughout the 
Federation"*67 But the decision was undermined as the 
government had shortly before sought to centralize the 
disparate regional boards in the interest of "maximum 
benefit to the farmers"’6®
Several observations may be made on the majority 
decision. It is the first time that socialism was
canvassed as an alternative model in an official forum in 
Nigeria.Its rejection was not based on a balanced
consideration of the two economic models.That is, no case 
was made against capitalism, rather its alleged virtues 
were uncritically advanced and defended with sweeping 
assertions and generalizations69 while the shortcomings 
of socialist regimes were put with equal energy. 
Secondly, the decision assumed or presented the public
sector as serving egalitarian purposes and therefore 
appeared to make a limited concession to welfare
principles.This obviously flies in the face of the
*7. Vol.X, p. xxiv.
68. Speech by Lt.General O.Obasanjo,(1976) in 23 Nigeria Trade Journal, 3i8-12.
For a vigorous factual contestation of thses assertions, see, Toyo,E.1977 "The
Mixed Economy as Fundamental Objective, A Study of the Economic and Ideological
Proposals of the Drft Constitution*, in Political Issues in the Nigerian Draft
Constitution (Nigerian Pol. Sc. Asaociatrion. Sept.).
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historical raison d'etre of the public service in 
Nigeria.
It was established to provide colonialism with requisite 
infrastructure, clerks and intellectual resources for its 
economic activities.This role has been modified only to 
the extent that the public sector now serves first as 
intermediaries between the state and multinationals and 
as a training ground for future managers and directors in 
multinationals or well endowed private companies to which 
such bureaucrats aspire.7® This is reflected in the 
Committee's membership, as seen in Appendix A on fusion 
of elites in chapter one where past top bureaucrats hold 
multiple directorship in subsidiaries of multinationals. 
Any meaningful role for the public sector has to begin 
with a restructuring of its inherited conception, 
function and mode of operation. The effect of the 
decision is in reality a further consolidation of the 
hold the same group of people have over the socio­
economic structure.
The Draft Constitution rightly vested in the National 
Assembly enormous powers to determine the division of 
public revenue between the centre and the states and the 
latter inter se.lt is also empowered to set up by law, a 
body to periodically review the ownership and control of 
business enterprises operating in Nigeria*71 This is
7®. This role wa» historically forecast by Panon, F.(1978) Tha Wretched of tha Barth. 
(Pengul, London). For a factual account of this rola in Nigeria, saa Abba,A.at 
el,ads (1985) Tha Nigerian Economic Crisis, Causes and Solutions (ASUU, Nigeria) 
cap 8.
71. Ss.102, 103 k 10(4)(a) of tha Draft Const.
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potentially democratic but-when considered against the 
background of the qualifications for elections to the 
legislature, the implication becomes obvious. Under 
section 64(f) of the Draft, no person is qualified for 
election to any legislature if he is an employee in the 
public service of all the tiers of government including 
the armed forces or was such employee within four months 
before the elections.In effect, only those in business, 
private professions or their nominees can vie for seats. 
Of course, by reason of their poverty, illiteracy and 
ignorance, the majority of the people are excluded while 
those in the organised private sector can not take 
advantage of their group strength to sponsor parties or 
candidates because associations of any sort are 
prohibited from doing same.72
3.B.4 Discussions and Policy on State Land.
Land is a major factor of production and vital resource 
endowment. Decisions on it are critical for economic 
programmes.lt is not therefore surprising that " this 
subject evoked very heated controversy".72 The source of 
the debate was the Sub Committee decision that no person 
shall own or occupy more than one plot of land throughout 
the country*74 The recommendation generated hysteria and 
provided the members with the opportunity to vent anger 
at what they perceived as tendencies by those with the
72. S.171 of tho Draft Const.
7i. VoX.I, p.x.
74. Ibid,xl.
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opportunity to use their of-Cicial positions to accumulate 
land.
Two strands of arguments were used to reject the 
proposal.First, it was observed with great elaboration 
that it would constrain business operations particularly 
those with diverse bases in one state and across several 
states.Second, some Nigerians use land as an investment 
employing its income to meet family commitments or old 
age care.lt then concluded that it is "obnoxious, 
immoral, unethical and wholly unjustifiable to take away 
through the constitution by way of mandatory provisions 
vested rights of a citizen which he lawfully acquired and 
for which there is no state necessity or need.This is 
confiscatory in concept..."75
However, despite the majority members' strong objection 
to restructuring land a general case for restriction was 
well supported.lt was noted that in spite of
indigenization which brought to the market the shares of 
numerous industrial and commercial concerns, land is 
still vital and critical as an investment because the 
former are limited. Again, land traditionally carries 
prestige and status, "a quality lacking in company 
shares, and which therefore makes it more highly prized 
and sought after".Pleading equality of opportunity, the 
members exclaimed, "it is revolting to one's sense of 
justice and equity that one person alone should own about
7S. ibid.
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three or seven more plots of state land...when others of 
comparable status have none."^®
Having made a vigorous commercial case for redistributing 
land, several modes of implementing it were explored. The 
"ability to develop" was described as a "desirable" 
condition for allocation while "a more radical approach" 
which advocated the nationalization of all lands in the 
country was rejected out of hand.77 In the end, the 
majority rejected all the proposals and settled for the 
status quo. A year after, the military introduced the 
kind of order the Committee could not agree on in the 
acquisition and use of land and entrenched it in the 
constitution.78 It converted all lands in the country 
juridically into state land largely under the 
administration of a state governor who grants certificate 
of occupancy to users. But in practice, the situation 
hardly changed regarding easier access to land.
It is obvious that the contemplated and actual reform 
were not about the basic ends which the policy should 
have addressed.That is, to remove bureaucratic and 
commercial restrictions on the social or communal use of 
land, to make it accessible to those in need for housing
7‘. ibid 
77 ibid, xii■
78. The Land Uaa Act 1978 (than known aa a Decree) and antranchad in the 1979 
Constitution via s.274(5)
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or farming, to eradicate exploitation and speculation 
through land ownership, and minimize private ownership.79
3.C.STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, 
a) .  The Executive.
According to the Chairman of the Committee, the choice of 
form for the executive was one of two issues that 
occupied the largest proportion of time spent on the 
debate.80 The issue was presented as a straight choice 
between the American type executive presidency with rigid 
separation of powers and the bicephalous executive 
monarch and prime minister of British parliamentary 
system.
The latter was rejected along with a "middle way" which 
urged the transfer of some of the enormous powers 
conferred on the president. It suffices to mention that 
the reasons for the part adaptation of the American 
variant is its so-called consistency with African custom, 
its integrative and unifying value coupled with the 
alleged defects of the Westminster system as operated in 
the first republic.81 The main check against the possible 
evolvement of a dictator in view of the enormous powers 
was rightly pointed out as a "politically conscious 
society jealous of its constitution". But as noted the 
structures for creating such a society was glossed over.
79. Toyo, B.op. clt.PN.63, p.90.
80. Williams, op. c i t .403.
81. Vol.IX, p.xxlx-xxxlii Ths arguments are debated In Dent op.clt.iPanter-Brlcks, op.
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It should be pointed out that the new and strong 
executive which is made the centre piece in the overall 
design of the constitution followed the pattern of post 
independence constitutions in Africa.®2 Other 
institutions the legislature, judiciary, political 
parties and other consultative organs are primarily 
conceived and organised as procedural and substantive 
restraints on the presidential powers.83 One can only but 
agree with Usman 84 in cautioning that whether a 
constitutionally powerful president is desirable and 
effective will depend on the purposes for which the power 
is intended.Its capacity will be determined less by the 
constitution than the overall social, economic and 
political setting of the country. In Nigeria currently, 
the relevant forces in the power structure are not the 
common people who therefore would not be the 
beneficiaries of a strong president. But paradoxically, 
the inability of the dominant forces to secure consensus 
and establish hegemony and the attendant in-fighting may 
not allow a president to actualize his constitutional 
powers without being perceived as a dictator, 
b). The Legislature.
The Committee rightly noted that legislatures play a 
vital primary role in a democratic society.In making laws 
and overseeing their execution, they need to be guided by
82. Ajanl,G.F.(1982) "The 1979 Somali Conatitutioni Tha Socialiat and African Patterns 
and tha European Style* 3 Review of Socialist Law, pp.259-269.
83 . Panter-Brlck,op.clt.p.313.
84 . Usman, For tha Liberation...op.cit.p.97.
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the overall current problems and set standards for future 
conduct.85 Although the Committee defined the role of the 
legislature in relation to the overarching powers of the 
president, it nevertheless vested it with potentially 
immense powers. Apart from its traditional law making 
role, it was conferred with enormous financial powers as 
already mentioned, it was responsible for the appointment 
and regulation of an Ombudsman, the Auditor-General of 
the Federation and States' Directors of Audit, etc.
Without delving into the details of these powers, its 
democratic concept is stultified by the restrictive 
nature of the qualifications for legislature. This defect 
could have been partly cured by an electoral arrangement 
which links the direct election of the president to that 
of the legislature.This has the advantage of bringing the 
legislature, the government86 and the people into 
contact, albeit a tenuous one given the limitations.Two 
other means of minimizing the rigid separation between 
the executive and the legislature have been suggested. 
First, to appoint ministers as ex-officio members or 
secondly, oblige the president to appoint ministers 
wholly from the legislature.87
On the whole, the expenditure of efforts and energy on 
the horizontal division of powers among the three arms of 
government leads to a progressive erosion of powers of
85. Voi.I. p.xx.
86. Nwabueze, B.0.(197«) Praaldantialiam In Commonvaalth Africa (London), pp.432-3.
87. Panter-Br ick, op. cit.
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the electorate.The latter'a-position can only be guarded 
by constitutional recognition of co-operatives, etc as 
alluded to using occupation alone or together with 
geography as the criteria for constituting the 
legislature. Also, provisions could be made for a set 
number of citizens to initiate policies or legislation 
coupling it with referendum to give the initiative, 
legislative effect.
C). The Judiciary.
By its own account, the Sub Committee on Judicial System 
"adopted a procedure which separates those general 
ethical and ideological aspects of our work and those 
general recommendations proceeding immediately on their 
own account from the more specific recommendations on the 
future structure and principles of operation of the 
judicial system".88 Consequently, the more fundamental 
issue of examining the ideological foundations, 
orientations and structures of the colonially modelled 
courts was skated over. Rather, it considered the extant 
structure as given concentrating only on a code of ethics 
for judicial officers additional to the general code for 
public officers.
However, it added a Sharia Court of Appeal to the federal 
courts in fulfilment of the Sub Committee's promise "to 
give relevance to the moral, religious and ethical 
beliefs of all segments of this society".The Court is an 
arm of the Federal Court of Appeal which hears appeals
88. vol.ix. p.101.
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from the various High -Courts of the States. The 
jurisdiction of the former is limited to appeals on 
Muslim personal law. But -its creation was preceded by 
very serious and delicate problems which almost resulted 
in a deadlock on the issue.89 We shall come back to this 
issue in the next chapter when we discuss the debate in a 
forum where the arguments were open, 
d). POLITICAL PARTIES.
The Committee had little difficulty in agreeing on a 
plurality of parties consistent with the rights to "hold 
opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information 
without interference" and "to assemble freely and 
associate with other persons",90It was fortified in this 
regard by an overwhelming preference of the members of 
the public who wrote on parties for plurality.
It was however necessary to regulate the parties and 
redirect their past regional tendencies to ensure that 
subsequent ones are genuinely national and democratic.The 
first restraint required parties to federalize their 
character in terms of the origin, name, motto, officials 
and membership. Secondly .they were severed from any 
particularistic interests or sentiments by prohibiting 
associations from canvassing for votes.Third, detailed 
provisions regulated the internal management of the 
parties' election of officers, source of finance and 
illegitimate means of persuasion. Specifically, parties
B9. Williams, op.cit.p.412.
90. 3s.32 t 33 of ths Draft Const.respectively.
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were to be funded only through individual contributions 
and government grant.There were no limits to the former. 
Contributions from abroad, and local associations 
including theoretically, business organizations and more 
practically workers' associations, were prohibited. An 
electoral commission was entrusted with the task of 
administering these detailed regulations, including the 
recognition of parties.91
The first problem to note on the Committee's 
recommemdation relates to its conception of political 
parties.They were conceived of as electoral machines 
whose main role is to herd the electorate in support of 
contestants, requiring nothing of the people in return 
save their loyalty.92 Also by denying associations the 
right to canvass for votes, sponsor candidates or 
contribute funds towards the project, citizens are 
atomized and kept at the periphery of the political 
process.Of course those worse off in the arrangements are 
not the affluent or their candidates as the Report of the 
Panel on the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) 
established conclusively the link and the massive funds 
some rich tycoons sunk in various political parties in 
the second republic.93 This has been the pattern since 
1954 as we saw.
91. Ibid. Ss.170-17«
92. Hullin, C ,«<3.(1981). Tony Banni Arguments tor Danocracy. (Penguin) p.211-212.
9J. Report of tha Judicial Coaniasion of Inquiry into tha Affaira of Federal Electoral Commission, 1979-1983 (Padaral Republic of Nigarla, Main Raport,1986) aspacially, 
pp.133-139.
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Thus the Committees w m  unable or unwilling to recognise 
the educational value of parties especially in the case 
of Nigeria where most people are ignorant of their 
rights,the modes of securing redress or protecting 
themselves from common official abuse.The failure to use 
political parties as vehicles for poliitical education 
and redress seems to be another common feature of Africa 
save Julius Nyerere's TANU.94 95 The latter and Ghana's 
Center for Civic Education before it was abolished in 
1972 made honest and serious attempts to explain the 
operation of government and the rights and
responsibilities of citizens.96 Another major negative 
restraint on the role of parties as conceived by the 
Committee is the restriction on the programme that a 
party may adopt.For instance,in rejecting socialism as an 
ideal,the majority passionately argued that "the Nigerian 
constitution should be flexible and should enable a 
popularly elected government to pursue policies which 
have been put and explained to the electorate".96 On the 
other hand, the Draft Constitution declared, "the 
programme as well as the aims and objects of a political 
party shall conform with the provisions of chapter II 
[fundamental objectives] of this constitution".97
94. Hayward, r.N.,(1973) ‘Political Participation and Its Rola in Development: Some
Observation Drawn from the African Context' 7 The Journal of Developing Areas,
pp.541-612.
95. ibid.
96. Vol.X, p.xlll.
97. 3.174 of the Draft Const.
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In effect, a party is prevented from making
enforceableble those fundamental objectives made 
judicially unenforceable in the constitution, the only 
concession being the provision which allowed a party to 
advocate or canvass the alteration of any portion of the 
constitution. Of course, this post- facto concession is 
really harmless and meaningless given the range of forces 
against any party that seeks to overturn some of these 
positions now firm in the constitution, 
e). Public Services And Accountability.
The Committee noted within the context of the Code of 
Conduct, but of general application, that "corruption and 
abuse of office has eaten deeply into the fabric of the 
public service in this country".98 This has been a 
recurring theme for the overthrow of both civil and 
military regimes in Nigeria since the first coup in 1966 
which is an indication of the failure of the extant 
disciplinary rules of the civil service and criminal 
codes.lt was therefore an issue on which there was little 
disagreement.
However, the nature of and the mechanics to secure and 
enforce public accountabilty and minimize corruption were 
multiple, problematic and mainly institutional.
Specifically, to ensure that the president/governor and 
their deputies were responsible and did not abuse their 
office, the legislature was vested with the power to 
impeach for "misconduct in the performance of the
98. V o l . I ,  p . x x x l l i .
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functions of his offce or is unable to perform those 
functions."99 This is complemented by a further 
legislative investigative powers with a wider compass as 
it was to cover any person or matter within the 
competence of the particular legislature.The latter 
enable it to acquire information to assist in legislation 
or "to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the 
execution of laws...and in the.. .administration of funds 
appropriated by it".100 A third method was the 
establishment of Ombudsman, called the Public Complaints 
Commission.191 It was responsible to the legislature. Its 
function was however circumscribed as it was confined to 
the remedy of private grievance against public 
authorities in contrast to what obtains in Scandinavia 
and New Zealand where maladministration in general may be 
inquired into to guard against future injustice.192
In drafting the code, the relevant Sub Committee was 
partly guided by the leadership codes of Tanzania and 
Zambia.But it declined to follow the neater Tanzanian 
position where different rules apply to separate 
categories of leaders.lt also expanded the category of 
leaders in both cases from high and middle cadres to 
include all employees of the public service including 
parastatals and universities.The latter would include 
messengers, cleaners, typists and labourers in government
99. Ss.117 t 118 of tha Draft Conat.
10°. ibid. a.80.
101. Ibid. a.81.
102. Dant, op. clt.p.24.
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service.103 Given the size- of the. people affected, the 
code was likely to create a huge bureaucracy of its own. 
It was certainly an error to have included people who 
because of their lowly position in the structure could 
only become victims of the abuse of office and 
corruption. This extended spectrum was an easy means of 
rendering it inoperable.
The Code enjoined the time worn admirable principle that 
a leader must not put himself in a position where his 
private interest conflicts with public duty.In addition 
to not holding two public offices at once, he is not to 
run a private business or profession in such a way as to 
jeopardise his public duty or opportunistically advance 
his private concern. Thus, a leader may operate a private 
concern or assist spouses and children once he is able to 
avoid the practical difficulties of conflict of 
interest .Also he may derive income from spare time 
activity.104
This contrasted with the recommendation of the PNG 
Committee prohibiting those engaged in profession or 
business for profit from being constitutional office 
holders.lt also requires leaders to declare any private 
interests in any discussion so as to value the proper 
weight to such person's contribution.105 It is 
instructive that the Sub Committee's suggestion is close
10J. 8.210 of tlta Draft Conat.
104. Saa Pantar-Brick, op. clt.p.133.
105. Pinal Raport, op. cit. 3/8 a 3/10.
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to this.Zt sought to prohibit officials and their spouses 
from engaging in any private trade or profession or 
employ workers in the same.Also the leaders/spouses may 
not be shareholders or directors in such private
enterprises.But it permited income from land owned or 
occupied by the official, from bank deposits, government 
stock or shares in public registered companies.10®
Similarly, the Sub Committee's prohibition of officials 
receiving positions of chairmanship, director or other 
employee of a public company after retirement was 
rejected in plenary session.lt however made a limited 
concession by confining the restriction to the offices of 
the president/governor and their deputies and limited to 
foreign companies.107 Some constitutions restrict leaders 
from acquiring interests in foreign firms some years 
after retirement.10®
After assuming office or the coming into force of the 
Code, the affected officials were required to declare 
their assets and liabilities and those of their spouse 
and children under the age of 21 years and finally at the 
end of their term of office. Such declarations would be 
available to the public for inspection but "on such terms 
and conditions as the National Assembly may
prescribe".109 In view of the kinds of interests who will
106. VOl.II, pp.42-3.
107. S.S. Fourth Schadula of tho Draft Const.
10*. Final Report..op.cit. limits tha period to 3 yrs.-p.3/10.
109. S.1S (1)(b) of tha Draft Const.
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probably converge in tha. Assembly, terms for open 
inspection are unlikely.
Again, gifts are not allowed except "those from relatives 
or from personal friends to such extent and on such 
occasions as are recognised by custom", while borrowing 
is confined as regards public officers of the highest 
rank to loans from recognised financial institutions.11® 
We have already alluded to the kind of problematic and 
corrupt link that existed between party, state officials 
and financial institutions since 1954.This requirement 
simply constitutionalizes that relationship. The entire 
Code depended for enforcement on a Bureau and Tribunal 
whose establishment and operation depends on a future 
legislation.We will see in the next chapter whether and 
how this has been accomplished.
It is clear from the preceding account and analysis that 
in their nature, operation and orientation, the Committee 
provided for the accountability of one set of the 
dominant group to another only. There was scarcely any 
reference to the people from whom power and authority is 
derived, on behalf of whom they act and who ultimately 
bear the burden of maladministration.111 Commonly used 
devices such as recall, initiative or the right of the 
citizens to lodge complaints in any department against 
any official or authority and the obligation of the
110. Ss. 6(3) t 7(b) of the Draft Const, rospactivaly.
111. Osoba and Usman, Minority Submission, op. cit.p.23i Usman For the Liberation of
Nigeria (New Beacon Books, London) p.ui.
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latter to forward the-petition to the Bureau and Tribunal 
were completely ignored.113 Finally, by providing for a 
number of Commissions and certain bodies to advise the 
president, power was diffused and would serve as a 
mechanism of accountability.113 Again, membership of such 
bodies are confined to the same group of people by tying 
the criteria for membership to qualification for House of 
Representatives, the second arm of the national 
Legislature.114
In summary, it is quite clear that the Constitution 
Drafting Committee who were wholly representatives of the 
elites, understood the problems of constitutionalism in 
Nigeria in terms of crises among the dominant groups but 
without admitting it and carefully sought to provide 
institutions and procedures horizontally at that level. 
However, since the Committee did not have the last word 
on it, we will see whether and to what extent its 
prescriptions would be adopted, rejected or modified by 
the Constituent Assembly after the public debate and 
discussion of the Report.
Thl» channel o£ complain was racommandad by tha PNG Raport. op.clt.p.3/12¡ see 
also a.91 of tha Chlnasa Const.,1978.
113. s.128 of tha Draft Const, astabllshas a host of Commissions covering a whola ranga 
of lssuas.
114. Ibid, s.131.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
4.THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 1977-78.
The life of the Constituent Assembly began with the local 
government reform 1976.The Federal Government considered 
the structure of administration at the local government 
level as critical in the next phase of constitutional 
development. Consequently, a reform was introduced in 
1976 to serve three broad purposes.1 .First, the local 
governments would serve as electoral colleges to
constitute the Constituent Assembly. Others were the 
standardization of the disparate systems of local 
government administration in the country and to establish 
it as a third tier of government with specific functions 
and fiscal powers. The idea was to secure a firm link 
between people and government at the most basic level.The 
government was however careful to spell out what the 
reform was not about: to disturb the traditional 
political structure or impose uniformity.2
It is important to highlight some of the structural and 
practical obstacles in reforming the councils and which 
undermined their suitability as vehicles for constituting 
the Constituent Assembly and achieving other goals.On the 
structure, the various state governments were given the 
leeway to determine the mode of forming the councils by 
either direct franchise or indirect electoral college in 
addition to a provision allowing for nominated
1. Guidelines for Local Government Reform, 1976.
2. Gboyega, A.B.* Oyedlran, 0.(1978)*A View from Ibadan- In Panter-Brlck, K.,Soldiers and Oil,(Prank Cass, London). pp.2S7-269i Allyu, A.». -As Seen In Keduna- 
ibid, pp.270-287, op.clt.cap III.
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councillors. Nine of the- nineteen states opted for
indirect elections. seven of which are in the North.^ The
main reason for the -decision was said to be the absence
of political parties which would have enabled voters to 
elect councillors on the basis of party programmes and 
debate the issues that the voters expected their
prospective candidates in the C.A.to grapple with. 
Rather, candidates were left to campaign on their
"personal merit and ability" with no discernible criteria 
for assessing it.4
Public employees could contest only if they resigned 
their work four months before the elections, a risk most 
sensibly declined.Hence, in the main, professionals in 
self employment, retired workers, etc could contest, 
thereby robbing the councils of knowledgeable and 
articulate candidates. It may be noted that although 
paramount traditional rulers were barred, their clients, 
the District and Village heads were not.5
On the practical aspect of it, the actual conduct of the 
elections was problematic.Cases of rigging and fiddling 
by traditional rulers in favour of client candidates, the 
opportunity for which was maximized in areas with 
indirect elections were reported.6 In general, few women 
contested and more particularly in the North, most were
3. Only Anambra and Cross River in the South opted for indirect elections-Gboyega a 
Oyediran, ibid, p.262.
4. Aliyu, ibid.pp. 275-76.
5. West Africa, 19th Sept. 1977, pp. 1917-8.
6. Aliyu, op. cit. p.280.
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excluded by tax requirements. These difficulties were 
compounded by the absence of electoral regulations at the 
time.
For these reasons, a large body of councillors were 
returned unopposed most of whom were people in petty 
private business such as traders, contractors, big time 
farmers. From the public sector were scribes to 
traditional councils, village and district heads, etc.^ 
Few of them had formal educational qualifications higher 
than the primary school level, but most had strong links 
with the first republic politicians. Above all, there was 
little evidence of awareness in the general population 
that the councillors only would elect the Constituent 
Assembly members.
4.A.Composition And Socio-economic Background Of The C.a 
Members.
The C.A.»established by Decree No.50 of 1977 8 comprised 
a total of 232 members. They fell into three categories.
Those nominated by the government including its chairman
/
and his deputy. The 22 persons in this category were 
chosen on "grounds of personal merit", being "citizens 
who have distinguished themselves in one aspect or other 
of our national life.." while others who "have also risen 
to positions of authority or excellence within rheir 
respective interest groups are here to represent such 
interests". The reason for nominated members was the
7. ibid.
8. Constituent Assembly Decree. 1977.
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government’s concern "to cover every aspect of the 
national life and that all shades of opinion should be 
brought to bear" on the deliberations.9 In this group, 
tertiary institutions, trade unions and students body had 
one member each while women had four with the remaing 
thirteen mainly drawn from the private sector.
The second group of members, seven of them were the 
chairman of the CDC and chairmen of its various sub 
committees.They were to serve as a bridge between the two 
works to clarify issues and the thinking behind the 
recommendations. Finally, the bulk of the members, 203 of 
them were elected by the various local governments 
forming an electoral college for the purpose. The size of 
members from each state was determined by the criteria of 
equality and population, hence it varied from 16 (Kano) 
to 7 (Niger). The Decree10 sets out the qualifications 
for candidature: I) Indigeneity to the state where the 
candidate proposes to be elected or residence for five 
years.ii) Payment of tax for three years consecutively 
and not paid in a lump sum in the year of elections as 
some candidates attempted.11 iii) The candidate was 
nominated by ten eligible voters in the local area, other 
than members of the council.
9. Inaugural Address by the Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, on the 6th Oct. 
1977 In Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, OFFICIAL REPORT, Volume 1 ( 
Federal Ministry of Inf. Lagos).
10. S.3(1 ).
11. Constituent Assembly (Special Provisions) Decree, 1977, No. 60.
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The Decree disqualified soma people absolutely or partly. 
In the latter category were employees of the public 
sector who were subject to the requirement of four months 
resignation prior to the elections. Absolutely prohibited 
were former public sector employees who were removed from 
office due to dishonesty or dismissed on any ground. 
Similarly, such public officers who were found guilty of 
corruption or abuse of office by a tribunal from 15th 
January, 1966 were subsequently added.12 Lastly in this 
group were the paramount traditional rulers.
The election was organized by the Federal Electoral 
Commission.12 The councils were however allowed to look 
outside their own ranks for candidates, consequently 
almost half (77) of the elected members were returned 
unopposed, mostly from the North, with a heavy dose of 
"old politicians"*14 Apart from the probable hold which 
such politicians had over the councillors who returned 
them unopposed, some got membership through corruption, 
as one member robustly put it. "I am fully aware that 
many of my colleagues here have been told very bluntly by 
their constituents that: 'I like you Mr.X, I respect you, 
but let me be frank with you, unless you give me some 
money at least to compensate me for being in the local 
government council which is going to act in the electoral 
college, you are not going to get my vote'. A lot of us
12. C.A. <Amendt. Decree) 1977, No.52.
13. Federal Electoral Commission Decree, 1977, No.41.
14. West Africa, 12th Sept. 1977.
190
have heard this kind of thing ,clear and simple. Let us 
face it. It la a fact."15
Corruption was of course facilitated by the small size of 
the constituencies. In effect, the sovereignty of the 
people to determine the structure of the constitution was 
undermined by corruption and the mode of elections into 
the councils and the C.A.which doubly removed them from 
the process. Thus, the claim of a member that the
"Assembly is profoundly and democratically 
representative" can hardly be supported by available 
evidence.1®
In situations where there are adequate fora and 
opportunities for pressure groups to provide an input 
through lobby, it may not be necessary to have
representatives of all or most shades of opinion in this 
kind of exercise. But the debates as we will see clearly 
show that most delegates being active politicians were
more pre-occupied with securing a good deal for their 
constituencies while the overall interest of the nation 
was tangential although the latter was a constant
reference theme.
4.B.Terms Of Reference And Procedure.
The Decree establishing the C.A.conferred on it "full 
powers to deliberate upon the draft constitution”.17 
Explaining further, the Head of State, General Obasanjo
15. Alhajl Y. Paiko tn tha Report, Vol. I. par. 1182.
16. Chief M.F.Adeegbe, ibid, par.1450.
17. S.l Decree No.SO 1977.
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in an inaugural address restated the Assembly's task to 
"discuss the- draft constitution..and come out with a 
recommendation” which will be considered and promulgated 
by the Supreme Military Council.18 It had one year for 
the exercise beginning 6th October, 1977.
The C.A. and the Government were at cross purposes on the 
question of who had the final power to enact the 
constitution. The chairman of the Assembly, after an 
initial prevarication settled for the unanimous view of 
all the members who had contributed on it including the 
CDC chairman that "we are here to enact the constitution" 
and that "the will of the people should not be treated as 
a recommendation".19 The military government of course 
had little difficulty in brushing aside the envisaged 
powers of the Assembly to enact its work as the 
constitution. However, according to Read, if the Assembly 
had got its way, the end result would be a "deracinated" 
rather than an "autochthonous" constitution. The latter 
applies if there is a breach of continuity with a foreign 
imposed document while the former reflects a constitution 
that is the product of its natural local environment.28
In its work the Assembly was to consider the official 
majority draft and no other. Subsequent demand by several 
members to secure for the Assembly, the Minority Report 
to ensure a balanced discussion was dismissed by the
19. Gan.Obasanjo in Vol.I. op. cit. par. 10.
19. Just lea Udo Udona, ibid. par. 330 t 336.
20. Raad.J.1.(1979) “Tha nsw Constitution of Nigeria, I979i 'tha Washington Modal'7*23 Tha Journal of African Law 2 >146.
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chairman as outside its agenda. He said: "What is before 
us- is- what we are supposed to consider. We are a legal 
body established by law and we have our own restrictive 
power... 1 am not interested in listening to any minority 
report"•21 This rigid construction of its agenda indeed 
robbed the Assembly of a major arena on which to organize 
opinion on a cross-cutting basis, given the non existence 
of parties. More profoundly, as we will see, it largely 
contributed to redirecting attention to religion and the 
tenacity of region as major cleavages on which opinion 
was firmly and implacably organized.
Together with the draft, the Assembly was also to 
consider the report of the Technical Committee on Revenue 
Allocation and public contributions as monitored by the 
government. General Obasanjo passionately exhorted the 
members to adopt a wider rather than myopic view of their 
responsibilities. He said: "There are of course millions 
and millions of our country men and women who will never 
express an opinion on these matters. Many are not 
inclined to comment on such issues as a rule[?], while 
many more are permanently engaged in the desperate 
efforts of making ends meet. We have millions of our 
country men and women who face a harsh situation almost 
fated, as it were, to continue to labour under very 
primitive conditions of eking a livelihood, with little 
modern aids, in thick forest zones as in swampy regions 
and the sahel.The interest of such people and their
*1. Justice Udoma, op. elt.par. 330.
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future happiness must also-be taken into account when we 
compare the views of those who write in the press or talk 
on the radio and television.." Finally, he advised that 
"valuble time will be saved by sticking to your 'term of 
reference' as closely as possible".22 In conclusion, the 
chairman in response , presaged in opposite direction 
what was to come when he noted that members were not 
there as delegates with their minds made up and with 
immutable instructions to vote in a particular way.
The work of the Assembly was therefore at the outset 
profoundly circumscribed by the military and the 
chairman, himself a Supreme Court Justice, who had a 
narrow, heavily legalistic view of its role. By being 
limited to the majority draft, some narrowly based public 
comments as we will see and other technical papers, its 
agenda and role was reduced to one of detail rather than 
an opportunity to examine the orientation and structure 
of the entire exercise in the light of all available 
draft proposals and contributions.
The procedure in the Assembly was governed by the 
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives in force 
on 12th January, 1966 as may be modified.22 This means, 
the Assembly would function as if it was a legislative 
house and treat the majority draft as if it was a Bill to 
pass through the usual three stage procedure for
legislation. Following this procedure, the C.D.C.
Gan Obasanjo. op. clt. par.9-10.
2J. S. « of Dacraa No. 50/1977.
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chairman opened discussions by presenting the entire 
draft to the Assembly as a Bill for first and second 
reading on its principles. He espoused the main 
considerations behind what he considered as the major 
aspects of the draft. According to the Assembly's 
Chairman, this aspect of the procedure was a favour done 
by the CDC chairman to the Assembly in the absence of 
parties. "There is no party leadership. All of us are 
like periwinkles wearing the same hat."^4 Before 
considering the issues raised, a word on public
contributions is apt here.
4.B.1 The Draft And Public Debate.
The federal government had decided at the outset not to 
organize a referendum on the end product of the exercise. 
Consequently, between the submission of the draft by the 
CDC and the commencement of the C.A., one year was 
allowed for public debate and discussion of the majority 
draft.For this, a Media Monitoring Unit was established 
in the Political Division of the Cabinet Office, Lagos to 
monitor and collate the discussions all over the country. 
However, no further structures were established to 
disseminate the exercise and receive inputs from the 
rural areas. Consequently, what is available as public 
contributions were views expressed by individuals and few 
groups as reported in the country's newspapers, reported 
debates on television and radio, reported organized 
symposia and individual memos and letters sent to the
24. Justice Udo udoma, op. clt.par. 6«.
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unit.2® In effect, the debate was confined to those with 
the resources and access to the media.There is of course 
little argument on the inability of a bureacracy based in 
Lagos to co-ordinate discussions in such a vast country, 
thereby necessarily narrowing the base of contributions.
The importance which should have been accorded to the 
debate is underscored by three considerations. First, the 
CDC whose work was the main document before the C.A. 
noted, each controversial issue was debated and 
determined by majority decision which in some cases was 
slight and in others, overwhelming. The view of the 
public in those regards is very important. Secondly, the 
CDC comprised not of representatives but a mixture of 
technicians.The wider public might reflect a different 
balance of opinion if the issues were properly presented 
and under stood. Finally, some of the CDC members who 
authored the draft had publicly disavowed some of the 
provisions underlining the need to re-examine those 
matters critically.2®
The Report of the Government Unit provides only a summary 
of the major issues raised by the debaters, without the 
contributors' identities.But one compiled by the Nigerian 
Institute for Social and Economic Research attempted to 
produce a list of contributors which by its own account 
is not comprehensive.27 In this report, 451 persons
25. The Public Debate on the draft Constitution: prepared by the Media Monitoring Unit 
of the Political Division of the Cabinet Office. 1977.
26. See West Africa, 31st Jan., 1977.
22. Univ. of Ibadan, Nigeria.
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contributed.The list indicated that as a generic group, 
but not as an organized opinion, the largest contributors 
were university academics and administrators, many of 
whom later became members of the Constituent Assembly.The 
largest individual contributor was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
with eight articles.He was one of the three 1st Republic 
regional leaders. Newspapers made the highest group 
contributions.
On the substantive issues, one aspect of fundamental 
rights, freedom of expression and the press, received the 
highest comments, followed by the executive president. 
This agrees with the summary of the Government Unit.In 
both reports, the legislature received little attention 
except the qualifications which attracted considerable 
comments from the teachers in particular. Also the need 
to transfer more functions and fiscal powers to the 
states and local governments attracted a fair attention 
in both reports.However, the economy and finance did not 
feature much, partly because a Technical Committee on 
Revenue Allocation established by the government prior to 
the discussions had not submitted its report.
The judiciary attracted very little comments, with only 
two articles on the Sharia Court in the NISER report 
while the few contributions reported by the Unit centered 
on improving the draft on the subject.Political parties 
received ample debates, but were mostly confined to 
suggestions aimed at reducing their number, ranging from 
zero to multiple.The funding of parties was commented
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upon with suggestions to prohibit open or secret 
contributions to parties by business so as to inhibit 
foreign manipulation of the political process and also 
limit individual contributions.But only one person was 
reported to have complained against the CDC decision to 
sever associations of any kind from having links with 
parties.
On the public services, there was no broad discussion on 
its structure and orientation.But a group of commentators 
noted that the federal character principle was a ploy by 
the elite to sow seeds of discord in the population by 
creating the impression that the basic cause of 
instability is diversity of people and not the gap 
between the the rich and poor.Another group wanted civil 
servants prohibited from taking up appointments as 
chairmen and directors of statutory corporations and 
government owned companies .Mixed economy as the 
ideological foundation of the draft constitution invoked 
controversy, notably among the academics.One group saw it 
as the rejection of socialism, while another considered 
it proper and compatible with the inclination of 
Nigerians.A third group yet, argued that the debate was 
futile as socialism could only be introduced in Nigeria 
through revolution and not the CDC who have a vested 
interest against it.
Finally, a fair proportion of contributors demanded the 
official release of the minority report for balanced 
debate and discussion. It is obvious that the limited
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contributions were a re-run of the debates that took 
place in the CDC deliberations, a not surprising result 
given the constraints already noted.
4.C.The C.A.Debate On The Principles: Major Issues And 
Cleavage Structure.
In determining the issues and cleavage structure in the 
American Convention of 1787, Jillson28 sought to bridge 
the polarized position of those who saw the dominance of 
ideas against those who posit the dominance of parochial 
economic interets.His data was the roll-call of votes 
taken in the Convention.He concluded that in dealing with 
the issues relating to the scope, scale and form of 
government, "higher level of constitutional choice", 
principles prevailed and coalitions were formed on 
intellectual cleavage.On the other hand, on the choice of 
institutions, nature of their relationship, regulation of 
political behaviour, distribution of power among the 
organs, between the latter and the citizens, etc, being 
matters of practical politics, they involved "lower 
level" decisions.In these areas, decisions were taken 
with direct reference to the political, economic and 
social characteristics of the choosers, their states or 
regions. His findings and conclusions were attempts to 
elaborate with evidence earlier hints and suggestions by 
others to that effect.28
28. Jillson, C. Calvin (1988) Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the
Federal Convention of 1787 (Agathon Press, N.Y.). 29
29. Buchanan, J.M.t Tullock.C.(1962), Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations ofConMstltutionai Democracy. (AnHArbor, MI: Unlver. of Michigan Press:
Dahl,R.A.(1976) Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and
Consent.(Chicago: Rand Mcnally).
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In testing this approach -against Nigeria's Constituent 
Assembly, some limiting factors must be underlined at the 
outset. First, the procedure adopted in the latter 
reduced considerably the use of open votes and divisions 
in deciding propositions.The idea was to enhance 
compromises and consensus. Second, most of the members 
especially the elected, lacked actual economic data 
because of the tendency of companies and business to 
cluster in few influential individuals. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, on the whole, the tendency in the 1977 
CA apparently compares with Jillson's findings as we 
shall now see.
Issues & Cleavages In The Discussions On Principles.
The C.A.approached its work by separating discussions on 
"principles" from the detailed considerations of the 
nitty gritty of the draft. It therefore assumed like 
Jillson, that principles are distinguishable from 
practical issues, an exercise that transpired to be 
futile as most members dwelt on what they perceived as 
the issues that affected them and their constituencies 
rather than the niceties of the constitution.The debates 
(second reading in parliamentary terms) contained in 
Volume I of the Proceedings , was moved by the CDC 
Chairman, Chief Rotimi Williams.He identified two main 
themes and made out the case for their adoption.
The first and main issue was the adoption of the 
presidential in contrast to the parliamentary system. The 
central reason for the choice was the desire to
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concretize the concept of the sovereignty of the people 
by enabling them to choose the president directly instead 
of allowing the choice made for them by the political
party with majority which obtains in parliamentary
systems.30 Practical considerations of Nigeria's past 
involving in fighting and tension between the ceremonial 
president and the prime minister played a significant 
role in the choice.31 The executve president became the 
centre piece of the entire system with all other 
institutions created in its shadow.Such organs as the
legislature, judiciary, code of conduct, ombudsman, etc
were to serve mainly as checks and balances on an all 
powerful president and his team.
The second theme , although part of the judicature, stood 
in its own right, that is, the question of a Federal
Sharia Court of Appeal. According to Williams, the CDC 
recommended the creation of a Sharia Court of Appeal at 
the federal level to rectify a legal anomaly arising from 
the dissolution of the regions where such a court catered 
for the entire region but had to be limited to individual 
states in the new structure. Second, to give recognition 
to the rights of the millions of Nigerian Muslims by 
providing a judicial avenue which is not available in 
existing federal courts structure for redressing
30. VOX.I, op.clt.par.38-9.
31. Those occasions were: a).On the choice of the Nigerian successor to the departing 
British head of Nigerian Arny. b).In 1964 when the President delayed In calling on 
the outgoing Prime Minister to form the government after winning majority of seats 
In parliament.c). in 1966, when the President declined to appoint acting P.M. to 
deal with the mutiny In the Army In the absence of the ubstantlve PM, on the 
ground that he had to contact the latter overseas-lbld, Alhajl Abdul Rasaq,
par.1893-1901.
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particular grievances. Furthermore, since there are 
appeal structures at state level for these courts, it is 
necessary to harmonize their decisions to ensure 
uniformity, predictability and certainty of the laws in 
tune with the federal structure.The CDC could not 
recommend the adoption of the entire Sharia jurisprudence 
because Nigeria is plural and secular.
In the debate that followed, members largely lifted the 
issues and pattern with very strong views expressed 
either ways. In particular, Ibrahim Tahir (Bauchi) who 
was also in the CDC advanced powerful arguments against 
the presidential system dubbing it as "anti-populist" 
(presumably dictatorial) and "anti democratic" because it 
tends to individualize and personalize the state away 
from the representatives of the people.32 Therefore in a 
broad sense, it could be argued that in the choice of 
form of government, principles and the desire for good 
government largely guided the discussions with cleavages 
veering towards intellectual. However, on several issues 
and cleavages, members reacted on different levels and 
under different influences and motives because of the 
personal, practical effect it would have on them as 
individuals or members of a group.
1. Political Constituency Interests.
Although the dichotomy is not clear cut in all cases, the 
following issues and groupings were evident and each 
pressed for particularistic interests.a) Members from oil
32. Ibid, Dr. I.Tahir, par.1748.
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producing areas.Those from these states sought a 
provision in the constitution to take into account their 
position as the producers of oil and the nation's wealth 
to secure special funds, b) Religion. Almost all Muslim 
members pressed for the establishment of the Federal 
Sharia Court, a position opposed by a large proportion of 
the Christian and other members. Similarly, a significant 
minority of Christian members wanted schools previously 
run by the missionaries but taken over by the governments 
returned to the past proprietors.c) Abandoned Properties. 
Most of the Ibo members wanted a provision in the 
constitution to compensate or return to the owners, 
property abandoned in the wake of the civil war in Rivers 
and Bendel states. This demand met stiff opposition from 
members of those states.d) Traditional Rulers. Although 
traditional rulers did not have a heavy representation, 
almost all the large members who contributed on it, 
pressed for a role for the traditional rulers. In urging 
caution on this demand, Okigbo 33 gave reasons for its 
apparent popularity.
According to him,since military^ rule, most civil 
political organizations had either been dismantled or 
driven under ground. Instead, the military relied on 
traditional rulers to reach out to the people, thereby 
creating a political constituency. Therefore, the attempt 
to glamourise the institution was an attempt to follow 
the short cut to reach the people. This is evidenced in
33. Ibid, par.1851-52.
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the common practice of such protagonists grovelling for 
all sorts of traditional titles.e) Students. The only 
representatve of students in the Assembly, after
considerable heckling from the chairman over his dress 
(all red from cap to trousers) pressed for issues 
pertaining to education.f) Women. The four women in the 
Assembly, expressed their wish to expunge or modify 
provisions which seemed to derogate on equality sections 
of the draft to uphold custom and Islamic laws as well as 
provisions which legitimate chidren born out of
wedlock.34 They also pressed for other issues affecting 
women in general.
2. Federal and States1 Rights Campaigns.
Being active politicians, with geographic constituencies, 
issues affecting states and local governments were 
profoundly raised. Most of the elected members from all 
states in marked contrast to their nominated 
counterparts, pressed for greater resources and 
responsibilities for these arms of government. They 
charged the CDC with coming heavily under the influence 
of the military government to produce a unitarist
constitution, a charge angrily denied by a CDC member.35 
The CDC decision to create only two lists-exclusive
federal list and residual for the states was severely 
attacked. Champions of states' rights also pressed for 
the decentralization of police.
34. ibid, Mrs. Ukpabi, par.80, Mrs. Akinrinada, par.91» Toyin, 696-7» Mrs.
Braids,1509.
**. ibid, Alhaji Bamali, 1810-11 danied such influanca.
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But the latter group were among themselves divided 
between populous and smaller states on a host of other 
items such as revenue allocation, whether in the 
allocation of seats in the national assembly, equality or 
population should weigh greater, procedure for states 
creation, etc. Together with the CDC members, the 
government nominees seemed to share wider views. One 
reason is the simple fact that they were federal 
government agents, hence were not expected to behave 
differently. But more importantly, most of them had over 
the years built a large interlocking network of economic, 
personal links and other interests spanning across 
several states. This was obvious in the dispute in the 
CDC over control of land.
3. Personal Economic Interests.
Personal concrete economic inter*fets featured mainly in 
three areas. First, there were advocates of minimum 
government, most of whom were the nominated members and 
intellectuals sympathetic to that cause.36 Their 
positions were expressed during the discussions on 
control of the economy, ideology, and justiciability of 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy which Okigbo described as "neo-socialist" which 
does not "square neatly with the neo-capitalist leanings
36. Those with known properties are« Ablola, 258i Cuobadia, 917« Odutola, 1309« 
Malami, 1070« Ebong, 1276« Soma of tha intellectuals areiDr. Tahir,1746-7«Dr. 
Ugoh.1323« Nwanodl,1342.
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of the chapter on the economy".37 The few advocates of 
socialism seemed overwhelmed and on the defensive in 
contrast to the vigorous arguments in the CDC which 
produced non justiciable fundamental objectives as a 
concession. The nature of land ownership and distribution 
produced a complex and diffused grouping. As in the CDC, 
there was a general chorus for redistribution. Most of 
the members who spoke on it and not known to be share 
holders in companies wanted land nationalized.
However, Alhaji Shehu Shagari38 who later became the 
president in the second republic made a vigorous case for 
social justice in the distribution and use of land and 
its resources in relation to the farmers rather than the 
elites who mainly complained of monopoly by the more 
established generation of elites.Finally, there was a 
general reference for the need to cater for the people 
with Mallam Aminu Kano and Alhaji Ali Mungono dwelling 
extensively on those problems affecting the common man.39 
Their resolution required collective rather than 
individual leadership, and Mungono rightly noted that 
sovereignty and poverty are incompatible. It is only by 
resolving these grave needs that there can be cohesion 
and tolerance and accomodation which all yearn for.
37. Okigbo, 1750.
38. 1117-1119.
39. Aminu, 1599-16111 Mungono, 1240-1247.
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4.D.Issues and Cleavages in the Full Committee.
Order 43(2) of the Standing Orders applicable to the 
Assembly required it to consider the draft clause by 
clause. An initial attempt to modify it to provide the
Assembly with some flexibility in approach was heavily 
defeated. Curiously, it produced an almost instinctive 
North (less the minority areas of Benue and Plateau) 
versus South cleavage. The latter together with the 
aforementioned minority states defeated the amendment 
which was made by Alhaji A.Z.Mahmudu from Kwara, with a 
strong backing from the CDC chairman.The amendment sought 
to delay discussions on the preamble until the entire 
Bill was considered.See Appendix B, Table I.40 The Table 
also shows members voting in block, first according to
states and then according to the old regions less the
Benue and Plateau areas of the North, rather than
consider the issues on an individual merit and vote as 
such.
Through the chairman's sole approach, and in the face of 
incessant objections by many members, the Assembly 
subjected itself to another major disability. According 
to his decision, an amendment however important, lapsed 
if the person in whose name it appeared was absent.41 
Incidentally it encouraged members to team up in making 
amendments to cover for absentee colleagues and also had 
the unforeseen effect of partly diffusing an obvious
40. vol.IX. par». 1920-24.
41. ibid, 5642-46.
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North Versus South voting, to other geographically or 
ethnically cross cutting divisions and partly aided 
compromises.
However, the Business Committee of the Assembly decided 
in keeping with the general perception that the chapter 
on the executive was the most important, became the first 
item to be considered while others seemed to follow as 
consequential.
1. The Executive.
There was a re-run of the origin and merits of both 
presidential and parliamentary systems between Ibrahim 
Tahir who opposed the former and Richard Akinjide (later 
minister of justice) who made the case for presidential 
system relying heavily on practical considerations.The 
latter was upheld by the Assembly.42 Most items under the 
executive were adopted in a spirit of compromise, but few 
others attracted sharp and sometimes open divisions, a) 
Age limit. The younger generation of the Assembly were 
fiercely pitted against most of their older colleagues on 
the question of 40 years minimum fixed by the draft for 
the presidency. Abubakar Rimi (Kano) strenuosly argued 
that a minimum age of 21 should apply to all elective 
offices. Ultimately, the division on the issue produced a 
complex cleavage structure, as Appendix B, Table II 
shows.
«2 Ibid, 1943-55.
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It showed first, a division between the nominated/CDC 
members and a large proportion of the elected 
overwhelmingly against it.Almost all the members from the 
South less a divided Anambra and Rivers and the members 
from the North less an almost equally divided Benue and 
Borno were against it. But members from Kano and Plateau 
states made a strong showing in its favour because Kano 
is noted for having a strong, radically politicized anti­
establishment youth under the leadership of Mallam Aminu 
Kano.43 Although the older members won, a compromise age 
of 35 was agreed upon for the president and subsequently, 
30 for the senate.
A subsequent amendment introduced separately by Wodi, 
A.K. (Plateau) and Yusuf,A.B. (Kano) to place a maximum age 
of 70 years for the presidency curiously re-produced a 
single alignment between the predominantly Hausa-Fulani 
states of Bauchi, Kano,Niger and Sokoto versus all the 
members from the South plus Benue and Plateau in the 
North. But Borno, Gongola, Kaduna and Kwara states with 
significant minority nationalities were almost equally 
divided on the issue.See Appendix B, Table III44.
b).An amendment to section 109(2) of the draft to delete 
the words "Chief executive of the Federation" on grounds 
of being superfluous produced yet another single cleavage 
of members from the North less the Benue-Plateau axis
43. Whitaker, C.S.,(1965) "Three Perapectivea on Hierachy: Political Thought and 
Leaderahlp in Northern Nigeria" in III The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Studlea, pp.1-19. i Paden, J.N.(1986) Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Valuea and 
Leaderahlp in Nigeria. ( Hodder a Stoughton. London) pp.378-83.
44. Vol.IZ, pars.2031-2036.
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versus their Southern counterparts. See Appendix B Table 
IV. The-amendment was sponsored by Adamu, M.(Sokoto).45
c). Partial reform of the civil service was suggested to 
remove appointments under section 146-secretary to the 
government, permanent secretaries, ambassadors, etc from 
the civil service structure so that the appointees vacate 
office with their appointors in line with the practice in 
the U.S.A. It was sponsored by Chief J.O.Udoji (Anambra) 
a person who had spent a long period in the civil 
service.46 Together with most current or former members 
in the civil service, the chairman was vigorously against 
the amendment. "It is true we are following the American 
pattern, but it does not mean that we must adopt 
everything American. I think there is a great deal which 
is very good in the British civil service system which 
must be retained in the country".
Predictably, most members from the North, less Plateau 
and a divided Benue and Kaduna voted against it. Except 
those from Bendel, most members from the South were 
almost evenly divided. See Appendix B, Table V.Two main 
reasons may account for the differences. First, there was 
a greater mix of members from the public and private 
sector from the South in contrast to the North where a 
larger number were drawn from the public sector. 
Naturally, the latter group would resist attempts to
45. Ibid, 1981-88.
46. Ibid, part. 5725-5750.
210
restrict their career prospects. Equally important, 
especially for members from the North, the public sector 
has been the incubator for careers in the private sector 
because of their relative lack of capital base in 
contrast to their southern colleagues. Apart from this 
amendment, there was no serious attempt to reform the 
public sector. In fact, there was greater emphasis on 
applying federal character in all spheres of the public 
service including the armed forces which most members 
viewed as a means of ensuring the economic and political 
security of every section of the community.
Apart from these instances involving open division of 
votes, there were some questions on which cleavages 
became pronounced.d) Node of electing the president. The 
procedure for electing the president attracted 
considerable discussion because of the fear expressed by 
the minority groups and smaller states that a few bigger 
and populous states might gang up to perpetuate the 
office among themseves. Consequently, the twin 
requirements of territorial spread and popular acceptance 
was agreed upon. That is apart from securing majority 
votes, it has to spread in a specified number of states, 
e) Political parties. Broadly, the CDC recommendations 
were adopted with little discussions. The changes 
introduced, stripped those on the left of the ideological 
spectrum of the concessions made by the CDC.47 The latter 
had tied political party programmes to mixed economy and *
*7. Saa Balabo'a axplanationa along this lina In Ibid. S9S7-8.
211
a non justiciable directive priniciples, but provided a 
small window by allowing a party to canvass or advocate 
for the alteration of the relevant chapter. The Assembly 
almost unanimously abolished this concession 
altogether.48
An amendment which sought to minimize the control of the 
political machinery by the rich men through limiting the 
expenditure of parties and contributions of individuals 
was negatived after little discussion.49 The attempt to 
limit individual contributions was scoffed at as 
impractical, denial of human rights, blackmail or 
inadequacy of subscriptions while one member dubbed the 
mover of the motion as a "socialist".50 Finally, an 
attempt to separate occupational from other associations 
for the purposes of contributing to and canvassing for 
political parties was negatived.The valid point made by 
the mover that occupational associations including trade 
unions and other professional groups are wholly 
integrative and satisfy the conditions of federal 
character more than the prescriptions of the draft, was 
ignored.51
It is clear that unlike the debates on other aspects of 
the section on the executive, where apparently non 
economic interests seemed predominant, the area on
48. Ibid, par. 5959.
*9. Moved by Mahmud, A.Z.(Kwara), ibid, 5972-3.
50. ibid, 5979-97.
51. See Dr. O.Oaoruyi (Bendel), ibid, 5940-41.
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parties disclosed a bias pertaining largely to the 
economic interests of the members.
2.The Legislature.
In deliberating on the Legislature, the Assembly adopted 
most of the CDC recommendations .Consequent ly, there were 
only three open votes and division on contested items. 
But they reveal shifted alliances, different and at times 
diffused cleavages,
a). Majority versus Minority.
a).Size of the National Assembly. Some members from 
Sokoto which houses the large Hausa-Fulani groups 
supported by others from Kano also inhabited by the same 
group pressed for an increase in the size of the senate. 
The applicable formula would be equality in the first 
instance which insures a minimum number for all states to 
reflect their equal status in the federation and thert 
population to reflect those large populations under­
represented by using equality alone.52 As a result of a 
fierce objection from the members mostly from the 
minority areas who saw the proposal as an attempt to 
shrink the federal principle embodied in the equal 
status of the states in the senate, the amendment was 
withdrawn.
52. See M.Adamu (Sokoto) 6028» Rial, M.A.(Kano), 6035-6» Alh. A. Shagarl. (Sokoto). 
6044.
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In a slightly different form, the issue came up again in 
the discussion on the ratio of a legislator to a 
constituency and the size of the House of 
Representatives. Ratio was a matter that appealed to both 
those from smaller national groups who had to be 
clustered together to form one constituency, and also 
bigger national groups who tended to have fewer 
representatives in proportion to their huge
populations.55 If the amendment was adopted, there would 
be a legislator for a minimum of every 150,000 and a
maximum of 200,000.But a large proportion of the Assembly 
was not inclined to adopt it in the constitution because 
it presented enormous technical difficulties. The
Assembly was however unanimous in agreeing to an increase 
in the size of the House of Representatives. Therefore, 
the open division recorded on whether to adopt the CDC's 
350 or the suggested 450 or 480 does not disclose a 
clearly discernible cleavage as Appendix B, Table VI 
shows.
b) Appropriation Bill. Under section 56(7) of the draft, 
if both arms of the Assembly did not agree on a Bill, it 
would be referred to its Joint Committee on Finance. The 
question again arose if the Committee was unable to 
resolve the matter. The amendment sought to resolve it if 
it is a money Bill, through the two Houses in a joint 
session where if it is passed by a simple majority, would *
Spokesmen of Minorities were: Ball«« A.Y.(Gongola); Cani, A.M.(Kwara) ¡Prof.A.Ali
(Bendel), 6101: For populous groups see Abdullahl, S.U.(Kano), Aghiaien,
J.0.(Bendel).6085.
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be sent to the president -for his assent.54 Those from 
smaller states objected to a joint sitting on the ground 
that states with fewer members, as house of 
representatives is solely based on population, would be 
swamped along with the senate inspite of equality of 
representation in the latter. Some members from the 
smaller states were also keen to ensure that there is 
equality of all states in the membership of the Joint 
Committee.The complication set in because members 
perceived it mainly in terms of sharing the national 
cake.
An attempt by Alhaji Shehu Shagari and a few others to 
present the likely cleavage in the legislature in the 
event of such a deadlock to be between parties rather 
than majority versus minority nationalities had little 
appeal to members. In the end, after a protracted debate, 
the amendment was adopted.
c) Legislative Lists. The question whether or not there 
should be two or three lists of areas of legislative 
competence between the national and state legislative 
assemblies evoked a spirited debate. The supporters of 
two lists-exclusive for the centre and residual for the 
states were the chairman of the Assembly and a 
significant number of nominated/CDC members who may pass 
as federalists. Most others wanted an additional
54. Alh. G. Ja Abdulkadir, Ibid,«333.
215
concurrent list.**5 The latter were conceded to without an 
open vote.
d) Procedure for states creation. There was an almost 
unanimous agreement on the principle of creating states 
where there is a genuine need and desire.But the criteria 
that must be fulfilled became one of the most contentious 
issues in the deliberations.lt forced the Assembly to set 
up a sub committee to consider and collate the various 
propositions made in the Assembly. Two camps were 
discernible. On the one hand were "hard core agitators 
for state creation".55 56 As the division list on Appendix 
B, Table VII shows, most of them came from states where 
there are strong demands-Anambra and Imo, Cross River, 
Kaduna and Gongola.57 They demanded a procedure that is
flexible involving less other states. They put the
question of states creation as a right to self
determination. Most of their opponents comprised the
majority nationalities of both the North and Western 
states of the country with fairly insignificant minority 
groups.
In the latter group's view, states creation is a national 
issue which must involve all states because it affects 
allocation of seats in the National Assembly, revenue 
allocation, etc. Inevitably, they insisted on a procedure 
that compromised the very rigid prescription of the
55. ibid, par.6706-6738.
56. So called by A. Y.Gusau, Chairman of tha Sub Committee of the Assembly on Statas 
craation, Ibid, 6794.
57. Stataa have now been created out of Kaduna and Cross River states.
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draft and the very lax one demanded by opponents. This 
position was reflected in the sub committee's formula 
most of which was adopted after another thorough 
debate.58
e). A similar cleavage between members whose interests 
were greatly served by the public sector against their 
colleagues inclined to the private sector was repeated in 
considering the provision which required public servants 
to resign four months before qualifying to contest 
elections. See Appendix B, Table VIII. One member charged 
that most of those opposed to relaxing the rules were 
lawyers in private practice.59 In the end, the Assembly 
deleted the period and required that such civil servants 
were only to show that they had resigned their 
appointments.
In the preceding discussion, except in its broad 
orientation, the issues and cleavages do not disclose 
much proprietary interest. There were however specific 
cases where such interests surfaced.
50. ibid, pars.6749-68X7, 6833-6852.
59. T. Muhammadu, ibid, 6502.
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b) . Quorum. A member sought to reduce quorum in the 
parliament from one third prescribed in the draft to one 
quarter because "the generality of the members of the 
legislature of this country are going to continue to be 
businessmen mainly...They are going to be businessmen who 
by themselves are managing directors of various companies 
and the problems as regards the day to day decisions on 
their business will take a great deal of their time..."60 
This position was adopted.
c) Disclosure of interest by members. Section 54(3) of 
the draft contained an enabling provision whereby the 
legislature may provide in its rules that the vote of a 
member with a direct proprietary interest in a subject 
matter may be disqualified. Some members sought to 
provide it in the constitution and extend the 
disqualification to participation but excluded indirect 
pecuniary interest. The member was also required to make 
that declaration.61 Most speakers were anxious to 
emphasize the non inclusion of indirect interest because 
the members's direct interest may coincide with those of 
his constituency. Therefore, they reasoned, it is unfair 
to his constituency if he is excluded from speaking on 
their behalf.6 ^ In the end, Udoji's suggestion that the 
entire matter be left to the rules of procedure of the 
legislature to allow "some flexibility to accomodate 
various situations" was adopted.6  ^*•
60. Chief Okilo who later became the governor of Cross River State.
• l . M.Hayatuddin, 62SO.
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dJDeletion of Public Complains Commission.
Under sections 81-89, the CDC provided for an Ombudsman 
to inquire into private grievances against public and 
private institutions, separate from any other forum 
provided by the legislature. On the other hand, the 
Assembly recommended that it be abolished. Ttwo reasons 
were adduced for the decision as articulated by Umaru 
Dikko. First, that it duplicated the investigative powers 
of the legislature. Second, that the public could channel 
grievances through their representatives and 
consequently, it would be a "white elephant".®4
No more need be said than an observation of one member 
that it was "indeed legalising oppression and misdeeds by 
those in power". Incidentally, political and financial 
profligacy and lack of accountability were the main 
factors that led to the collapse of the second republic 
in which the prinicipal actors were members of the 
Constituent Assembly. 
e).The Sharia Controversy.
Uundoubtedly,the most controversial and deeply divisive 
issue in the Assembly was the recommendation of the CDC 
for the creation of a Federal Sharia Court of 
Appeal(F.S.C.A.). As noted in the beginning, while 
introducing the main elements of the draft constitution, *
*2. Alh. S.Shagarl drat raised the Issue.
6J. Udojl, 625«.
6«. unoru Dikko became one of the most powerful ministers In the second republic and 
Is alleged to have been Involved In colossal corruption.
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the CDC chairman apparently motivated by good intentions, 
put the spotlight on the reasons for and the decisions of 
his Committee to establish the courts. Subsequently, it 
turned out to be the issue commented by almost all 
speakers generally with a great deal of passion and 
sometimes, threats. However, because the issue and the 
attendant controversy was replayed in the later 
constituent assembly of 1988-89, its discussion and 
analysis will be deferred until then so that its 
historical, contemporary and socio-economic dimensions 
could be put in a proper and complete perspective.
It suffices to mention here that following an impasse and 
a subsequent boycot of the proceedings of the Assembly by 
88 members65 mostly from the Muslim dominated states of 
the North, the Federal Military Government intervened 
after repeated warnings for caution and tolerance by the 
Head of State, other senior state officials and concerned 
citizens.66 Ultimately, the government adopted the version 
recommended by a compromise committee set up by the 
Assembly and chaired by Simeon Adebo which was rejected 
by the pro-Sharia camp. This version provided that 
instead of a separate court, there should be special 
sittings of the Federal Court of Appeal where only 
Justices of the Court "who are versed in Islamic Law" 
would preside. Thus, no full F.S.C.A.was established, and
New Nigerian, 7/4/1978.
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more over, "persons versed-in Islamic Law" need not be 
Muslims.
Following the bitterness engendered by this dispute, it 
is no surprise that the Assembly rushed through its work, 
rejecting special provisions for press freedom,
overwhelmingly turned down amendments aimed at
establishing Houses of Chiefs as part of state 
legislatures. Similarly, the provision which sought to 
prohibit discrimination because of circumstances of 
birth, generally perceived as the constitutionalization 
of illegitimate children was completely deleted.67 68
Finally, it left decisions on the criteria for revenue 
allocation to the Technical Committee on Revenue 
Allocation established by the government and the
subsequent civilian legislature.
Following this, the Assembly adjourned indefinitely on 
5th June, 1978, four months ahead of schedule under the 
impression that unless the chairman felt it necessary, 
there would be no need to convene another meeting.
4.E. Promulgation of the Constitution.
Given the circumstances the Assembly's work was completed 
and of course in the exercise of its supervisory powers, 
the government introduced a number of changes totalling 
22.66 First, it restored the Ombudsman,earlier rejected by 
the Assembly. Second, using the provision on adaptation
67. Wait Africa of 12/6/1978, 26/6/1978.
68. Ayua,I.A.<1983) 'Constitutional Developments In Nigeria Slnca tha Colonial Bra* In 
Atanda, J.A.and Allyu, A.Y., Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria 
Since Independence, Zaria, Volume I.
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of existing laws 69 it conferred a constitutional status 
on some existing institutions, the most notable of them 
being the National Youth Service Corps and the Nigerian 
Security Organisation. Similarly, three days before the 
constitution came into effect, the government introduced 
another amendment incorporating fresh provisions relating 
to run-off elections, issue of proclamations for 
convening and dissolution of assemblies.70
Finally, the government enacted the Constitution as an 
ordinary Decree: The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, No.25, 1978 in which the 
Constitution formed a schedule. But section 2 authorised 
its future reprinting separately. Section 1 of the Decree 
gave it the force of law and came into effect as a whole 
on 1st October,1979 except section 262 establishing the 
new federal capital.The latter was to become effective on 
a date to be specified by the president upon confirmation 
by resolution in each federal legislature. Lastly, the 
government completed the process by repealing sixteen 
laws, half of which date back to 1966 relating to 
supremacy of military government, public order and 
security regarded as obstacles to political activities. 
This therefore enabled and ushered in the second republic 
on 1st October, 1979.
69. S.274 ot ths Constitution.
70. The Constitution (Aaendt.) Decree No.104 of 1979.
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CHAPTER PIVE.
5.THE POLITICAL BUREAU.
The preceding processes which culminated in a
constitutional government in 1979 highlighted the nature 
and diversity of interests which competed for 
constitutional protection and entrenchment. The end 
result was institutions and a system of accountability ^  
which were almost wholly elitist in purpose, structure 
and execution. In the main, it lacked a system of
accountability to the citizenry and in its operation, to ^ 
the premises of the system itself requiring a certain 
degree of honesty and impartiality, due to massive
corruption and electoral fraud.1 This led to the
overthrow of the second republic in 1983.
Three years later, in the bid to secure a stable 
constitutional system, another process was begun. The 
spate of failures by the dominant elites to stabilize the 
political economy however, engendered a thoughtful debate 
among some students of African politics on the necessity 
of developing a democratic control over the continent's 
elites to overcome the perennial economic and legitimacy 
crises.2 Clearly, the past elite strategy of repressing 
voluntary democratic movements through violence.
Diamond, L. (1987) ’Issue* in ths Constitutional Design ot A Third Nigerian 
Republic" 86 African Affairs pp.209-226.
Molutsi, P.P.and Holm J.D.(1990) ’Developnlg Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: 
The Case of Botswana’ in 89 African Affairs, 356:323-340: Mamdani, T., et 
at,(1988) Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy 
in Africa. CODESRIA, Working Paper no.l; Graf, W., (1989) ’Issues and Substance in 
the Prescription of Liberal Democratic Forms for Nigeria's Third Republic 88 African Affairs, 350i91-100i Haynes, Jeff,(1989) Inching Towards Democracy: the 
Ghanaian Revolution, the International Monetary Fund and the Politics of the 
Possible. The 1989 Conference of ROAPE: Taking Democracy Seriously: Socialists and 
Democracy in Africa. Warwick University, Sept.
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cooptation or vertical mobilization along communal lines 
have become increasingly unviable and counterproductive.3 
Instead, there seems to be a full cry in favour of 
providing structures that could relieve lower class 
marginalization through genuine reform, a broad based *•' 
development, multiplying opportunities for groups and 
individuals and socio-economic mobility to reduce anti- 
systemic pressure— the classic Hirschman trade off 
between exit and voice.This provided the setting and tone 
for the approach to, debate on and choice of institutions 
and philosophy of government the framework for which a 
future Nigerian constitution is expected to provide.
This theoretical debate became official government policy 
in 1986 when President Babangida made a commitment that 
"In order to estabish a viable and enduring peoples 
oriented political system devoid of perennial 
disruptions, this administration has decided to involve 
the people in the search for a solution to the problem of ./ 
political instability".4He promised to sponsor a national 
debate on the country’s future political system. He 
underscored the "need for systematic mobilization of 
farmers, workers and youths for production, community / 
governance and widespread national consciousness". The 
mobilization was wrapped up in a patriotic flag as it was 
essential "to defend the integrity of the nation's *I
3 These elite strategies in the face of lower class mobilization are discussed by: Chazan, Naomi (1982) -The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa* 14 
Comparative Politics, 2, Diamond, L.(1987) “Social Change and Political Conflict 
in Nigeria’s Second Republic“ in Zartman, I.W..(ed).The Political Economy of 
Nigeria (Praeger N.Y.) pp.25-84 at 29-30.
I 1986 Budget, 31 Dec.
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economy, to fight corruption, discourage smuggling and 
expose all forms of social ills".5 6
This populist gesture had a precedent in an earlier 
government sponsored national debate on whether or not to 
accept conditional IMF facilities. But more importantly, 
it was part of a continuing legitimating device 
cultivated by the president since he staged a successful 
coup. The reason for the coup was given as the rigidity 
and unpopular policies of his predecessor. It was also 
useful as a survival strategy to discourage restive coup 
plotters. Hence, the "sincere and widespread support" 
shown by the people against a coup plot against the 
government was implied as part of the utility of the 
mutual confidence between the people and government.5 To 
accomplish the objective set out by the government,a 
Political Bureau (PB) was established in 1986.
5.A.Appointment And Composition.
The 17 member team was entirely appointed by the 
government. They were overwhelmingly academics-11. There 
were 2 women, and 2 from the Nigerian Labour Congress. In 
view of the preponderance of academics, only 3 were known 
to be directors of companies, two of whom were 
publishers. One member described the ideological outlook
5. ibid.
6. President Babangida, Inaugural Speech to the Political Bureau at Abuja on 13th 
1987 1986, R,port of th# Political BNureau. Appendix I ( Federal Printer, Lagos
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of the members as left of -the- centre liberal democrats'^ 
consistent with the view of- another member that only four 
were avowed socialists.7 8
5.B.Agenda And Terms Of Reference.
After pouring scorn on Nigerian politics and politicians
i
and especially singled out the latter for contempt, the 
president set out an omnibus agenda for the PB.9 First, 
the PB was required to act as a resource group using the 
rich academic and intellectual background of its members 
to "provide an objective and indepth critique" of 
Nigeria's chequered political experience to serve as 
background information for the debate.
Secondly, it was mandated to organise a national debate 
along the following schemes: a) For this purpose, it 
would organise public discussions through debate, 
seminars, symposia on the various issues essential to the 
search for a new order, b) To gather, collate and 
synthesize public contributions. c) Consider other 
political questions that the government may refer to it.
d) Evaluate the contributions and produce a blueprint of 
model(s) for the administration to consider.
Third, in the search for a new order, the PB was required 
to "sensitize and energize the ordinary people". Fourth, 
it was enjoined to help the military government in the
7• Dr. Madunagwu, Edwin, in a dicussion in Oct. 1989.
8. Dr.Adamu, Haroun, in a discussion in Oct. 1989.
9. The agenda was set out in the 1986 Budget Speech and Inaugural Address to the Political Bureau, See notes 4 a 6 .
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difficult task of disengagement by working out a 
realistic implementation programme for the agreed model. 
This was a precaution to avoid responsibility for and 
minimize flaws in the transition itself. The transition 
process to the second republic was widely criticized for 
being too abriged with little room for learning, hence 
partly contributing to its failure.
The government left itself open to fresh ideas as it 
challenged all contributors to be "daring and 
imaginative". The process was thought to be too important 
and urgent to constrain contribution. "We are committed 
to an order that will check the excesses of government 
and the abuse of power by the political leadership.We 
shall equally frown at a system in which a small group of 
individuals shall be allowed to misuse power to the 
detriment of our national aspirations". However, the 
president had an idea of some unwanted things. Hence, he 
advised the PB not to regurgitate the models of the 
advanced industrialized countries because Nigeria lacks 
their economic foundation and constitutional maturity. 
Thus, "every socio-economic order has a political 
arrangement appropriate to it".10 This double edged 
caution is of great significance given some of the 
government policies adopted while the debate was on and 
its ultimate attitude to the PB's recommendations, as we 
will see later.
10. Ibid, Inaugural Address.
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5.C.Procedure And Conduct Of The Debate.
Three weeks after its inauguration, the PB chairman 
announced to the nation the range of issues to be debated 
and the way to do it.11 In order to appeal to and secure 
the confidence of all segments of the society, the PB 
sought to present itself as an independent machinery 
standing apart from the class and other interest 
configurations in the country.lt Identified thirty major 
issues and themes which formed "the bedrock of the 
political culture of Nigeria and that discussion and 
analysis of them should provide a basis for fashioning a 
comprehensive political model for the country".12 The 
themes were indeed profound and comprehensive, more than 
any earlier process had attempted to do.
Broadly, they ranged from the mode of organising the 
economy, political and constitutional systems, 
apparatuses of state, machinery of democracy, special 
groups and issues to a programme of transition to 
civilian rule, etc.The PB hoped to stimulate, guide and 
co ordinate the debate by: a) organising and mobilising 
the broad population.b) encouraging the participation of 
functional groups and associations.c) solicit the 
opinions of "men of experience in public affairs".In 
concrete steps, the following measures were adopted.13
11. Text of a broadcast to th# nation on 3rd reb. 19th by the chairman of the 
Political Bureau, Dr.Cookey, J.S., aee Report of the Bureau, pp. 229.
12. ibid, p. 9.
13. ibid, p.9-10.
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First, a monitoring officer was appointed for each state 
with a base in the capital.' Specific duties were assigned 
with a guideline. In the main, they were to coordinate 
and oversee the work of assistant monitoring officers two 
of whom were appointed for each local government in the 
country. Clearly, a team with greater membership both for 
the state and local governments would have been a more 
practical approach instead of depending on the judgement 
of an individual covering an entire state. Similarly, the 
4 day workshop organized for training the officers could 
not have been adequate given that the PB was to 
"sensitize and energize" the people.
Second, in addition to specifically commissioning nine 
national associations to hold debates on assigned topics, 
topics related to their areas of interest, the PB invited 
individuals, and other organisations to write 
commissioned papers. It also encouraged others to send 
memoranda, write newspaper articles, engage in radio and 
television talks and organise seminars, symposia and 
conferences on the scheduled topics. The individuals 
specifically contacted were described as early active 
nationalists, retired senior military and police 
officers, retired top civil servants, renowned 
academicians and distinguished professionals.
Third, to mobilize the unorganized segment of the 
population, the local government area was identified as a 
basic unit for the exercise. Questions for interviews 
with them appeared simplified and partly slanted to
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issues directly affecting them. Also, Publicity and 
Enlightenment Committees were established in all states 
and local government areas. At the state level, the 
Committees comprised the general managers of television 
authorities, states radio, local newspapers and 
representatives of labour, students and women's 
associations. Others were the federal and states'chief 
information officers and the PB's state monitoring 
officers. Its main role was to pubicise the work of the 
Bureau and the issues at stake. A television screen play 
"Ombudspirit in Politics" was shown as it was thought to 
be educative and suitable for raising the political 
consciousness of the people, but it was conducted in 
English which inevitably excluded majority of the 
population.
Finally, the PB divided itself into small committees and 
toured the country in zones created for the purpose. The 
tour was aimed at inspiring and facilitating the debate , 
acquaint the members at first hand with the debilitating 
social and economic conditions of the ordinary population 
and raise awareness of the peoples' rights and 
responsibilities. The immediate objective was to secure 
the confidence of the general population to participate 
in the exercise by instilling the belief that their views 
may be reflected in the recommendations based on which it 
was "possible to evolve a just and democratic political 
system in the country."14
14. ibid.
230
However, despite this apparently elaborate approach, 
three months after the debates had commenced, the PB 
found it necessary to place a newspaper advertisement 
cautioning against its extremely narrow pattern.15 The 
contributors had overwhelmingly concentrated on the form 
of the future political system to the neglect of the 
reasons for past failures, solutions to it and the whole 
range of other scheduled items. At the end of it, the PB 
recorded 27,324 contributions which included memoranda, 
commissioned papers, seminars, interviews, etc.16
5.C.1 Constraints On And Limits Of The Debate.
A debate on the past and future direction of the Nigerian 
political economy can scarcely be expected to run without 
major difficulties. First, because government bureaucracy 
was a major factor in providing and administering the 
enabling facilities, such as funds, transport, etc. The 
PB complained of delays in releasing funds which affected 
the early execution of projects, although the period was 
later extended. But more seriously, the bureaucracy, 
which is a major component of the system is not likely to 
yield to any attempts to whittle down the role carved for-' 
it since colonialism. Consequently, a procedure for 
reform through its own operation would more probably be 
futile.
15. ibid) west Africa, 14. 4. 1986.
16. Tha P.B. Report, p.254.
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A second limit and a factor that rendered the debate 
futile was government policies and actions while it was 
on course. During this period, the government banned the 
students association in the aftermath of students 
demonstration nationwide against the murder of some of 
their colleagues by the police in Ahmadu Bello 
University. Ironically, the association was unbanned by 
the president to enable the students^participate as a 
functional group in the exercise. Following this, 
relations between the government and the Nigerian Labour 
Congress deteriorated when the latter planned to protest 
the incident by peaceful demonstrations, a move resisted 
by the government who saw it as "a direct challenge to 
[its] authority and legitimacy". Henceforth, the 
governments strategy of "maximum harrassment with minimum 
violence" poisoned the environment and undermined the 
political efficacy of the contributions of labour.17 
Thereafter, its participation was symbolic only. Rather 
labour concentrated its energy on preparations for 
promoting a workers' party.18
Third, a few months after the discussions had taken off, 
the government embarked on a scheme of privatization and 
commercialization of the public sector enterprises. This 
was in pursuance of a larger structural adjustment 
programme intended to reduce government role in running
17. African Guardian, 31/12/1987, p. 12.
18. Mast Africa, 18/8/ 1986.p.1720.
232
the economy.19 * The programme was not preceded by any 
officially sponsored public discussion like an earlier 
one by which conditional IMF facilities was rejected.The ' 
entirety of the economic policies undoubtedly goes to the 
heart of the economy, ideology and philosophy of 
government with pervasive constitutional implications. 
For instance, guidelines on it would have to grapple with 
the provisions of the 1979 constitution requiring the 
state to control the economy in such a manner as to 
secure the maximum welfare and happiness of the citizens 
on the basis of social justice, equality of status and 
opportunity. Also, it required the economy to be operated 
such that the means of production and distribution are 
not concentrated in a few hands.
All these led some discerning and articulate Nigerians to 
believe the debate to be a fruitless and diversionary 
tactic by the government. Against this background, except 
to provide justification for its report, it is difficult 
to find any basis for the wholesome satisfaction 
expressed by the PB with the general response of 
Nigerians, especially the less privileged. Clearly, such 
satisfaction can only be partial and in relation to those 
groups whose activities are not normally constrained by 
government such as traditional rulers, chambers of 
commerce, etc.
19. FRN Structural Adjustment Programme
1988. (Fed.Govt.Printer, Lagos).
for Nigeria. July 1986-June
5.D.SUMMARY OP ISSUES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE.
1 Nature of the Nigerian Society and '-the- Development of 
Its Political Economy.
The Report of the Political Bureau was heavy with 
theoretical explanations for its conclusions and
recommendations. It began with a discussion of the nature 
of the Nigerian society, the diversity of its 
nationalities and geography and yearned with nostalgia 
for the period when these groups lived together in 
unself-conscious ethnicity. It noted with great concern, 
how this diversity had progressively become a tool in the 
hands of political and other elite groups to enhance 
their positions in the competitive system with a 
resultant disharmony in the community.2® It also observed 
the negative impact western education has had in 
undermining the recipients' perception of the ertswhile 
norms and ethos of the society.
In discussing the class and other social configurations 
in Nigeria, it declined to adopt a pure Marxist
methodology because it "seems superficial".In its view, 
the society comprises "both a modernising, capitalistic 
system and a largely pre-industrial... subsistence
economy".21 For this reason, it structured the society 
into six interest groups, a).Those with ascribed status- 
traditional rulers, b). The landed gentry. Prior to the 
Land Use Act, 1978, this group were largely traditional *2
20. The P.B. Report, chapter I, op. clt.
22. ibid.
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rulers and a few individuals and corporate organizations. 
The position is still the same after but with a marked 
shift to influential individuals in government and 
business.22 C). Industrial/commercial elites.
D). Intellectual and military elites. E). Quasi­
proletariats. They are so called because most low level 
urban workers retain land rights and other cultural ties 
and obligations in their rural homes partly to secure 
economic security in an uncertain future and in the 
absence of a social welfare system.2 3 This obstructs the 
development of a fully developed proletariat.F) Workers, 
peasants and the unemployed. It implied that except the 
last two, "the masses properly called" who have always 
borne the burdens of the country- a broad convergence of 
interest and role is evident with regards to the rest who 
have more often participated as beneficiaries of the 
system.
On this, the PB concluded that "the challenge of 
converting the above assets and liabilities into positive 
development calls for ingenious social engineering, clear 
ideology and committed and purposeful leadership".In its 
subsequent reaction. Government merely noted the PB's 
analysis but accepted the challenge.24
22. Koehn.P.(1983) "State Land Allocation and Class Formation In Nigeria" 21 The 
Journal of Modarn African Studias 3:461.
2J. Sand brook,R.(1981) "Worker Consclousnass and Populist Protast In Tropical Africa" 
in I Research In tha Sociology of Work,pp.1-36.
24. Ibid: Federal Republic of Niger la iCovernment1s Views and Comments on the Findings and Recommendations of the Political Bureau.(1987) ( Government Printer, Lagos.), 
par.7.
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The difference between Nigeria's dominant groups as 
identified by the PB and their counterparts in the 
industrialised world lies in attitude. The latter tend to 
be productive, largely operate and observe the norms and 
conventions of the constitutions of their society. On the 
other hand, those in Nigeria denigrate the rules of law 
as prescribed by them, avoid all forms of accountability 
whether to themselves, the constitution or the society, 
thus producing instability .More importantly, they found 
it convenient to inherit the colonial bureaucracy, 
institutions, system of education and ideology which were 
geared to exploitation rather than service to the people 
and legitimated by subsequent constitutions.25 Thus, what 
emerged in the realm of the rules of the constitution and 
other laws were not robust and humane but rather a notion 
of it which bedazzled the people.
The PB noted some of the positive effects of military 
rule such as the balancing of the skewed regional 
structure, local government reforms, etc.But the current 
government policies were severly criticized for being 
undemocratic and would lead to their further
impoverishment. On the whole, the overall effect of 
military intervention has been largely negative. It 
stultified the political growth of the country and 
legitimized violence as a succession mechanism.
In conclusion, it identified what a new constitution must 
do."It must seek to restore the balance between rulership
25. P.B. Report, chapter XX, ibid.
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and responsibility on the one hand and power and  ^
accountability on the other... a philosophy directed 
towards the promotion of the welfare of the people, to 
whom sovereignty must be restored...” In response, the 
government noted the analysis, accepted the challenge 
posed but rejected the criticism of its on going 
policies.26
2) A New Political Economy For Nigeria.
Among its terms of reference, the PB had the task of 
recommending a basic philosophy of government for Nigeria 
and a fortiori a corresponding constitutional framework. 
The absence of such a well articulated popular philosophy 
in the past was noted as partly responsible for failures. 
In the course of the debate, various suggestions were 
made, some of which are "Afrocracy", "African 
commmunalism”, "Triachy", "Meritocracy" "Islamic 
Theocracy" along with the usual ones-Capitalism and 
Socialism.27 In making a choice, the PB set a criteria, 
the core of which is "justice".The contributions 
attributed to the rural areas were used to elaborate in 
concrete terms the essence of justice. These were: social'' 
rights-shelter and education for all at all levels, 
health services, security of lives and property. Economic 
Rights-provision of basic infrastructures, full 
employment, modernisation of agriculture, reduced taxes,
26. ibid: Goverment Views..op. clt.par 16.
27. The p. B.Report , Chapter IV, ibid.
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elimination of middle men, restructuring the economy to 
ensure the equitable distribution of wealth. 
Constitutional rights- démocratisation of the political 
process and elimination of violence, victimisation and 
discrimination and right to political education.These, 
the PB recommended as minimum and enforceable rights.
Against this background, the PB decided that only
socialism has the capacity to fulfil all these
aspirations , hence recommended it.2® Following this,, the
state was required to nationalize and socialize the
commanding heights of the economy . The latter were
identified as: i) public utilities, ii) enterprises 
requiring heavy capital expenditure, iii) assets tied up 
with the security and political integrity of Nigeria such 
as Banks, Insurance and the Oil sector. However, a 
private sector that is "cooperative or non monopolistic 
in character" will be permitted to co-exist alongside 
state agencies. As expected it urged the government to 
reconsider some of its policies consistent with the 
recommendations.28 9
As expected, the government rejected what described as 
"the imposition of political ideology on the nation" and 
expressed satisfaction with the time-worn all-embracing 
goals stated in the Second National Development Plan 
(1970-74) .These were adopted in the 1979 constitution 
through the non justiciable fundamental objectives. The
28. ibid, p.50.
29. ibid.
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nationalization schemes which would have entailed a 
complete reversal of policies were rejected almost out of 
hand.30 The government noted those aspects which the PB 
called "minimum rights" while sharing in the concern and 
aspirations on matters of social justice. However, the 
government fully agreed with the PB on the duties of 
citizens.31
Apart from these broad review of policies, the PB 
examined some specific aspects and made recommendations.
5.D.3 Land and agriculture.lt pleaded for the 
democratization of land and the payment of adequate 
compensation for that already acquired by the government. 
The principles were agreeable to the government but not 
the concrete steps which required it to organize farmers 
into cooperatives and provide them with mechanized farms 
to produce inputs for industries. 5. D. 4. Income 
distribution and the reward system. It recommended a re 
distribution of income by reviewing and enforcing the 
various economic laws. Similarly, the reward system 
should be re examined to abridge differences between 
public and private sectors as well as within the sectors. 
The former was accepted while the latter was noted.32
It is to be noted that the recommendations seem too 
statist. Although they were made on the premise of a 
socialist order, it is however no guarantee that
30. Govarniwnt Viava. ..par.53.
31. ibid. para.55-57.
32. ibid, cap.V.
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socialization would by itself be effected given the
experience of bureacracies in the the USSR and the
ertswhile socialist regimes of Eastern Europe.In Nigeria 
in particular, statism is a profound problem for several 
reasons. First, the state itself tends to resist 
democratization. Second, it would further become the 
object of acquisitive and rapacious private attention. 
Furthermore, the magnitude and perniciousness of
corruption, inefficiency, nepotism and complicity of the 
political leadership increases "with the size of the role 
accorded to the state in economic regulation and
management".33
This is not however to endorse the present wholly 
exploitative and muddled system nor the governments' 
approach which aims to plough back to few people the 
nation's resources. We shall come back to this later.
But more importantly, the centre-piece of the PB's work 
was the ordinary people, thus its first point of call /  
should have been a thorough investigation of existing 
informal social security system which is already in 
crisis due to a number of pressures 34 It is evident that 
like their predecessors and the general approach of those 
who talk about social security in Africa, they dwelt on
33. Sklar, R.L.(1986) "Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Africa", 261 The Journal of 
Modern African Studies,li Joseph, R. A.(1983) "Class, State and Prebendal Politics 
in Nigeria",in 21 The J.of C/vealth and Comparative Politics 3: Jeffries, R.
(1982) -Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana", 81 
African Affairs. 324 t311.
34. Some of these systems that survived colonialism and the current crises they are
experiencing are discussed byi Woodman,G.R.(1988) "The decline of folk-law
social security in common-law Africa" in F.von Benda-Beckman, G.R.Woodman,et al 
eds Between Kinship and the State: Social Security and Law in developing Countries (Poris.Holland/U.S.A) pp.69-88: Schott, »."Traditional systems of social security 
and present-day crisis in west Africa", Ibid, pp.89-107.
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formal, state social secur-ity based on European concept 
of it.3* It can not be emphasized enough that the 
implementation of that kind of social system is 
predicated on administrative, financial and economic 
structures together with-a sense of commitment, most of 
which are lacking at the moment. Although the reason most 
often given is lack of financial resources, it is in fact 
the least problematic given that governments undertake 
elaborate schemes in health, education and other wasteful 
projects such as the festival of arts and culture of 1978 
(FESTAC), military weapons, etc.
The kind of schemes they advocated like most others would 
only benefit the wage earners given that these welfare 
rights in their original conception were intended to be 
offered by the state to those who suffer distress due to 
loss of earnings.35 6 Clearly, this can not apply to the 
situation in Nigeria where due to some disabilities or 
misfortunes whether of the body or economic resources 
such as scarcity of land, a person remains
unemployed. What is needed in the case of Nigeria is a 
constitutional framework that could bolster existing 
systems that are disintegrating. For instance, it would 
be extremely useful to organise communities on extant 
units which may be family, clan or even village where 
insurance cover could be provided to cater for disasters, 
natural or human. These units could serve as basic
35. woodman, ibid.
36. Tha Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convantion,1952 (No.102) of tha 
Intarnational Labour Organisation, which dafinitlon and its inadaquacy to tha 
African situation is critically axaminad in, ibid.
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intruments for advice to and implementation of other 
welfare and development projects of the government.
Secondly, given that there is a high incidence of 
polygamy in the country with uncertain implications in 
state law, the status of the parties, their property and 
inheritance need to be protected.This is due to the 
tendency among those entitled to inherit under customary 
law to inherit the property of the deceased but reject 
the accompanying customary responsibilities such as care 
for the children and widow.»7 Lastly, it is extremely 
important to re-examine some of the state taxation, a 
large part of which have taken away the surplus that 
would have been available to family bread winners to 
assist their less fortunate kins in the customary way. In 
any case it partly contributes to the shifting away from 
the growth of food to cash crops.
5.E.Constitutional System and Structure of Government.
The constitutional system and form of government 
attracted the largest contribution. Various suggestions 
were made which include "Diarchy"- joint venture between 
the military and civilians; "Triachy"- a mixture of the 
latter with traditional rulers. These proposals were made 
on the premise that the inclusion of all the strata of 
the dominant class in government would remove the 
incentive for coups. 37
37 Sae Pn.35.
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The PB had little difficulty in properly dismissing such 
claims given that most coups have been intra military and 
that traditional rulers are inter alia, hereditary and 
therefore undemocratic. According to its scheme, the PB 
was left with a choice between the presidential and 
parliamentary systems. As earlier on, strong arguments 
were made one way or the other and with the benefit of 
experience of both. It opted for the former. This 
decision was acceptable to the government but noted its 
analysis of diarchy and triachy.38 Having adopted the 
system under the 1979 constitution, most of its
structures were also carried over.
1). THE EXECUTIVE.
It sought to plug some of the loopholes in the 1979 
constitution by introducing a limited accountability of/ 
the executive to the legislature.The composition and role 
of the Council of State was enlarged but still far short 
of the overbearing National Oversight Council suggested 
elsewhere.3® The merit of the latter lies in its 
involving functional si- groups such as the professional 
associations, peasants, women traders, etc.The executive 
will have only one term and a ceiling placed on the 
cabinet to reduce the practice of over_. bloating the 
cabinet to provide jobs for the boys at any cost. *39
3S. The P.B. Report, cap. VIi Government Views..op. cit. par.8b.
39. Diamond, L. ’Issues...“op. clt.209-226.
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2). THE LEGISLATORE.
A novelty was sought to be- introduced at the legislative 
level. A one term unicameral legislature was recommended 
throughout the country. It reasoned that they would be 
better able to fulfil the function of a vigilant check on 
the potentially enormous powers of the president, be 
active partners in policy making and reduce cost in 
government. A minority rejected the proposal and saw in 
it a revival of the hegemony of the three nationality 
groups. The latter has been reduced through the 
application of the principles of equality and population 
separately for the bicameral legislatures.
The basis of representation to the legislature was 
considered, that is whether on population, territory, 
functional/interest groups or a mixture. It opted for a 
territorial form but based on local government units 
instead of the existing system of federal constituencies 
separate from local governments. However, the government 
preferred two terms for the executive and the limited 
involvement of the legislature in the executive had 
little appeal, otherwise the rest of the suggestions were 
accepted. Women and labour were reserved 5% each in all 
legislative seats.
In order to raise the quality of legislators, the rules 
which required public servants to resign their 
appointments prior to elections was relaxed.Henceforth, 
they only need to take leave of absence without pay until 
the end of the election or tenure of office. This was a
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position strongly resisted by traditional rulers who 
favoured the past system. 4° These recommendations were 
rejected in entirety by the government, consequently, the 
token gains made by labour, women and public servants 
foundered. The government affirmed the position under the 
1979 constitution.40 1
3) The Machinery Of Justice: The Judiciary, Police And 
Prisons.
Here, three problem areas were identified: the nature of 
the law itself; its administration and weaknesses of the 
organs responsible for administration.
On the law itself, the PB urged a review of its colonial 
heritage and structure and the redirection of the 
curricula of legal education to the needs and realities 
of the nation. In the administration of justice,it 
recommended de-emphasis of the role of lawyers and money 
as well as the use of the jury system in minor offences. 
Borrowing from the pre- colonial mode of dispute 
settlement, it urged the introduction of intra-community 
procedure in tackling delinquency, in place of prisons. 
It sought to minimize the role of politicians in the 
appointment and removal of judges of superior courts by 
involving a supposedly less political Council of State.
These recommendations did not appeal to the government 
who preferred the 1979 position. It is to be noted that
40. A position taken in a conference of all tradiotlonal rulers in the North on the 
constitution— west Africa. 3.11.1986.
41. Government Views...op. clt.par.99.
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the total pre occupation of the PB with superior courts 
was unjustified given that the bulk of cases affecting 
the ordinary man are decided in the lower level courts. 
Similarly, what is required in harnessing the skill and 
role of lawyers is not disengaging them, but rather how 
they can be positively used. This may be done through 
improving the quality and breadth of existing legal aid, 
establishment of citizens advice centres easily 
accessible to ordinary people in the rural and urban 
areas. Lawyers manning them could offer advice on a whole 
range of issues on the socio-legal implications of 
government policies to determine the rights and 
opportuinties offered or denied them. This of course will 
require changes in the training and orientation of 
lawyers.
Incidentally, even within the framework of the existing 
legal system, a body of lawyers'42 customary law have 
evolved over the years especially in the arena of family 
and land laws.43 Lastly, they could help in the training 
of para-legal staff who could offer services in 
environments that are conducive, cheap if not free, and 
less intimidating.
In regards to the police, the PB suggested re-orienting 
the force and integrating them in the society as servants
42. For tha distinction batwaan this and folk-law and tha (oraar avolvadin Ghana and 
Nigaria, saa woodman,G.R.(1983) ’How Stata Courts craata Customary Laws in Ghana 
and Nigaria* in Pinklar, H.W. (Compilar), Papars of tha Symposia on Folk Law and 
Lagal Pluralism. Xlth Intarnational Congrass of Anthropological and Bthnological 
Sciancas, Vancouvar, Canada
43. Saa Nwabuasa.B.O.(1972) Nigarian Land Law (Bnugu.MwanifaiDobbs Farry, Ocaana)i 
Nwogugu,E.1.(1973) Family Law in Nigaria (London).
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in its proper sense. Thus, it recommended Citizens 
Monitoring Organizations to oversee police conduct. Its 
members would be drawn from the various associations of 
drivers, farmers, traders, students, the army, the Bar 
and the police itself. These suggestions were in addition 
to the familiar cry about improving the quality and 
conditions of service of the force. However, the 
activities of this group may well be revised to include a 
general oversight of implementing specific government 
policies rather than relying on ineffective intra elite 
mechanism for accountablility. But most of these 
suggestions were rejected.
4). The Civil Service And Bureaucracy.
The civil service and its bureaucracy had not undergone 
any major reform since its colonial creation. Hence, the 
PB reommended a three pronged reform. First, it urged its 
re-orientation so that it could be perceived as 
implementers of programme for the welfare of the people. 
The instrument for this purpose would be social 
mobilization and political education. Secondly, the Code 
of Conduct and Ombudsman will be used as agencies of 
oversight. Finally , it recommendeded the adoption of the 
American style of Project Management, Programme and 
Performance Budgeting, earlier on recommended by an 
official commission.
Tied up with this, were recommendations on the reform of 
the parastatals and other public sector agencies. What is 
noteworthy here is the recommended reforms of the board
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memberships of these agenci-es which have become places of 
patronage for the cronies of those in power. According to
the PB, it would be modified to include a female. one
representative of labour and any group that is a
recognised primary consumer of its services or
products.This fiddling was merely noted by the
government, a euphemism for rejection.44 Again, the
Bureau was mistaken in the sense that it merely referred 
to a "female" implying that any woman would reflect the 
interests of all woman.
5) Local Government System.
For quite some time, the system of local administration 
had attracted a great deal of attention in the country. 
Its potential as a third tier of goverment and agent for 
development has been discussed and articulated.45 The PB 
therefore had the opportunity to provide a tangible 
framework to accomplish these objectives.
The PB recommended the creation of multipurpose units 
subordinate to the local governments. These were the 
Development Area Councils and the Village and
Neighbourhood Committees. Both would be organized for 
prodution, community action and mobilization in a two way 
traffic between government and people at the grassroots 
level.46 Some of the extant local government functions
44. Tha P.B. Report, cap.VIIi Govarnmant Vlaws.. .op.cit .par . 159.
45. Tha latast major official undartaklng on chls was tha Dasuki Raport-FRN, Local 
Govarnmant: Report by tha Committee on tha Review of Local Govarnmant 
Administration in Nigeria, Tha Dasuki Report.(Fad. Govt.Press, Lagos,1984).
46. Tha P.B.Report, pp.117-122.
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would be devolved'on the Area Councils. On its part# the 
Committees would be engaged in community development 
activities, control, allocation and use of land and other 
natural resources, help with social services such as care 
for orphans, delinquents, aged and the disabled, etc.The 
leaders of the Committees would be members of the Area 
Councils while the latter will be led by the elected 
councillors from the particular Area Council in the local 
government council.
The main weaknesses of the scheme was in its lack of 
linkage with the structures of power at both the state 
and federal levels. They had no defined source of 
finance. These groupings could be important agencies for 
a decentralized power sharing with the people devoid of
bureaucracies and with their basic needs tackled by
themselves. But despite the limited nature of the
recommendations, they were merely noted by the
government.47
6). The Machinery Of Democracy.
The major candidates in this area were political parties 
and the electoral systems. They have been the main 
structures for elite abuse and manipulation of the system 
in the past. However, despite the great anxiety expressed 
by Nigerians regarding the spectacular failures of the 
party system in the past, as indicated by increasingly 
loud calls for zero or one party system, there was a
47 . Government Views...op. cit.par.165.
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solid support for its use in the new order.48 
Accordingly, guided by this and the desire to give 
expression to the constitutional right of freedom of 
individuals and groups to form associations, the PB 
examined the format of multipartism to determine which is 
suitable to Nigeria. It eventually proposed a two party 
structure. But the PB envisaged no fundamental difference 
in the orientation and ideology of the two parties 
because both must subscribe to the national philosophy of 
government with minor differences only on priorities and 
strategies.
This regimentation was justified by the argument that the 
next decade must be regarded as "urgent and extremely 
difficult" for Nigeria.49 But, it must be noted that 
assuming the validity of the argument in the current 
circumstances, which it is not, there is a strong case 
for providing a constitutional leeway to allow for review 
after a certain period of trial. This is indeed necessary 
given the fear that elites may continue to exploit the 
party system around the two regional or religious blocks.
Attempts were made to reduce any strangulating influence 
financiers may exert on party structures. Hence, under 
the new dispensation, the state will provide the bulk of 
the funds. Limited individual contributions when made 
would be subject to disclosure while foreign *4
48. Th# P.B. Report, cap.VIII.
4*. Ibid. pp.126-8.
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contributions were prohibited, to check the influence of 
alien agencies on* the internal politics. Except the 
funding which— the government noted is a matter for the 
electoral system, the above recommendations were 
accepted.
First, the PB rejected proportional representation on 
grounds of technical difficulties because given the 
choice of two parties, the usual argument relating to its 
engendering of multiplicity of parties does not hold.50 
Second, regarding the electoral system, opinions varied 
not surprisingly because of the controversy that follow 
elections in Nigeria.51 Suggestions by the public ranged 
from a wholly military electoral commission, a mix of 
civil and military or civil only.52 The PB chose the 
latter but with functions that go beyond the conduct of 
elections. It also had the power to recognise and 
register parties, monitor their campaigns and finance and 
determine the level of government funding. In its 
membership, were recommended two military officers of a 
rank not below a colonel or equivalent, one woman, a 
representative of labour. All of them were required to 
fulfil certain conditions regarding age, integrity and 
experience in service. It may be mentioned that the age 
requirement ( 50 yrs.) could hardly be fulfilled by the
50. Rae,Douglas, (1971) Tha Political Consaquancas of Electoral Laws (Naw Haven a 
London).
51. Tha 1959 Padaral alactlons had lass difficulties bacausa it was conducted under 
tha tutalaga of colonial offlcars, saa Post,I,K.w.J, (1953) Tha Nlgarian Federal 
Blactlon of 1959 (Oxford) i Howavar saa OJo, J.D. (1985) Tha Development of tha 
Executive under tha Nigerian Constitutions, 1960-19S1 (Univ. of Ibadan) cap.3 for 
tha 1954 elections* Oyadiran O (1981) The Nigerian 1979 Elections
52. ibid, pp.112-141.
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military members because most of the officers attain
generalship before or by 40 years and retire soon after 
to lucrative business.This difficulty was obviated by the 
decision of government to decline the functional group
representation.53
7) Referendum And Recall.
The full cry for popular control over issues, policies
and government is not propagated by sympathetic
intellectuals only. Such desire emerged strongly across 
the board during the debate. Obviously some people, 
especially the politicians would call for it only to 
secure reognition and popularity with the masses, while 
others were well intentioned.
The PB sought to fulfil this aspiration by recommending 
referendum and recall as a further control mechanism in 
specified circumstances.54 Referendum would be used to 
ratify the new constitution and any major amendment 
affecting the new philosophy of government, states 
creation, adoption of a national language(s) and changes 
in the form of government. The list may be expanded by 
the national assembly.
Through recall, an elected official at any level may be 
removed before his term expires for offences falling 
short of "minimum ’good behaviour* required by the 
electorates of their elected officials". Recall process
53. Government Views...op. cit.par 187.
54. The P.B. Report, pp.138-141.
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would be Initiated by a petition of one third of the 
registered voters in the particular area and become 
effective if approved by a simple majority of votes 
cast.Both processes will be administered by the electoral 
commission.
The recommendation was accepted in principle by the 
government but rejected the part requiring its 
application to the new constitution on the ground that 
there has been wide consultation already.55
5.F. Special Groups And Issues In The Political Economy
Unlike past constitutional processes, the PB identified 
the diverse strata of interest groups who have either 
been dominant or oppressed with a view to recommending 
remedial measures, if desirable.56 Alot of pressure was 
exerted by or on behalf of some of these groups for a 
special place in the constitution. It also sought to 
locate the main issues which have been in contention, 
contribute to disunity, etc.
In the dominant segment are the traditional rulers, the 
military, the political class and the bureaucracy. 
Together, they have held on to the political economy of 
the country to the alienation of women, workers, youths 
including students and the small time farmers. As noted 
earlier on, the PB found no compelling case for making a
5S. Government View»...op.cIt.par». 209-210.
The P.B. Report, op. cit.cape IX a X.
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particular provision for the traditional rulers and the 
military. In fact there were views strongly expressed for 
the abolition or democratization of the former.In the 
end, the PB recommended that their activities should be 
confined to their respective local governments.lt was 
largely agreed to by government. Similarly, the military 
was confined in the main to its traditional role of the 
defence of the realm and few other named social functions 
related to its skill and training.
1). Women.
This group rightly attracted the greatest sympathy of the 
PB because they have been exploited and neglected more 
than any social class.Consequently, it recommended a 
constitutional role for them in politics, economy and 
social programmes.
However, it is a tragedy that the government merely noted 
or rejected most of the suggestions which would have 
structurally uplifted their lot. Examples are: the 
reserved legislative seats, provisions for day care 
centres for working mothers, adult education with 
emphasis on skills acquisition, free medical and health 
facilities, minimum age for marriage, equality of 
conditions of service, the formulation of broad policies 
on women and development, etc. Alt hough most of the 
recommendations aimed at women who have acquired formal 
education, they however provided a starting point for 
more expansive policy to cover those in the rural areas.
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2). Workers
The position of organised labour in the dispensation was 
reflected in two opposing strands of opinion. One view 
advocated an active political role for workers as a 
distinct class to be realized through a workers' party. 
The other opinion preferred them to be non partisan, that 
is without formal structures to promote workers' 
interests. On its part, the PB steered a middle course by 
not openly suggesting a workers' party, but recommending 
the establishment of a political fund, impliedly to be 
used to support pro-labour candidates and parties. It 
also recommended the review of laws and structures which 
inhibit labour in the pursuit of its interests, 5% of 
legislative seats and the integration of workers in the 
overall structure of the economy. These modest 
concessions were rejected by the government describing 
the political fund as ''discriminatory and dangerous".5^
3). Youths And Students.
No specific constitutional role was envisaged for this 
group, but recommended the strengthening of extant 
positive policies and programmes directed to them. 
However, recommendations which would incidentally involve 
youths in politics or even the adoption of a name 
implying that, was rejected by the government. For 
instance, government would not replace the existing 
National Youth Council with a National Youth Vanguard or 
their involvement in mobilising youths to raise their 57
57. Government View*...op. clt. per. 24i.
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awareness, etc. But the -government would allow their 
participation in agricultural activities and to be 
organized for community development projects during long 
vacations.58
5.G.SPECIAL ISSUES.
The PB identified the following issues as major areas of 
concern for all administrations in Nigeria with 
recommendations for their resolution.59 60
a) National Census. The linkage between population, 
revenue and political representation has resulted in 
Nigeria not being able to conduct a census acceptable to 
all, and consequently, deprived it of essential data for 
planning.lt therefore recommended a scheme that seeks to 
depoliticise the scheme.
b) Revenue Allocation. The PB dwelt on the political 
aspect of revenue sharing in the federation. Revenue 
formula has been a perennial source of difficulties in 
the country.88 The emphasis of the PB was however on 
greater devolution of fiscal responsibilities to the 
local governments and in line with this, an enhanced 
percentage of revenue. The rationale is their proximity 
to the people for development and political activities.
58. ibid. par.249.
5*. Tha P.B. Report, cap.X.
60. That partly explains tha reason for its exclusion from all the conat ltutional 
bodies since colonialism.
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c) Creation of states. Immense pressures were mounted for 
the creation of more states for developmental and 
political reasons. The case for creating more states for 
the latter reason was made out with greater emphasis by 
the Ibos who form 1/4 of the nations' population but felt 
crammed in and sharing the facilities of two states only. 
Consequently, the PB recommended the creation of more 
states based on those grounds.
d) State and religion. This is an issue that has 
increasingly gained greater potency in the nation's 
politics. The main concerns were considered by the PB but 
its discusssions will be postponed to chapter seven where 
it almost stalled the work of the constituent assembly. 
However, the PB largely adopted the position in the 1979 
constitution but suggested further withdrawal of the 
state from religious activities and increased education 
of ordinary Nigerians about the basic tenets of the major 
religions.
e) External affairs. The PB noted the capitalistic 
orientations and economic conditions of Nigeria due to 
its colonial linkage but urged the redefinition of its 
external relations to be guided by the principles of 
social justice, human rights, self reliance at home and 
liberation of Africa, promotion of security and peace 
abroad.
f) Federal Capital Terrritory. The problems here relate 
to its status in terms of accessibility to all.
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administrative ( nature and. efficiency of the territory's 
government), and physical structures. Detailed 
recommendations were made to solve these issues of 
concern.
g) Citizenship and nationality. The problem here arises 
from the definition of a Nigerian citizenship. The 
constitution refers to a person belonging to a community 
indigenous to a state, hence bolstered home communities. 
It eventually acquired a political and economic meaning 
through the concepts of regionalism, statism and 
ethnicity together with a perception of being dominated 
by minority groups. Those individuals and groups who had 
early contact with western education and acquired an edge 
in the political economy and the elites of the major 
nationalities did nothing to mitigate the disadvantages 
of those not so favourably placed. In fact the former 
used their advantageous position to the detriment of less 
privileged areas and peoples, hence resulted in 
resentments by the latter group. This resentment has been 
expressed in minority politics and discriminations of all 
sorts in states against non indigenes.
The PB sought to tackle the problem in three broad ways. 
First, it adopted the total elite formula of sharing 
posts in public offices which carries the name "federal 
character". It provided neither a new definition nor mode 
of application. Its frontier could have been expanded to 
include an equal opportunities mechanism for all groups 
and individuals. This is more urgent at lower levels
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where massive victimization, oppression and 
discriminations take place.
The PB1 s second approach was to modify the criterion for 
citizenship to lay emphasis on place of birth or 
residence where the person has lived in the place for a 
period of ten years. Finally, it enjoined the government 
to adopt and sponsor educational, industrial and social 
policies and programmes to narrow existing gaps as render 
the exploitation of these primordial factors ineffective. 
The government accepted the broad principles of the 
recommendations in this area.
5.H. A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT: MASS MOBILIZATION v 
AND OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
In conclusion, to secure the objective of democratising 
the social, economic and constitutional structures of the 
country along a socialist path, the PB sought to rely on 
two propu. The main tool are the people themselves who 
for this purpose were required to be virile and vigilant 
to guard their rights and the conscience of the nation. 
Their ignorance had rendered them easy prey for 
misinformation by the elites, thus, consultations if at 
all have been top down exhortations by the officials 
requiring people to show sympathy for policies they 
provided no input.61
61 . For A survey of these schemes, see Agbaje, A. t Adisa, J. (1988), ’Political
Education and Public Policy in Nigeria: the New War Against Indiscipline (WAI)'.in 
XXVI The J. of C/Wealth and Coaiparatlve Politics, 1:22-37.
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The PB sought to modify this approach by recommending the 
establishment of a permanent autonomous body for 
mobilization-the National Directorate of Social 
Mobilization and Political Education.62 The Directorate 
was to work through existing popular, voluntary 
agencies/institutions, and if non-existent, their 
creation was to be fostered.These are cooperatives, 
orgnizations of women, youths and students, age grades.
village. ward and clan councils. etc. There was no
specific mention of the membership of the Directorate
except that they were expected to be persons of
impeccable character and committed to the programme. The 
substance of the mobilization was pervasive but primarily 
aimed at inculcating in the citizens acute awareness of 
their rights and duties in relation to the leaders, 
involving them in community projects and raising the 
moral consciousness of the nation.There is no gainsaying 
the fact that it is the dominant class who require a 
great deal of moral education.
On its part, the government accepted the entire
recommendations. But, in the Decree establishing it, the 
objectives were further mellowed and replaced with some 
vague concepts. For instance, it talks of the "positive 
mobilization and education of all Nigerians towards 
economic recovery and development and a new social and 
political order" etc.63 This struck accord with the
62. The P.B. Report, op. cit. pp 204-208.
Directorate of Social Mobilisation Decree, Ho.31, 1987, a.4.
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language of the- government's structural adjustment 
programme. Thereafter, it' became a government outfit 
attached to the office of the president with most of its 
members and facilities drawn from existing official 
departments, except that a significant proportion of 
academics benefitted as directors. At the local level, 
the Local Government Councils were simply constituted 
into "Committees for the implementation of...the 
programme as envisaged in this Decree".®4
But this anomaly was partly improved upon in a subsequent 
amendment which provided for the establishment of Area 
Committees in each local government area with further sub 
units of Ward and Community Committees. But the latter 
were also to "work closely with the local government 
councillors, traditional rulers and other social groups 
in its areas in the performance of the functions assigned 
to it ".®® It should be remembered that the government 
rejected socialism and most of the schemes for 
democratising the political economy. Therefore, one can 
deduce that mobilization was for the government's 
structural adjustment programme.
Apart from mobilising the people, the second avenue for 
securing official accountability was the affirmation of 
the code of conduct for public officers and the ombudsman 
earlier on recommended by the Constitution Drafting 
Committee. The mechanism for implementing the former *
64. lbl«J, s.7<2>.
*5. Directorate for Social Mobilisation (Anendt.) Decree, Mo. 35. 1988, a.4(4-5).
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could not come into force in the second republic because 
inter alia,the National Assembly deliberately refused to 
enact the relevant Bill into law.66 Moreover, the 
structure and powers of the Code of Conduct Bureau which 
has responsibility for enforcing the code and the nature 
of access available to the public to inspect declared 
assets was vague and uncertain.
However, the PB expressed satisfaction with the position 
in the 1979 constitution. It only recommended remedial 
measures to insulate it from the influences and pressures 
of politicians. Thus, its members were to be appointed 
during the transition period by the military for a term 
of five years. The government agreed to all the 
recommendations except that it thought the president 
should continue to appoint subject to ratification by the 
Council of State.
Finally, while the debate was on course in 1986, the 
government announced the banning of "all past 
politicians" from seeking or holding any public office 
for ten years. The PB noted that it transpired in the 
debate that there were strong views "in support of 
certain actions to ensure that the former political 
office holders who looted the nation's treasury and 
flouted the constitution with impunity must not be 
allowed to resurface politically in the new order M.67 
But to ensure that its educative and deterrent value was
66 _ cod» of Conduct i Tran* It Ion to Third Republic ( Fed. Min. of Inforaatlon and 
Culture, Lagoa, 1989) p.8.
47 . Th» P.B. Report, op.cit.pp217-218 .
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not lost because of arbitrariness, the PB placed a date 
on and defined the category of those affected.
Two class of people were either banned or disqualified 
from any official or party position. First, banned for 
ten years from the date of lifting of ban on politics 
were those who held named offices between 1975-85. They 
included the president, governor and their executive 
team; legislatures at state and federal levels; political 
party officials; chairmen and members of parastatals at 
the state and federal levels; chairmen and supervisory 
councillors of the local governments; heads of police. 
National security organization and the Armed forces who 
held political offices. Finally, in this group were 
judicial and other public officers removed from office 
for a cause. The ban extended for life for those found to 
have breached the code of conduct.
To ensure that properties illegally obtained were 
recouped, their assets would be investigated and 
verified, which information would be made public for 
scrutiny, claims and counterclaims.
In the second group were those disqualified.This was a 
temporary impediment intended to instil confidence in the 
electoral system by ensuring impartiality in the 
transition process and allay any fears the public might 
entertain in the government recivilianising itself to 
contest elections.They will be free to contest after 
1992.Those affected are officials who have held or are
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holding defined positions in the present military 
government.
Most of the recommendations were accepted less the aspect 
requiring publication of investigated assets for public 
scrutiny. However, in the subsequent Decrees 68 effecting 
the ban, major modifications were made. First, the 
relevant date was extended to 1st October, 1960, 
Nigeria's independence date. It was made for life for 
those in the first category.The group was expanded to 
include all persons in public and private sectors who 
have been or will be dismissed from office and their 
accomplices from the relevant date to the transition 
period. The second group was extended by the inclusion of 
officials of agencies considered essential to guarantee 
an acceptable and fairly contested political process.69
Subsequently, the ban was strengthened by prohibiting the 
indirect involvement of the banned persons. Thus, any 
person banned or disqualified shall not be registered 
with any of the political parties or sponsor, canvass, 
campaign, fund or in any way assist any candidate or 
party. No reference to or display of the photogragh or 
portrait of such persons shall be made in a campaign.70
6e. Participation in Politics and Elections ( Prohibition) Dscrts, no. 2$, 1987.
*9. Participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) (Aaiandt) Decree, no.9, 1989. 
The affected agencies are i chairmen and meisbers of the Directorate for Mass 
Mobilisât ion i National Electoral Coaaissionr National Population Commission) Code 
of Conduct Bureau; National Revenue Mobilisation Coanlsslon» and the Directorate 
of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure.
70. Transition to Civil Rule ( Poltical Parties Registration and Activities) Decree 
no. 27, 1989.
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Finally, the PB recommended that its report and the 
government reaction to it- be translated into Nigerian 
languages and made available at a cheap rate. All the 
materials should also be kept in four centres well spread 
in the country for research.None of these was honoured 
because even the English versions of the report and white 
paper on it are extremely scarce. Worse still, the 
materials used by the PB are nowhere to be found 
including the national library and office of the 
president which the writer visited.
In conclusion, an exercise begun with an ostensible 
objective of ploughing power back to the people suffered 
the same fate as its predecessors, namely, the formal 
strengthening of the grip the later generation of elites 
have on the system. The older groups were reduced to a 
behind the scene role although critical as well since 
upward mobility in the system is largely dependent on 
clientage relationships. To be sure, the PB sought to 
make modest efforts which were either struck down or 
hijacked by the government for different purposes. But 
the government established a further constitution 
commission as we will next consider.
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MISSING
6.A.Appointment And The Socio-economic Category Of The 
Members.
Like the PB, the CRC was entirely the president's 
creation.1 But in contrast to the former, there was a 
near total swing away from theoretically inclined left of 
the centre liberal intellectuals to the practical men of 
business and industry with overwhelming bias for
practising lawyers, retired judges and industrialists. 
This group, comprising serving and retired Supreme Court 
Justices, Judges of High Courts and industrialists made 
up over 70% (33 out of 45) of its totatl membership. The 
remaining twelve were top serving/retired officers in the 
public sector including the parastatals (5); other 
university lecturers (4); private medical practioners 
(2); labour(1). 2
This obvious radical shift in composition was clearly 
intended to have the same effect in the substance of its 
deliberations and recommendation. The intended result was 
guaranteed by the terms of reference, the materials that 
would guide them and the probability that given the 
background of the members, their views will more probably 
converge with those of the government as reflected in the 
on going market oriented policies.
6.B. Terms Of Reference And Procedure.
The parameters of the CRC's work were set out in clear 
terms in some respects, but although foggy in others, the
1. The list or i w M r i  at« contained in the Federal Republic Of Niqeria, Report of 
The Political Bureau, Voluae II (Pad. Min. of Inforaation. 1.190«. 19(8) pp.20«~ 
205.
2. Ibid.
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intended general direction was indicated. In his 
inaugural address, president Ibrahim Babangida enjoined 
the CRC to produce a document that "will prove 
acceptable, workable, adaptable, enduring and suited to 
our particular circumstances, needs and temperament as a 
people now and in the foreseeable future".^ To achieve 
this objective, the CRC was to be largely aided by the 
Government White Paper on the Report of the Political 
Bureau and the 1979 constitution.3 4 Later, the federal 
Attorney-General elaborated on other materials to be 
used.5 They were: all military amendments to the 
constitution since 1983, judicial interpretations of it, 
and more importantly, only and all the PB recommendations 
which were accepted by the government. This clarification 
put to rest earlier debates and uncertainty in the CRC on 
whether or not it could open afresh matters outrightly 
rejected or noted by the government.
In addition to these materials, the CRC flung its net 
much wider. In particular, some of its sub-committees 
consulted the 1963 constitution, the CDC Report, the 
Dasuki Report on Local Government and the federal 
government's views on it, public contributions and the 
personal experiences of the members in operating the 1979 
constitution.6 Having determined the relevant materials,
3. FRN, Report of the Constitution Review Committee containing the Reviewed 
Constitution, volume I, (red. Min. of Information, Lagos) p.xvill.
4. ibid.
5. ibid. p.i.
6. See in particular, the reports of the Sub Committee on the Executive and the 
Federal Capital Territory. Vol.II. op. cit.pp.10S a 181 respectively.
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the president then set out or rather reminded the 
Committee (since most of them were already explicitly 
stated in the White Paper) of the matters the government 
had settled for and the general direction which it 
intended to follow.
6. B.1 Policies Explicitly Determined.
These were proposals the Committee was explicitly 
required to adopt. ^ I) The government was committed to 
the presidential system and federalism. But the Committee 
was empowered to re-examine the basis of the federalism 
as it relates to the various nationalities of the 
country. Thus, the Committee was to examine and provide 
an acceptable congruence between the apparently 
contradictory aspects of Nigerians' wish to practice 
federalism with states as the basic units and its plural 
society which seems to tend towards ascriptive primordial 
ethnic groups as the core units. II) The "pragmatic and 
useful balance between the public and private sectors of 
the economy" adopted in the fundamental objectives 
provisions of the 1979 constitution would be retained. 
This is to enable individuals to realize their latent 
abilities while allowing government to provide for the 
welfare of all citizens. Consequently, there was to be no 
more socialism, partly for this and also because 
"fundamental issues arise when a transitional corrective 
regime like ours exceeds its brief and goes beyond 
correction and imposes a particular ideological 7
7. Vol.l, op. cit. pp.xvlll.
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commitment which is so fundamental in nature that [it] 
should be left to successive government".8 Obviously, it 
avoids the reality that the mixed economy is itself an 
ideological position, broadly a cover for capitalism.
Ill) The two party structure was to be retained. But the 
Committee was to develop the criteria in the 1979 
constitution on party formation, structure and spread to 
allay the fears that the parties may become the tool of 
the elites of the major nationality groups or be 
organized on religious/regional cleavages.9 This and 
other problems connected with the two party structure 
will be examined in the next chapter against the 
background of subsequent decisions by the government on 
it. IV) The provisions in the 1979 constitution 
forbidding the adoption of state religion and those 
providing bill of rights in the Anglo-Saxon fashion will 
be retained. V) The government was also committed to the 
separation of powers among the different arms of 
government.VI) The clamour especially by the press for 
freedom greater than those of individuals was 
unacceptable. "No institution should be guaranteed 
freedom not guaranteed the people is an irreducible 
principle of all constitutions". But the Committee could 
consider how, if at all, press freedom could be separated 
from those of individuals. VII) In recognition of the 
"need to restore the balance between rulership and
This anxiety has been consistently held by i 
Ak inola,A.A.(1990) -Manufacturing the Two Party System 
J. of C/wealth and Comparative Politics, 3« 309-327.
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.responsibility on the _one hand, and power and
accountability on the other.", the Committee may consider 
that "the best avenue" is the Code of Conduct Bureau. 
This should be examined.10
This means the form of official accountability will 
continue to be through institutions manned by the elite 
groups with the mainstream of the society scarcely aware 
of its operations since they are not prepared to consider 
means that could provide sufficient contact with the 
people for this purpose.
These specified areas constitute the bedrock of the 
constitution. In some areas, the government although less 
regimental, indicated its preferred direction. Thus on 
the style of drafting, the president noted that some 
constitutions are "reduced to a short but comprehensive 
statement of the major principles, ideals and aspirations 
of the society..." But the general preference in Nigeria 
has been for a detailed document because there is a 
direct link between the level of political consensus in a 
society, which is low in Nigeria, and the size of its 
constitution. Consequently, this fact must be borne in 
mind. "Nothing should be taken for granted".11
Similarly, a role for traditional rulers, if any, would 
be "perhaps the most delicate and intractable matter" the 
Committee may have to tackle. After an elaborate espousal
10. Vox. X. op.clt.. pp.xxl-xxli.
11. ibid, p.xlx.
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of the positive achievements of the institution, the 
President noted that the problem lies in rationalizing it 
with constitutional democracy. The 1979 constitution 
provided them with a purely advisory role. The president 
enjoined the Committee to examine the possibility of 
providing them with a "more formal but still advisory 
function".1* But they must be insulated from partisan 
politics, a position agreed to by most of the traditional 
rulers in the course of the enormous pressure they 
exerted individually and in concert on those involved in 
the process.
Finally, the president expressed his wish to adopt in the 
constitution, some of the bodies it created to achieve 
its policies.In this way, the Committee's agenda was 
determined, but the government was cautious to avoid 
being seen as fundamentally putting the deliberations in 
a "strait-jacket and force particular view points down 
[its] throat".Hence the Committee was asked to "consider 
also any fresh and new ideas that may come to light 
now".14 The Committee's chairman seemed to have 
interpreted this literally and liberally to mean his 
Committee was not bound to take "the advice" offered by 
the president.1® *12
12. Th# pressure was admitted by the CRC chairman in a note to his colleagues-Justice 
Buba Ardo, Note by the Chairman! The Traditional rulera. 1968.
12. A memorandum tent by the emirs and Chiefs of the 21 stats of the federation- West 
Africa, 19. 10. 1987, p. 2067.
u . Vol.I, op. clt.p.sxii.
ls. See note 14.
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However, the Attorney-General's clarifications of the 
president's real intentions alluded to earlier,1® 
completely explodes any view that the Committee had a 
wide mandate. Its task would seem primarily to 
rationalize into a single coherent document those areas 
of the Bureau's recommendations that were accepted by the 
government and other existing changes introduced by the 
courts and the government. It is for this reason that 
some discerning obersvers viewed the interposition of the 
Committee between the PB and the subsequent Constituent 
Assembly as wasteful.1  ^ The PB Report should have gone 
directly to the constituent assembly where the entirety 
of the discussions, the recommendations and possibly, but 
not necessarily, the governments views on it are 
considered without incumbrances. Whatever may be agreed 
upon would then be streamlined by its drafting committee 
rather than another team as suggested elsewhere.* 18
The real purpose of the Committee would seem to have been 
to place the government's views of the constitutional 
process and the general direction of the economy beyond 
further discussions. That explains why the government did 
not make any attempt to place a formal contact between 
the CRC and the public. A second reason for the CRC was 
to remove any element of chance which it entails if left 
open ended in the constituent assembly where there will
ll. infra.p.3
ibid, contains a number of such comments.
18. Dr. Ayo Dunmoye, ibid.
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be elected representatives- .This is more so given that 
the debate organized by' the PB and some of its
recommendations partly informed the public on the vital 
issues of domination, exploitation and manipulation by 
the dominant class and other interest groups in the 
country. For this reason, the Committee was not in a 
position to introduce fundamental changes. A summary of 
the issues it tackled are highlighted here.
6.C.Summary Of Subtantive Issues.
According to the Committee, from the public 
contributions, findings of the PB, and government input, 
"it seems reasonable to conclude that there was nothing 
fundamentally wrong with the 1979 constitution. However, 
ambiguities and lacunae in certain of its provisions and 
difficulties in the operation of some of its institutions 
have been encountered, thus justifying such changes and 
attempts at clarification as contained in this Report".19 
Against this background, the main changes introduced are 
briefly examined. Fortunately, the task is eased by the 
existence of a table comparing theprovisions of the 1979 
constitution and the CRC reommendations.20
1). The Executive.
a) Mode of electing the President. In the 1979 
constitution, for the president to be duly elected, he 
had to fulfil the twin requirements of majority of all
19. vol.l. op. clt.p.v.
20. Ibid , pp.xxlll-xxix provides only tha titlaa, but an alaborata schema Including 
the 1989 conatltutlon is made by Pappla , A.I. (tha daputy sacretary)-FRN, 
Constituant Assambly. 1988-89, Draft Constitution Amendments and Naw Clausas.
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votes and its spread over 12 2/3rds of the states of the 
federation. What amounts to 12 2/3rds was the source of a 
major constitutional debacle in 1979.21 Consequently, the 
CRC replaced it with a flexible provision to round up any
fraction to the nearest whole number.22 b) Term of the
executive. The hitherto two term tenure of the president 
was replaced with a single six year period. It therefore 
overturned the government's position in its rejection of 
the single term proposed by the PB.2  ^ c) Impeachment
process. In operating the 1979 constitution, a number of
state chief executives were intimidated with impeachment 
and two actually impeached largely on ideological and 
other political differences. This was thought possible 
because the process was entirely handled by the 
legislators. Consequently, the Committee sought to 
involve the judiciary by empowering the chief justice and 
the chief judge to constitute the panel that will 
investigate the allegations.24 d).Creation of an acting 
president. The vice president was empowered to perform 
the functions of the president in an acting capacity if 
the latter goes on leave or is unable to perform the 
functions of the office. This is to avoid delay in 
exercising presidential powers in case of emergency as 
the occasion arose in the first republic noted earlier 
on. e) Exercise of nolle prosqui. In the second republic,
21. Awolowo v. Shagar1 a ora. Suit NO.S8T/1/1979 delivered on 10/9/1979 
(Unreported),S3i Awolowo v. Shagar1 (1979) 6-9 8.C.51-55.
22. Ss.133 6 135 of tha Reviewed Constitution, V01.X op. clt.
23. ibid, a.136.
24. ibid, a.141.
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some Attorneys-General were feared to have compromised in 
favour of political friends, their enormous power to 
terminate proceedings in courts at certain stage. The 
Committee sought to restrain this by subjecting it to the 
leave of court.25
2).The Legislature.
The legislative arm experienced the least changes. Most 
of those sought by the Sub Committee on the Legislature 
were turned down at the plenary session, such as 
reduction of the size of the national legislature to save 
cost, staggering of elections on the American model, 
etc.26 However, the Committee created a Security Fund 
different from the contingencies fund to meet security 
needs. The value of this additional fund is doubtful and 
it is also regretable that the Committee rejected the Sub 
Committee's proposal for a limited form of control over 
its use by requiring any expenditure made thereunder to 
be communicated to the security committee of the House of 
Representatives within seven days.27 This was intended to 
curtail the rampant misuse or corruption in the use of 
security funds in the second republic.
3). The Courts System.
The judiciary attracted a great deal of discussions 
mainly because of the on-going controversy about the
25. ibid, a.171(2).
26. voi.ii, op. cit.p.es.
27. ibid, p.67.
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creation or otherwise of —the Federal Sharia Court of 
Appeal, which need not detain us at the-moment as we will 
treat it below. It was also partly because the Committee 
itself was overwhelmingly dominated by lawyers and 
judges. In fact, the Sub Committee on the judiciary 
comprised entirely of lawyers.
However, the thrust of discussions and aim of
recommendations were twofold. First, it wished to
insulate the judiciary from partisan political 
controversy and strengthen its independence. Civil 
regimes in Nigeria tend to be enmeshed in the
judicialization of politics and the corresponding 
politicisation of the courts. Two schemes were proposed 
to curtail this phenomena. a) Ad-Hoc Election
Tribunals.28 These were provided for and conferred with 
exclusive original jurisdiction to determine election
petitions to all offices. They were also to determine 
whether the terms of the holders of these positions have 
ceased. But the Sub Committee's attempt to give them 
total command of the election process by creating a 
hierarchy of appeals process outside the regular courts 
was diluted by the Committee which replaced them with the 
regular courts to determine appeals. Members of the 
tribunals would be a mixture of retired judges or
practising senior lawyers and non lawyers, b) Funding. 
All monies for capital and recurrent expenditure due to 
the judiciary would be transferred to a fund under the
28. Vol. I, op. clt. *.26«.
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control of the relevant judicial service commission to 
avoid the past practice where justice seemed- compromised 
because of executive influence over these matters. 
Similarly, a strong case was made for upward review of 
the income and retirement benefits of judges to a level 
relatively comparable to their counterparts in U.K. and 
Ü.S.A as well as a properly guarded tenure.29 However, 
the more radical recommendation of its Sub Committee 
which sought to centralize the appointments of all 
judicial officers in the federation was rejected .So 
also, the Sub Committee's attempt to take chieftaincy 
disputes outside the arena of the courts was declined.If 
they had succeeded, it would have reduced the hold of 
bureaucrats and politicians over traditional rulers since 
most of the disputes emanate from official decisions 
thereby enhancing the powers of the chiefs.
4). Political Parties.
Apart from entrenching the two party structure 
recommended by the PB and adopted by the government, the 
Committee conferred discretionary power on the national 
assembly to limit the maximum amount an individual may 
contribute to a political party.30 There was no 
consideration of making allowance for reviewing the two 
party structure after a specified period of experiment.
29. Vol.XX. op cit.pp.156-158.
J0. Vol.I, op. clt.8.221(a).
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5) . Fundamental Objectives And Fundamental Rights.
The Committee adopted the 1979 provisions in these areas 
while the Sub Committee's attempt to convert free primary 
education to fundamental right was thwarted by the 
Committee even though it is the declared policy of the 
government.
A case was made for fundamental rights provisions to be 
broad and less specific to allow flexibility and 
adaptation to changing circumstances. But the majority 
preferred the existing elaborate, specific structure. In 
several respects, the Committee rejected some positive 
proposals made by the relevant Sub Committee. For
instance, it sought to drop the word "vagrant" from 
section 32(1)(c) of the 1979 constitution. Vagrancy was 
one of the exceptions created to the fundamental right 
to freedom of movement.lt has been exploited by the 
police to harass citizens who go about in search of the 
means of livelihood. A specific provision requiring the 
provision of legal aid to enforce these rights was
rejected in favour of one that is discretionary and 
vague. ^ 2
6) . Accountability Of Public Officials.
Financial and political corruption, mismanagement and ^
general lack of accountability of state and other 
officials in the public service have been a major *3
31. VOX.II. p.41t Vol.I, 8.19(3).
33. Vol II, p. 70.
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contributing cause for tbe failure of constitutional 
democracy in Nigeria since independence. The approach to 
resolving this disease has been to rely totally on 
institutions manned by segments of the dominant groups 
themselves which- proved largely unsuccessful. In the 
second republic, the newly introduced Code of Conduct for 
public officials and the accompanying Bureau and Tribunal 
were rendered inoperable for reasons already noted in the 
fifth chapter.
It is to fill this lacuna that the Code of Conduct Bureau 
and the Ombudsman were added to the federal bodies that 
are established by the constitution.33 They were also 
conferred with powers which did not require further 
legislation. This was bolstered by the fact that the 
executive team at all tiers of government are required to 
declare their assets before they begin to perform the 
functions of their offices and at later, specified times. 
Similarly, the legislators at all levels are required to 
do the same before they take their seats and at the 
prescribed intervals. Incidentally, the situation is now 
clearer at the local government level because the 
military government has moved them away from their 
Westminster styled structure to a presidential system 
with clear differentiation between the executive and the 
legislature.34 That is, the local government chairmen and 
their supervisory councillors now constitute the
33. 8 .1 5 1  V o l. X, o p .c i t .
34. wasc A fr ic a .  18-24 March, 1991.
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executive while the rest of the councillors become the 
legislature. But the substance of the Code remains as it 
was formulated in 1979.
The only concession made to the people in terms of having 
a direct control over officials is the endorsement of the 
recall system which both government and the PB agreed to.
7). Inter-governmental Relationships.
The significant changes introduced on the distribution of 
powers and resources and the overall relationship of the 
various levels of government was in respect of local 
governments. But here too, they were in fact adoptions of 
an earlier Dasuki Report 35 on local government endorsed 
by the PB and accepted by the government in a modified 
form. The reform envisaged more functions and resources 
for local governments. More importantly, they were given 
a constitutional framework as a third tier of government 
with its income statutorily fixed, enhanced and paid 
directly from the centre.36 This is a substantial 
improvement on the previous position when they were 
appendages of states.
In contrast to this desire for greater decentralization, 
the legislative lists as framed in 1979 were left intact 
with the exception of evidence which was shifted from 
federal exclusive to concurrent list. Again, the
35. FRN (1984) Local Government, Report by the Comaittee on the Review of Local 
Government Administration in Nigeria, The Dasuki Report (Fed. Govt.Press.
36. A new Fourth Schedule, Part II 4 S. 7 are evidence of this constitutional 
position. See Vol.I, op. cit.
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Committee failed to re- instate the PB’s recommendation 
for the constitutional creation of Development Councils 
and Ward/Village Committees. Rather it sought to steer an 
improperly thought out middle course by conferring on 
states discretionary powers to create a maximum of five 
development areas for each local government. This of 
course goes against the new desire for autonomy for local 
governments as third levels of government.
8). The Federal Capital Territory.
The new Federal Capital Territory attracted considerable 
discussion for two reasons.37 First, those from the 
southern part of the country were apprehensive that the 
territory would not acquire the status of a state with 
all the consequences of discrimination in services 
arising from indigeneity. The second group were the 
inhabitants of the area before it was declared a federal 
unit, who legitimatly felt stranded and disadvantaged 
partly because the government had not met its commitment 
to pay compensation and provide alternative land. The
former anxiety was resolved by the adoption of a
mayoralty for administering the area which ensures
equitable access to all citizens. The second issue of
course depended on administrative efficiency to quickly 
honour the rights of those affected.
9). Traditional Rulers.
The lobby and pressure mounted by this group have been 
mentioned. The CRC chairman personally formulated a set
37. Vol.II,p.183; Vol.I, p.xv.
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of functions to be formalized in the constitution for the 
emirate and traditional councils in the country. If his 
proposals as hurriedly agreed to by the relevant sub 
committee had been entirely adopted, the councils would 
have gained considerable initiative in formulating and 
determining policies on a range of areas such as land, 
religion, chieftaincy matters, customary law and broad 
policies at the local government level.38 However, they 
were significantly watered down at the plenary session. 
Their role , although formally extended to the local 
government, was still advisory as it is in the Council of 
State and States' Councils of Chiefs where they had 
hitherto served in similar capacities.
6.D.Entrenching Existing Institutions And Decrees.
As noted in the inaugural address, the president wished 
to ensure the continuity of the broad thrust of his 
policies after handing over to 1992. It is for this 
reason that constitution making, especially during his 
regime and other government policies must be considered 
as a package.39 Some of the institutions are the 
Directorate for Social Mobilization (MAMSER), the 
Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure 
(DFRRI), etc.
Vol.XI, p.32, op. eit. Sa« Fourth Schedule, Part II, Vol.I, Cor tha rola finally 
agreed to.
39. This point is alaboratad by Uwasurike, P.C. (1990) 'Confronting PotentialBreakdown: tha Nigerian redemocratization Process in Critical Parspactiva*, in 28 
Tha J.of Modern African Studies, 1:55-77» Financial Tinas, London, 2 a 3 
Jan.,1991.
283
However, the Committee, foe. the second time (the first 
being the term of the executive) -parted ways with the 
government by rejecting the plea for entrenchment. Two 
reasons were offered. First, that they are the political 
programmes of the government of the day which another may 
not wish to adopt. Second, because their functions cut 
across the constitutional areas of competence of the 
three levels of government, it could be a fertile ground 
for constitutional bickering. These are undoubtedly 
strong grounds for apprehension and we will see how 
government contested them subsequently.
The inescapable conclusion of this chapter is that the 
CRC was established to put in place a certain 
constitutional prescription desired by the military. The 
broad orientation of its framework is capitalistic with 
welfarist overtones which properly serves the interests 
of its authors given their vocations. On the whole, 
changes introduced by the CRC were incremental and 
matters of detail on the 1979 constitution.
We shall however see whether or not the basic framwork 
was be reviewed in the constituent assembly depending on 
its composition and wish of the government as we will 
consider in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7.THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 1988-1989.
The CRC as we saw in the last chapter had an extremely 
narrow agenda, which was to coordinate into a single 
coherent document those decisions of the Political Bureau 
accepted by the government. For this, the government 
chose men from industry, and law, whose backgrounds and 
orientation probability squared with the kind of market 
oriented values preferred by the government to form the 
main thrust of the constitution. Barely two months after 
the submission of its report, the government established 
a Constituent Assembly, being the final public body to 
work on the constitution.
7.A.Establishment, Composition And Background Of Its 
Members.
The Constituent Assembly (CA) was established by Decree 
14, 1988 and inaugurated by President Babangida shortly 
after.1 The 567 strong Assembly had three categories of 
members. The bulk of them, 450, were elected like the 
previous CA through an indirect electoral college formed 
by the various local governments in the country.2 Even 
some of the members thought of this procedure as 
"retrograde".1 Against the background of known government 
position against extremists, there were some who felt the 
government should have applied the same restrictions to
1. official Gazette No.25, Vol.75, April 20, 1988-Part A, Also Inaugural Address by 
Ganarel Babangida to the members of the C.A. at Abu)a on May 11, 1988 in Federal 
Republic of Nigeria(FRN), Report of the Constituent Assembly 1988-1989, pp.i-xi.
2. s.2 of Decree No. 14, 'Report ...* ibid.
J. Contribution to the debate by Amb.G.A.Onyegbula in fr n. Proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly Official Report, Vol.I 1988 (Federal Govt. Printer, Abuja) 
p.1285.
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"pecuniary extremists"4, (-the wealthy). The difference 
this time, compared to the 1977 CA was that the unit of 
representation was federal constituencies rather than 
states. This course was adopted because, according to the 
president, federal constituencies "are the closest to 
what can be called 'grassroots' and they take into
account the discernible diversities in Nigeria...and in 
fact cutting across the narrow ethnic and religious
boundaries...Members drawn from this source should see 
themselves as representing Nigerians at large and not 
state, ethnic or religious groups".5 6
Apparently, the ideology of popular participation is 
still being employed even though it is not matched by
deeds. The second group of members were those nominated 
by the government and constituted "not more than one 
quarter” of the first group. In the end, they were 113. 
The necessity for them was also explained by the 
president. They were " distinguished Nigerians to 
represent important and critical interests in a
deliberate effort to further broaden the base of the 
Constituent Assembly".® For the first time, traditional 
rulers were brought in not to "intimidate the Assembly", 
but to guide it. Labour had a token single representative 
but students had none. However, its bulk were lawyers 
including retired and serving judges and businessmen.
4. A.C.Madusk*. ibid p.128.
5. President Babangida, 'Inaugural Address ...'op.cit. p. 1 i .
6. ibid.
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Contrary to its current policy» some of those nominated 
belonged to the category of officials banned from public 
office» for instance» Colonel Yohanna Madaki (rtd) was a 
governor in Babangida»s regime. Finally» the CRC chairman 
and chairmen of its various sub committees were appointed 
as automatic members. They were to serve as "resource 
persons" providing the basis for the Reviewed 
Constitution and "pilot" it in the deliberations. We have 
already dealt with the background of the CRC members.
Unlike any previous leader. President Babangida made 
explicit the fact that constitution making is a political 
process. It was his view that the constitutional 
evolution of Nigeria had not been been subjected to the 
interplay of political forces. It had "been more or less 
embarked upon in haphazard manner".^ His administration 
was determined to move away from that approach as this is 
intended to be the last major constitution making 
process.
In the light of the discussions in the preceding 
chapters, it is true that Nigeria's constitutional 
evolution has been partly haphazard, especially in the 
period before the 1951 Macpherson Constitution, but 
certainly not devoid of politics. All governments that 
controlled the process since 1914 had by diverse means 
successfully influenced the outcome. The present *
Ibid.
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government differs only to the extent that its massaging 
of the process was manifested both in words and deeds.
In pursuance of the objective of establishing a consensus 
politics, the president carefully excluded or jettisoned 
the involvement of those he labelled, "extremists", 
generally regarded as those holding strong leftist views 
on the mode of organising the political economy of the 
country. But of recent, religious extremists have also 
come into the literature and it was implicit in the 
president's address.8 * Thus "from the composition of the 
CA, it is now abundantly clear to the people of this 
country what I had in mind". Now "everyone is very 
cautious not to move too far out on either side of the 
spectrum".® This attitude of the president was severely 
criticised by some members who thought of the so called 
extremists as the guiding lights of progress.10
The following (Table A) strength of the main interest 
groups in the given percentage of both the elected and 
the nominated members on whom information was available 
completely squares with the government's desire. Out of 
the 450 elected, information was available on 288, and on
8. Diverse religious organisations mada enormous and passionate campaigns in the
course of all the debates generating alot of anxiety, the main flag bearers were 
the Christian Associatian of Nigeria (CAN), especially the Northern zone. The 
Taken Study group.
*. President Babangida. 'Inaugural Address... “op. elt. vlll-ls.
10. Garki, S.N. ibid. p.SSSi Onyegbula, ibid.
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Table A
i) Elected
Occupational Categories
Clergy
%*
Business
-men
Diplomats
/Senior
Civil
Servants
Lawyer:
/Judge:
Ex-
Ministers
/Directors
Univ. Lect. 
/Admin
Other
Teachers
Jour­
nalists
0.6 33.8 22.5 4.5 4.5 19 14.9 2.4
* Percentage of 288 out of 450 members.
Source: Who's Who in the 1988/89 Constituent Assembly. 
(Abeya Post Communications, Nigeria, 1989) .
ii) NOMINATED
Occupational Catégorisa
Tradi­
tional
Rulers
%*
Business
Civil1 /Judges
Ex-
Ministers
/Directors
Univ. Lect. 
/Admin
Labour
nslists
7.5 30.00 2.5 11.2 10 16.3 1.25 5.00
Percentage of 80 out of 117 members. 
Source: ibid.
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Inaugural Address to the .Assembly. He identified some 
"agreed political issues" -and decreed in no uncertain 
term that their main structures must not be changed.11 
They could only be improved upon in their details.
Like the CRC, there were areas where the decision of the 
government was final while leaving a small window for 
innovation in few others. Those in the former category 
were policies similar to those set out for the CRC, hence 
need not detain us again. But there were few additions. 
For instance, the government had pegged the number of 
states to 21 , hence the CA could not create more, or 
more local governments. The ban on past office holders 
could not be reviewed.
The Presidenrt noted a number of grey areas where the CA 
could have initiative and innovate. First, although local 
governments have had a firm footage as a third tier of 
government, the Assembly was asked to critically examine 
the division of powers among the three levels of 
government and relate it to the mode of sharing the 
nation's resources. Inter-governmental relationship in 
the federation was extensively considered in 1983 by a
study team who made a wide tour of the major world
federations to study how that kind of relationship
works.1^ There is little evidence that its
*■*. President Babangida, ‘Inaugural Address...* op.cit.p.iv.
FRN, Report ot the Study Team on the Management of Inter-Governmental Relations In 
Federal Administration Systems (Fed. govt. Printer, Lagos. 1983).
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recommendations were utilized by the sponsoring 
administration or thereafter.
Secondly, the Assembly was enjoined to ensure that only 
fundamental issues were provided for in the constitution, 
some of which may already have been provided for in 
current legislations or judicial decisions. He noted with 
apparent disdain, the near total absence of habits, 
customs and traditional practices as means of restraining 
the behaviour of politicians. To this end, an elaborate 
code of conduct should be considered rather than a 
critical examination of some of the restraint mechanisms 
outside the state sector used by most nationality groups 
and some of which may still linger on despite pressures. 
Similarly, the Assembly should examine known conventions 
in mature democracies which might be popularized and 
internalized through the Directorate of Social
Mobilization and some of which might be embodied in the 
constitution.
Finally, the president noted the failure of the 1979
constitution to produce a leader who had vision. 
Therefore, the new system should not only aim to provide 
for autonomy, energy and unity, but also engender a
"visionary realist who can transform vision into 
action".13 This is additional to evolving provisions that 
should constrain the behaviour of politicians in general. 
The president sought assistance from the members in
providing a transition provision to guide in the gradual
l3. President Babanglda. 'Inaugural Address..* op.clt.lx.
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process of transfer -of power as the constitution might 
come into force and civil government be partially 
introduced while the central government remained military 
until 1992.
In the end, the members were warned to desist from 
writing themselves into power by carving a set of rules 
in anticipation of themselves as the beneficiaries. The 
latter must be the "PEOPLE OF NIGERIA", said to be 
Nigerians in perpetuity in contrast to those in small 
letters who are only the present.14 Despite this constant 
reference to the people, there was to be no referendum 
because Nigeria is polyethnic and complex. It is for the 
same reason that in fact there should have been one.
Although there is this constant pre-occupation with the 
people, in concrete terms, the constitution was expected 
to concentrate on the leadership. In one respect, this 
may be excused because its that section that bears sole 
responsibility for the failure of constitutionalism in 
Nigeria. But looking at it differently, this neglected 
section must be mobilized and empowered to determine 
their own fate and that of the nation by creating 
paricipatory structures. This attitude to the popular 
sector is reflected in the emerging thinking in the 
literature on the human rights to development.1^ The 
right of peoples to development has been articulated and *15
1A. ibid.
15. Rich, R.(1983) *The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right* 23 VirginiaJournal of Int. Law 287j Rich, R.,(1988) "The Right to davalopmanti A Right of
Peoples ?* in Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples (Oxford),
Raviandram.D.International Commission of Jurists, Geneva at the seminar on TOWARDSAN EFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA, MANILA, 11-16 Oct. i988.
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given official recognition -by the General Assembly which 
on 4 April 1986 adopted the Declaration on the Right to 
Development.*® We will come back to this subject later.
The Constituent Assembly, like the CRC had a highly 
circumscribed agenda. In addition to limiting the 
substance of its job, the government determined the mode 
of attaining it. Thus, in furtherance of the consensus
politics, the members were exhorted to ensure that
motions for amendments met the "geographical spread" of 
the country. "Contrariwise, motions for amendments which 
have subscribers mainly from one ethnic, geographical or 
religious group or even ideological group should be
discountenanced by the leadership of the Constituent 
Assembly".""*^
This regimentation of the Assembly was derisively dubbed 
as "no go areas" by both the press and the members and 
was one of the major topics that dominated the debates on 
the president's inaugural address.*8 It was severely
attacked by most of them including the establishment 
candidates. The following outburst by a nominee reflected 
the mood of the Assembly. "Mr. President has gone to the 
extent of defining how a decision should be taken on this 
floor. To go to that detail, I think, is a little too 
far. But not only that, for him to go to the extent of 
saying that we should ensure that decisions that are 167*
16. United National Declaration on the Right to Development <DPI/918-Nov. 19B7-4N 
reptrinted in U.N., N.Y. Oct. 198B-3M).
17. President Babangida, ’Inaugural Address..• op. cit vi.
lB. Contained in Vol.I. op. cit.
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going to be taken are based on a wide geographical 
spread, and then curtail all the means of arriving at 
that geographical spread, leaving us with no option
whatsoever, I am yet to understand how this House is 
going to arrive at that geographical spread. We are being 
told here that we should shy away even from ideological 
polarisation of this country. This is most
unfortunate".
7.B.1 Procedure In The Assembly.
Initially, conduct and debates in the Assembly were 
regulated by section 4 of Decree No. 14, 1988. It 
required them to be guided by the Standing Orders of the 
House of Representatives as in force on 30 December, 1983 
subject to any modifications. The Standing Orders had 
provided for a number of posts one of which was that of 
the deputy leader of the House. Quickly, members vied for 
this post, the main contenders alleged to have had the 
support of the two major religious camps in the House. 
This engendered infighting and soured relations with the 
press which engaged in gossip and speculations. For this 
and the fact that the Assembly did not not need some of 
the posts provided for, the rules were modified by the 
government at the request of the Assembly's 
chairperson.2® Thereafter, the Assembly was regulated by 
new rules introduced by Decree No. 24, 1988.* 201
19. Pro. Loabin, G., ibid p.U76.
20. ibid. pp.636-637.
21. C.A. (Arndt. |D*cr„ No.24, 1988, attached as a Schadula.
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Schedule 3 of Decree No. 24 set out detailed rules to 
govern the Assembly including its language, sitting 
hours, quorum, duties of its officials, mode of 
conducting business, establishment of some committees and 
their composition, etc. In particular, it required a 
fixed percentage of the membership of the two mandatory 
committees- Standing Orders and Business Committees to go 
to government nominees-the CRC. Both Committees would 
assist the chairman to serve as guard dogs as it were, 
partly to determine the merits and conformity of 
substantive motions and any proposals to change the 
standing orders of the Assembly in the light of their 
agenda.
Again, to ensure that the main thrust of the Reviewed 
Constitution was not upset, s.40(l) of the Standing 
Orders required it to be considered in chapters and 
clauses in chapters serially beginning with the preamble 
and finally, the schedules. This was followed in the 
final plenary session where decisions were taken on the 
proposals of the various sub committees. Prior to that, 
the debates on the inaugural address and the Reviewed 
Constitution when presented by the CRC chairman 
(designated the leader of the House) as a Bill for first 
reading, were in general terms on the broad outlines of 
the constitution.
As alluded to, after the general debates, the Assembly 
divided itself into twenty three committees, its 
composition based principally on the choice of members
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ending with an average.of«.27 members in a committee.22
Although the nominated comprised a quarter of the
elected. they were in charge of 13 out of the 23
committees. Six co-ordinators were appointed by the
chairman to link up the work of the committees and were
all drawn up from the nominees.
In the course of the general debate, it had become
obvious as we will see later that some issues had the
capacity to stall the Assembly's work. In anticipation, 
the chairman wisely appointed a Committee of Elders made 
up of "few infuential and knowledgeable members" which 
itself later set up its own sub committee of five 
comprising Christians and Muslims to resolve an impasse 
on Sharia Courts.2 3
Debates in committees were held in camera and in the 
final plenary session, it was partly open and partly in 
camera presumably to minimize constituency pressure on 
the members. It was also because of strained relationship 
with the press over reportage of issues in the Assembly. 
One of the committees -committee 3- almost stalled while 
another,- committee 16-actually did so until the
government intervened. We will come back to the
controversy later.
It, is evident that the CA like the CRC had very little 
room to manoevre, notwithstanding opinions expressed by
22. Vol. I, op. clt. pp.1095-96.
23. Chairman’s Latter of Presentation In FRN, Addresses by Gan.Babangida and Justice 
Aniagolu on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Draft Nigerian Constitution at 
Abuja on April 5, 1989. (Ped. Govt.Printer, Lagos. 1989).
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some members that there was room for major innovation.24 
But the limitations of its agenda did not hamper the 
emergence of major cleavages in the determination of 
issues in the Assembly.
7.C.Issues And Cleavage Structure.
During the general debates on the inaugural address and 
first reading of the Bill, the issues closest to the 
hearts of the members emerged. This development was 
partly given a shove by the fact that the President and 
the CRC chairman singled them out for attention. Broadly, 
they were the relationship between state and religión, 
constitutional role for traditional rulers, press 
freedom, coups and the role of the armed forces, states 
and local government creation and of course the 
limitations on the Assembly's powers.
However, the only method of determining the cleavage 
structures on the issues that were so important as to 
have led to divisions is to outline the voting structure 
in the divisions according to states. This was the 
procedure adopted by Jillson to review the cleavage 
structure in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.25 The 
roll call of votes are in Appendix C 
1st Division.
The issue was whether the president needed senate 
approval before he could deploy the armed forces in a
2A. As iodu, P.C., VOl.X, op. cit. pp.116-1171 William«, L.R.p.133.
2S. Jillson, C.C.(1968) ’Constitution Making...’op. Cit.Appendix A.
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limited combat if the integrity of the nation is under 
imminent threat. A proposal by Paul Ukpo (nominated) 
dispensed with -the approval so as to provide a leeway to 
the president to act with despatch and decisiveness.^® In 
arguing against, it was noted that it would involve the 
lives of citizens and might in fact eventually involve 
the country in a full scale war, hence, senate resolution 
was essential at all times. The ensuing division 
contained no discernible cleavage. Most members from all 
states preferred a president who could act unhampered by 
politics in the senate.
II Division.
This was a motion proposed by Bala Takaya (nominated), an 
academic, seeking to expunge from the Reviewed 
Constitution, the provision (S.8(l-4)which 
constitutionalized traditional rulers complete with 
defined functions. The reason was as poetically
summarized by him. "Our philosophy of government is
republic, not monarchy. Our form of government is
democracy, not ascriptive leadership. The status of a
Nigerian is a citizen. not subject. The structural
arrangement of Nigeria is federalism. not
confederation.Our national aspiration is national unity 
and integration, not tribalism. Our societal attitude 
should be that of universalism, not primordialism and 
that of the historical legacy" 267
26 . Discussions in Voi.II. pp.2095-2134.
27. Takaya, B. Voi. II, Par.2228
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The resultant cleavage structure upon division showed 
that the motion was heavily defeated by a combination of 
states inhabited by nationality groups with a strong 
history of traditional rulership. They are the 
predominantly Hausa-Fulani states of the North, Yoruba 
dominated states, Bendel and Cross Rivers from the South. 
Supporting the motion were members from states with 
strong minority groups and who in the past have had 
grievances against the institution in the North-Benue 
(BN), Gongola (GG), Kaduna (KD). The Ibo states of the 
East and other minority areas were divided partly because 
most of them lack a long history of the institution. The 
measure of support here was because there is an 
increasing bid by the elites to reproduce and participate 
in chieftaincy through acquisition of titles as it seems 
to provide a short cut to positions of power and 
influence over the masses. The nominated were in full 
strength (28:1) against the motion.lt was therefore a 
victory for traditional rulers.
Illrd Division.
An amendment proposed by Committee 3 sought to reduce the 
involvement of other states in states creation whose 
procedure was already stringent-(S.9(l) a-d). Those in 
opposition were of the view that states creation affects 
the structure of the federation and therefore, all states 
must contribute to it at all critical stages.28
28. St»« Vol.II, pp. 2266-2271.
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Two sets of groups favoured the proposal. They were those 
from states with large minorities agitating for states- 
Bendel (BD), Rivers (RV), BN, GG. Others were the 
homogeous Ibo states of Imo (IM) and Anambra (AN) where 
as the Political Bureau noted, there is a strong 
political case for creating more states because although 
they constitute about a quarter of the nation's 
population, they are lumped in two states only. Those 
against were a combination of the homogeneous Yoruba, 
Hausa-Fulani dominated states with less demand for states 
creation. Most of the nominated voted with this group 
which secured their victory.
IVth Division.
The amendment introduced by Dahiru Musa (elected-KN) 
sought to provide a safeguard against the National 
Assembly exercising its emergency powers to legislate for 
a state where its legislature is unable to sit, using it 
as a pretext to remove the governor of the state. 
Implicit in it was a fear of opportunistic consequences 
when there is a major strain in the inter-governmental 
relationship between the centre and other smaller units 
of government, especially if they belong to different 
parties.29
Except Bauchi state (BA) for no apparent reason, the 
motion had the decisive support of most members. It
29. ibid, pp.2343-2347.
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showed alliances as fluid depending on the principle and 
its direct effect on the members.
Vth Division.
The amendment co-sponsored by Sola Akinyede (N) and Jise 
Akinmurele (Elected-Ondo-OD) sought to create an 
exception to the injunction in section 15(3), 1979
Constitution requiring the application of federal 
character in public offices. They proposed to allow the 
use of merit and excellence in appointments as an anti­
dote to what they perceived as the lowering of standards 
due to the wholesale application of the principle. In
effect, the elites who see public service as the sharing
of positions among themselves were caught in their own 
net. It was opposed as superfluous arguing that federal 
character does not in fact derogate from merit.^0
In the division that followed, all members from the 
northern states including those of its minorities (BN & 
PL) who so far voted differently, in alliance withtwo
minority states from the East, RV & CR combined to defeat 
it.The nominated, most of whom were past and present 
beneficiaries were in full strength in support of this 
position. On the other hand, all the members from the 
Yoruba and Ibo states combined for the first time to
support it. They are actually the groups that 
consistently complain against the alleged misapplication 
of the principle. Again, old alliances were partly
30. Ibid, pp.2382-2392.
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dissolved and fresh ones made. There were no permanent 
friends or positions.
Vlth Division.
The motion proposed by Committee 4 was on the nation's 
language policy. The CRC proposed the learning of the 
three main languages in the country, viz, Hausa, Yoruba 
and Ibo, which was strongly opposed by the minority 
groups on grounds of discrimination and domination. 
Consequently, Committee 4 proposed an omnibus compromise 
clause simply exhorting the government to promote the 
learning of indigenous languages.
The ensuing cleavage structure in the division was 
pluralistic and diffused. First, members from the Hausa- 
Fulani states were united in opposition. Hausa, the most 
widely used language in the country was one of the three, 
therefore, self interest seemed to have been the 
motivating factor. The second group, supporting the 
motion, came largely from the five Yoruba dominated 
states (Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Bendel & Oyo-LOOBO) in 
alliance as expected with the states where minorities are 
clustered- Akwa Ibom, (AI)j BN, PL, GG & RV) and majority 
of the nominated. Although Yoruba was one of the 
languages affected, the Yoruba members either as a matter 
of principle or shrewd political calculation showed 
solidarity with the minorities.
Jl. ibid, pp.2515-2517.
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A third anomalous group are those who were divided. They 
were the Ibo state of Imo, the largely Kanuri state of 
Borno and Niger where in the case of the last two, there 
is also a strong minority politics but usually in 
alliance with the Hausa-Fulani states. However, the 
alliance of the largely Yoruba states with the minorities 
produced a victory for them.
Vllth Division.
An amendment proposed by Olusegun Ajayi & 5 others sought 
to reintroduce the clause prohibiting discrimination 
against any citizen because of the circumstances of his 
birth. The CRC expunged it from the 1979 Constitution as 
it thought of it as legitimating illegitimate children 
and therefore immoral, a view shared by most of the women 
and Muslim members. They opined that illegitimacy must 
not be constitutionalized as it would present Nigeria in 
bad light and also encourage promiscuity. But it was 
contended that there were other circumstances of 
discrimination such as the Osu class system practiced by 
the Ibos etc.22
The largely Hausa-Fulani states allying with Borno (BO) 
with the coincidence of predominance of Islam, voted 
solidly against it. They had the support of majority of 
the nominated members. In its favour were the entirety of 
the states in the East for the first time. The Ibo states 
were expected to be influenced by the caste system and
32. Ibid, pp.2650-2657.
3 0 4
more importantly, the fact that they are greater in 
diaspora in the country than any group. They had the 
support of the Yoruba states who as is now evident tended 
to vote together in block.
The other states in the north in minority situation were 
divided. Thus, the coalition of the southern members with 
their minorities and the division in the minority states 
of the north let in victory for the supporters of the 
proposal.
VUIth Division.
This was a motion by Odili, P.C.& 16 others mostly from 
the east, seeking to modify the provision which vested 
all the mineral wealth of the country in the federal 
government-S.42( 3). The idea was to create a joint 
ownership of the minerals between the central and state 
governments where the minerals are located.33
The ensuing division registered a singular polarized 
north versus south cleavage. The case for the eastern 
states and Bendel was a clear self interest because all 
the country's oil is exploited there. On the other hand, 
the reason for the support given by the Yoruba states is 
difficult to discern as minerals are not extracted from 
any of them.
In stark contrast, the members from the north including 
its minorities were almost undivided in alliance with an
33. ibid, pp.2674-80.
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overwhelming majority of Mie nominated in opposing and 
securing victory. It was in the interest of most of the 
nominated to so oppose because they have business 
interests which cut across state boundaries. States 
participation in the management of sectors which form the 
nerves of the economy could complicate those business 
dealings.
IXth Division.
The proposal made by Committee 8 sought to relax the 
rules regulating the participation of public servants in 
elective offices. It proposed that a public servant 
wishing to contest shall be granted three months' leave 
of absence prior to the election on terms that if he 
wins, shall resign, withdraw or retire from his job.But 
if he fails, shall resume his position. The rationale 
given was partly to give reality to their constitutional 
rights and partly to reduce the stranglehold of the 
business community on the country's politics.
It was opposed mainly on grounds of the historical 
British legacy of the so called neutrality of public 
servants But a scare tactics was also used by asserting 
that judges and members of the armed forces would be 
drawn into politics.
The voting pattern was significantly diffused. The LOOBO 
group maintaining its usual coalition opposed it, but 
with a significant number of members changing their
î4. Ibid, pp.2749-2756.
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position. There was no discernible pattern in respect of 
members from other areas, with fair distribution for and 
against. But the nominated, the bulk of whom are in 
private ventures were decisively against (42:7). 
Therefore, a logical inference is that together with 
other members from all states who were in private 
vocations, they felt threatened and overturned the 
proposal.
Xth Division.
The amendment sponsored by Elson Awano (GG) was a 
reflection of the two party system adopted for the 
country in the new dispensation. In the 1979 Constitution 
and adopted by the CRC, which involved more than two 
parties, a person to be duly elected as the president had 
to secure inter alia a quarter of votes in at least two 
thirds of all the states in the federation. The proposal 
sought to upgrade one quarter to one half to ensure that 
a minority president with a token spread in some states 
was not elected as there will be two candidates only.35
There was almost absolute support for it. The main snag 
is that barely a quarter of the Assembly were in session 
during this particular decision. It was one of the clear 
instances where a principle, the desire to secure a 
popular president, prevailed.
35. Vol.III pp.3000-3007.
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XIth Division.
This was a proposal made by nine members all from the 
oil producing states seeking to introduce derivation and 
enhanced percentage for ecological problems in the 
distribution of revenue in the federation This meant 
greater share of revenue to those states where the wealth 
of the country is generated. It was proposed despite the 
existence of a National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission inaugurated during the currency of 
the Assembly. One of the Assembly's committees complained 
that its establishment affected their work and greatly 
reduced some of the recommendations it wanted to make . 3 6
In the ensuing division, the members from all the 
northern states were united in rejecting it. 
Correspondingly, all members from the east including its 
minorities in alliance with those from Lagos were 
absolutely for it. Except Lagos, they produce oil and 
rubber and together, constitute the coastal areas of the 
country where the ports and therefore most custom and 
excise duties are earned. They also have the heaviest 
concentration of industries in the country.
For the first time, the Yoruba members were divided. 
Already, those from Lagos and Bendel were in support 
being directly affected as dominant producers of the 
contested wealth. But those from Oyo and Ogun were almost 
evenly divided because they together with the northern
3 6 . I b id .  pp.3284-3300.
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state»- contribute little relatively to federal coffers. 
For the same reason earlier on alluded to, the nominated 
teamed up with the north to defeat the scheme.
Xllth Division.
An amendment by Committee 13 sought to make the 
appointment of diplomats the sole prerogative of the 
president, the senate only to be consulted. This was 
contested on the ground that the involvement of party 
officials and pressure groups could prevent the president 
appointing the best candidates, hence, would be counter 
productive given that diplomats represent the entire 
nation abroad. ^
The core Hausa-Fulani states— Katsina (KT), Kano (KN), 
Sokoto (SO), and Bauchi (BA) were solidly in support with 
majority support from Kaduna, Kwara and Niger and a 
divided Gongola. The nominated by a large majority gave 
support. It is instructive that two of the country's 
three civilian leaders came from this group. This may 
have some explanatory value as they hoped that they would 
continue to produce the president who would then be in a 
position to select his men without having to go through 
the sometimes unpredictable all party screening process 
in the senate.
In opposition but in a more diffused form, were the LOOBO 
states and the easterners including its minorities. The 
main minority states of the north supported them thereby
37 . ibid, pp.3346-3349
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reverting to its pattern of voting with this group but 
lost out.
XIIlth Division.
In the course of the debate, strong dissatisfaction was 
expressed regarding the role of the police during 
civilian regimes and whether the governor rather than the 
president should have ultimate control over law and order 
in a state. The demand seemed stronger especially from 
the north. This crystallized into a demand for state and 
local government police. Others would have none of it.
In order to reconcile these widely conflicting positions. 
Committee 14 proposed the localization of the junior 
cadre of the force. This compromise was meant to resolve 
the historical fact that in the first republic. Native 
Authorities had their own police with the reality of the 
current situation where Nigeria has a very strong central 
authority and finally, the new approach to federalism by 
distributing positions in most spheres of public life 
through the mechanism of federal character. 38
The division that followed indicated an overwhelming 
support from the states that had strong emirates and 
local police in the first republic (BA, BO, KN, NG, SO) 
less Gongola, base of the hitherto dominant Adamawa 
emirate. These states except Borno are incidentally 
dominated by the Hausa-Fulanis. It may also be noted that 
the governors of Borno and Kano who were in parties
38. Ibid, pp.3487-3490.
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different from the central government with a war type of 
relationship, had immense difficulties with the police in 
the second republic.
In favour of central police only even though most of 
their civilian governments had problems with the central 
authorities and the police as well, were all the members 
from all the eastern and western states plus the minority 
areas of the north ( BN., GG.,6. PL.). They have common 
grievance in that they had enormous difficulties in the 
past with the native authorities, and its machinery of 
justice-police and the courts. The nominated were divided 
but as expected, had a majority support for central 
police only. Thus, a combination of all members from the 
south, northern minorities and a majority of the 
nominated ensured victory for those who may be called 
federalists against the localists of the emirate north.
XIVth Division.
The issue here was anxiety especially by the members from 
the south who feared that Abuja,the new federal capital 
was being converted into another state by stealth. 
Consequently, Gabby Nwankwo introduced a motion seeking 
to delete the clause that provided that it was to be 
administered "as if it were one of the states of the 
federation", S.279, 1979 Constitution). For this reason, 
those members seemed to consider less important the fact 
that the present residents have neither been compensated 
nor finally resettled in breach of one of the cardinal 
injunctions of the constitution which prohibits
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expropriation of property— without adequate and prompt
compensation.3^
The ensuing division followed the now familiar pattern of 
cleavage. The members from Borno and Niger allied with 
the Hausa-Fulani states (BA.,KN.,KT.,SO. ) to vote against 
it in full strenghth. Correspondingly, all the members 
from the south allied with those from the minority areas 
of the north and a majority of the nominated to carry the 
motion through successfully.
Discussion.
From the preceding presentation, the motives that 
influenced members to vote the way they did fall into two 
broad categories. In three clear divisions, I-III the 
members seemed to have been affected by a higher value, 
the wish to see that the integrity of the country is 
secured by a president who can act with despatch, that 
the national legislature does not use crises in any state 
to remove its governor, and a desire to secure unity 
through a popularly elected president.
However, the bulk of the divisions show a clear voting 
structure apparently motivated mainly by the group and 
individual interests of the members. Thus, those from the 
emirate Hausa-Fulani states allied in many instances with 
the nominated or minorities especially of the south to 
produce victory for themselves, for instance by securing 
a constitutional status and defined functions for 39
39. Ibid. 3666-3678.
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traditional rulers Also, divisions sometimes followed a 
polarized north versus south cleavage. For instance, with 
support from majority of the nominated in most cases, the 
north combined to defeat the explicit introduction of a 
nebulous merit as exception to the elite federal 
character formula, form of ownership of the country's 
minerals but lost in respect of the status of Abuja as it 
could not muster the support of the southern nominees and 
some of the northern minorities.
On the other hand, the members from the minority states 
had more shifting positions. For instance, they were all 
united against most members from the Hausa-Fulani block 
on the nation's language policy. Also states from which 
most federal resources derive were united in demanding 
derivation and enhanced percentage in revenue sharing, 
although they lost out.
The nominated, like the minority but to a lesser extent 
had no definite ally or position. But on the whole, they 
stood for measures that favoured the centre and 
uniformity because of the national character of their 
business interests and the fact that they represented the 
interests of their appointor, the federal government. 
They were overwhelming in rejecting any threat to their 
eminently predominant positions, for instance they allied 
with their elective counterparts in business to see off 
the challenge posed by the public servants and their 
sympathisers who sought the relaxing of rules governing 
entry into positions of power.
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Finally, it may be noted that two blocks of states 
generally maintained a common position on most issues. 
The LOO BO members most of the time voted together like 
those from the predominantly Hausa-Fulani states, 
(BA.,KN.,KT.,& SO). Alliances were then drawn from either 
the minorities or the nominated. On average, most of the 
nominated voted with the Hausa-Fulani block while the 
minorities of Benue and Plateau voted with LOOBO. This 
new coalitions has important implications for the geo­
politics of Nigeria. First, it actually confirms the 7 
liberalising effect of the break up of the old regional 
arrangement through states creation which was notable in 
the second republic coalitions. 40 Secondly, it also shows 
that no particular coalition can rely on its own
strength to dominate the country which makes the unity of 
the country dependent on manifold variables . 41 Thus, no 
particular coalition consistently won or lost out. 
Finally, differences were broadly on elite participation 
in the structures of government rather than on primordial 
differentiation.
However, apart from the issues which led to divisions, 
there were others which polarized the members forcing the 
government to intervene.
40. Diamond, L. (1983) ‘Social Changa and Political Conflict in Nigeria's second Republic* in Zartman, i.w.(ed.) The Political Economy of Nigeria (Praeger, N.*.) 
pp.28-84.
41. See Laitln, D.D.(1982) ‘The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second 
Republic* in 20 The Journal of Hodern African Studies,3«411-430.
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7.C.1 State, Religion and the Sharia Controversy.
More than any issue, and like the 1977/78 Constituent 
Assembly, the dispute over the relationship envisaged 
between state and the majoi religions in Nigeria, 
polarized the members almost absolutely between Muslims 
and Christians. To be sure, there were some members 
especially in the nominated camp, the LOOBO states and 
the whole East who were conciliatory and attempted to 
exercise moderating influences in their campaign in the 
case of the 1977/78 C.A.«
The dispute had two aspects to it. First, on the broader 
issue of the relationship between state and religion, 
most Christians within the Assembly and apparently in the 
wider Christian public as represented by the many 
publications of the disparate Christian organisations 
wanted at best an ecumenical, secular role for the state, 
playing no active part. Their demand approximated to the 
position in America and certainly not Marxian which is 
hostile to religion. Consequently, the definition offered 
by de Smith largely encapsulates their position. He 
defines a secular state as one "which guarantees 
individual and corporate freedom of religion, deals with 
the individual as a citizen irrespective of his religion, 
is not constitutionally connected to a particular 
religion nor does it seek either to promote or interfere 
with religion" . 42 3 It is required to maintain a position
42. The factual bails for this catsgorlmatIon la provided by a datallad analysis by 
Laltln, Ibid, p.420
43. Smith, A.Donald (1963) India As A Sscular State (Princeton Unlv.Press, N.J,
Bombay, Oxford Unlv. Press) p.4.
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of transparent neutrality- in its conduct with the 
multiple religions in the country. 4 4 This position was 
later concretely reflected in section 10 of the 1979 
constitution, adopted by the P.B and C.R.C. It provided 
that "the Government of the Federation or of a State 
shall not adopt any religion as state religion”.
However, dissatisfaction with the perceived partisan 
attitude of government engendered a demand for a specific 
more prohibitive phrase. Arising from this, the perceived 
bias, most Christians took strong objections to the bid 
by Muslims for an appellate federal structure for the 
states Sharia Courts which had existed since even before 
colonialism in the erstwhile Northern Region. They also 
protested against the incorporation into the 
constitution, of Decree No . 6 1989 which enlarged the 
jurisdiction of the State Sharia Courts. As noted there 
was unity in the views of the members and the leadership 
of the organized Christian community outside it . 4 5
It is instructive to note that, contrary to the known 
apolitical, deferential tenets of Christianity to 
authority, the Christian leadership shifted from this and 
sought to reinterpret those scriptures to show 
consistency between the religion and an active political
44, See contributions by Dr.Hypollta Adigva (Rav.Msgr), Vol.2. pp.1738-1744; Dr, 
Iwuoha, E.I., pp.1820-1825, as representative examples fro« tha numerous comments
4S. Saa Ibidi Tha Takan Study GroupiTha Path to a Lasting Constitution, A Memorandum 
submitted to tha Constitution Review Committee, 1978; Leadership In Nigeria 
Enlightenment Series I (CAN Publicity, Northern Zona, 1988).
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life. 4 6 This political perception partly begun in the 
aftermath of the civil war when Christians in the South 
and the North felt uneasy because lack of unity among 
them was part of their inability to prevail on the 
official parties to the dispute, and thus prevent a war 
in which a part of its victims were Christians. 47 This was 
later compounded by some official policies considered 
detrimental to Christians and the country upon which 
input from the former was not sought. 48 The desire for 
unity and the strength that accompanies it, led to the 
change in approach to politics and its institutions. 
Thus, the Church followed on an earlier declaration in 
Lome by its leaders. The latter declared thus: "Despite 
the occasional voice crying in the wilderness, the 
Church...was inclined far too often to conform to the 
world rather than, to transform it. In thus conforming, 
the church has weakened its position as the conscience of 
the nation. IF the Church is to reassert itself 
effectively and consistently, it must determine never 
again to be dragged along by the powers that be . . . " 49 But 
the unity remained elusive while arguments on whether 
clerics or only the flocks could engage in active
46. Relying on the following verses which implies active political life- Romans 13il- 
7i Titus 3i1 >Acts 4■19 t 5)29.
47. Pro.Erlvwo, S.U.(198S) “The Church In A Changing Nigeriail960 to Date“ in Kayode.M.O.fc Usman, Y.B.eds The Economic and Social Development of Nigeria (The 
Panel on Nigeria since Independence History Project.A.B.U,Zaria)pp.371-400.
48. Notable schemes were the take over control of Voluntary Agency Schools, most of 
which were missionary schools, and the later Universal Primary Education, whose 
ultimata goal they complained was "the secularisation of education, which will not 
do this country any good*.ibid p.383.
49. Quoted from ibid, p.380.
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politics raged on unresolved until the creation of 
Christian Association of Nigeria (C.A.N.) in 1976.
The agenda of the latter was broad enough to incorporate 
both puritanical and political ends, evident in 
subsequent positions on issues emanating from official 
actions, investigation and chanelling of reported 
grievances both of individual and corporate Christians, 
politics, etc . 50
Later, an appeal was made to all Christians in the 
country urging that "when the Christian passes from the 
realm of the church into the political sphere, he is not 
passing out of Christ’s dominion into the political 
sphere, he is not passing out of Christ’s dominion into 
the dominion of some other lord, and that political 
affairs no less than the life of the church are within 
the dominion of Christ." 5 1
As examples of the gains to be made or inversely past 
injustices, the Christian Association of Nigeria (C.A.N) 
published the leadership structure of the country since 
independence, in government and other public institutions 
which according to it has been under the monopoly of 
Muslims because impliedly, they controlled politics. The 
leadership of C.A.N therefore, urged its flock to be 
active poltically, and resist in any way ,perceived 
injustices. To this end, inter alia, it went on to
50. A number of then* are mentioned in. Ibid.
51. "Leadership In N i g e r i a . o p .  cit.p.71.
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challenge government decisions in respect of allocation 
of plots of land to religious organizations in Abuja, it 
went to court over the Decree which established the 
Pilgrims Commission. 5 2 In fact, the Churches begun to 
express concern from the time the CDC completed its work 
and contemplated the possibility of establishing Canon 
Law Courts in Nigeria. Also, fears were expressed even 
before the C.A. 1977. Thus "we must not allow ourselves 
to be misled in our response by the false 
impression...that there is nothing new in the provisions 
for Sharia in the Draft Constitution. . . " 53
Later, in 1989, it threatened to reject the constitution 
if it contained provisions on sharia or sanctioned the 
Sharia Courts . 5 4
There are a number of reasons why the secular proposition 
ignores the reality of the Nigerian situation. First, the 
use of a religious platform to seek political power is 
inconsistent with its wish for a secular state since it 
is one of the areas outside the scope of religion's 
legitimate aims in truly secular western societies like 
the U.S.A. whose footpath Nigeria is copying. Second, in 
Nigeria and most developing countries, where the state is 
both the "differentiator and distributor" of resources, 
"the equating of secularity with neutrality even at the
52. National Concord of 7/3/1999 12/4/1999» lt/4/1999»27/4/1999.
53. Mamorandum by tha Diractor of Inatituta of Church and Soclaty to C.A.N.tor 
dallbaration in 1979 in Prof.Brivwo, op. clt.p 39«.
54. N/Concord of 2S/4/1999.
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theoretical level implies a cast that is too rigid" - * 5 
Third, in most pre-colonial nationalities in Nigeria, 
political power was legitimated by myths and religions, 
which position was scarcely different during colonialism 
through the preservation of the Emirates in the North 
whose rationale we saw was Islam, while the setting in 
the South is generally perceived Christian. Fourth, in 
contrast to Western experience where debate is conducted 
against the dominance of one religion, the relative size 
of the dominant religions in Nigeria is such that neither 
"can dominate- or be allowed to dominate" . * 56
The position of the Muslim community was slightly 
different. Those in the C.A. wholly supported the demand 
for the Federal Sharia Court Of Appeal with jurisdiction 
over limited civil areas only, partly objecting to the 
idea of a secular state. Rather, they envisaged the state 
to be supportive of all the religions without adopting 
any one of them.5^
But in studied contrast, it was evident from available 
literature that a notable segment of Muslims outside the 
C.A. preferred Islam to be presented as an ideology which 
should replace or at worse run concurrently with the 
prevailing ideology in the country, so that it could be 
applied in political, economic and social life . 5 8 But so
**. Agbaje, A.(1990) 'Travails of th# Secular State: Religion, Politics and the 
Outlook on Nigeria's Third Republic* In XXVIII The Journal of Commonwealth a 
Comparative Pol itlcs,31289.
56. ibid, p.292
57. Dr.Yadudu, A.T.. Vol.2 as example of this position.
**. Memo addressed by the National Committee on Sharia, Mushin, Lagos, to the CRC,
1988) Memo submitted bty the Muslim Community. A.B.U.Zaria. 1988) Justice Ustas Y
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far, no concrete steps have been taken to realize this 
alternative model of state unlike the Moslem Brotherhood 
of Egypt who, although not in power, have sought to 
provide banks, social and educational services. Mosques, 
etc to the public . 59 *
Given this context, the debate in the C.A.s was scarcely 
conducted in a rational exposition and exploration of the 
merits and demerits of the situation with a view to 
winning over opponents. Rather, it sounded like positions 
taken prior to the C.A.and at the same time articulated, 
echoed and enlarged the virulent and inciting attacks on 
aspects of both religions over the radio, television and 
newspapers. Committee 16 in the case of the 1988
C.A.which had responsibility for the judicature dragged 
on without settlement in sight despite the mediatory
mechanisms employed as in 1977 as noted earlier while the 
report of Committee three generated tension.
For these reasons, as in 1977/78, the federal government 
intervened to withdraw the jurisdiction of the Assembly 
on those items dealing with the Sharia Courts.®® In its 
final decision, the government upheld the 1979 position 
including the jurisdiction expanded by Decree No.6 , 1986. 
It also deleted the new provision prohibiting the state
Abdullah, Sharia as a Panacaa for Nigeria's Soclo-ecnonmic Problems, Paper 
presented at the 4th Annual Confaranca of Islamic Law Taachars, Univ. of 
Maiduguri, March, 1990.
59. Hussain N.(1989) "Islamic Fundamental ism as a Political Protest Movement" inIslamic Fundamentalismi A Debate on the Role of Islam Today (Inst, for African 
Alternative, London) p.31-33.
i0. Address by the Chief of General Staff, Vice Admiral Alkhomu to the members of the CA, Abuja 2S/11/1988, Vol.2 op. cit.21270-2129. Further correspondences between 
the CA and the government on matters incidental to it are contained in "The
Report...* op. clt.
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from overtly or covertly assisting any religion. But to 
mollify the Christians, it removed the option clause 
which empowered any non Muslim party to a case with a 
Muslim to opt for the application of Islamic Law to the 
proceedings. 6 1
Given the manner the Sharia debate was conducted and what 
was sought by the official parties to the dispute, the 
primary objective seemed to have been the creation and 
consolidation of political constituency by both sides and 
strengthening of bargaining positions in the subsequent 
civilian politics. It was part of the continuing 
exploitation of religion by the dominant elites to inter 
alia, further a political cause as used during the civil 
war (1967-1970).62 At that time, the war was presented at 
both domestic and international level as between the 
Muslim North and the Christian East. Since then, 
developments in the country such as the splitting of the 
hitherto emotive highly politicized regional structures 
into smaller units and the resultant emancipation of its 
minorities, centralization of power and resources, inter 
alia, have undermined the efficacy of past cleavage 
structures and thrown up potential ones on the one hand. 
This is easily supported by the fact brought out by 
Laitin where those who held extreme positions were the
61. SS.261 t 329 of the 1969 Constitution., FRN.
62 ■ The history and ths incidents of this manipulation including ths local and foreign 
links are traced and examined in Usman, Y.B.(1978), The Manipulation of Religion 
in Nigeria, 1977-87. (Vanguard Publishers Kaduna, Nigeria)) The violent Politics of Religion in Nigeriai A Press Statement by some lecturers of A.B.U.Zaria- 
13/3/1987) A simillar effort by traditional rulers in the North is reported in 
west Africa, 20/7/1987.
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members from the North (KNr NG,SO,Bo,KD & BA-pro-Sharia; 
BN,PL,GG partly» anti-Sharia) . 63
The extreme pro-Sharia group were part of the core geo­
political areas of the ertswhile Northern region that 
benefitted from the ideology of "Northernization” used in 
the past to maintain the North as one political 
constituency which ideology is no longer viable. The case 
of BN & PL is explained only partly by the fact that they 
were seeking to sever ties from communities seeking to 
maintain authority as Laitin urges, but more importantly, 
their elites have turned their liberation into a weapon 
of attack to secure political platform largely using the 
ideology of religion.
The political, economic and psychological environment is 
provided by the failure of the extant ideology and its 
practitioners to address the basic needs of the people. 
The resultant dissatisfaction has been expressed through 
the sporadic violence and destruction of property that 
have taken place in the country since the 1980s described 
as religious fundamentalism. 6 4 These socio-economic 
issues did not come into the agenda in the fierce debates 
in the C.A.on this matter contrary to the notion that 
this C.A.provided for a welfare state despite pious 
declarations as we will now examine. *6
6J. Laitin, op.cit.422.
6*. A critical aaaaaamant ia mada by Ibrahim, J.(1989) *Tha Politics of Raligion in 
Nigeria: Tha Paramatars of tha 1987 Criaia in Kaduna Stata* in Raviaw of African 
Political Economy No.45/46 pp.65-82; violanca aa a part of aactarian compatition 
for aupramacy among dlvaraa Islamic organlaationa ia praaantad by Clarka, P.B.
■ Fundamental lam in Ialam in Nigaria*, Woat Africa, 23/8/1982.
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7.C.2 Welfare State and the 1989 Constitution
The often cited most important difference between the 
1979 and 1989 Constitutions is said to be the provision 
by the latter of a welfare state. 6 5 The scheme was first 
proposed by Committee 4 which was in charge of the
Fundamental Objective and Directive Principles of State 
Policy. But the theme itself in relation to the
constitutional process was first raised and canvassed in 
the C.D.C. without concrete measures while the P.B. 
sought to provide the latter.
According to the Committee, it is to emphasize "the need 
for government to be more responsive to the basic needs 
of the people". But it quickly entered a caveat that no 
ideology was intended to avoid being misunderstood as 
introducing socialism by stealth. 6 6 This followed its
rejection of the justiciability of the chapter on 
fundamental objectives. But to give some degree of teeth 
to the welfare idea, it proposed a body to be called
Fundamental Objectives Performance Monitoring
Commission. 6 7
However, the Committee provided no specific content to 
the declared welfarism, except the hope it placed on the 
realization of the chapter on basic objectives, assisted 
by the Monitoring Committee. Committee Four's proposal 
for welfare provisions were accepted by the Assembly, but
i5. J u s t ic e  Aniagolu. ‘Latter of Presantatlo...* op. cit.p.16.
Prof. Abdullahl, Ango, Cttee. 4 Chairman, Vol.2 op.clt.1712
67. Ibid, p.1713.
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it rejected the Monitoring Committee as well as a 
spirited effort by few members to provide some content. 68 
Similarly, as a way out of the classical reason of lack 
of funds used to deny concrete content to the welfare 
provisions, the sixteen medical doctors in the Assembly 
proposed for adoption a National Health Insurance Scheme. 
It was negatived.6®
In the same vein, an amendment which sought to reinforce 
the existing legal aid system by providing for a Legal 
Aid Fund in the constitution to which state and central 
governments will contribute annually, lapsed for lack of 
secondment. A related proposal seeking to empower 
Nigerians to defend each other was refused for fear of 
floodgate of frivolous actions in the courts.
Some of the Committees attempted to provide concrete 
meaning to the concept, for instance. Committee 6 made a 
strong case for upgrading health and education from mere 
objectives to fundamental rights. But the Assembly could 
only concede the transfer to fundamental rights of free, 
compulsory and universal primary education, free 
secondary education and free adult literacy programme 
after a prolonged and stiff opposition by some members 
especially, the nominated camp . 70 Also on the plus side, 
the Assembly adopted after a considerable opposition 
including the chairman on grounds of costs, free medical
68. Sae Abba Dabo, ibid 2374» Garkl, Vol.3 op. cit.pp.3789-3790.
69. Dr Hanahaw and IS othara-Vol.2, pp.2551-2554.
70. Dabataa at pp.2485-2507, Vol.2 now embodied in a.43 of tha 1989 Conatitutlon.
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care for children from birth until 18 years of age, aged 
from 65 and handicapped and disabled. It declined in 
respect of mothers in pre and post natal conditions on 
the pithy and mean ground that it is a private affair 
between couples which the state should not fund. 7 1
The Assembly's prevarications on these matters contrasted 
markedly with the speed with which some of the economic 
aspects of the constitution were dealt with. For
instance, it was observed that property rights which one 
member wrongly claimed as the very basis for the 1948 
Covention on Human Rights, should not be a matter for 
ordinary statutes and implication in the constitution as 
provided in 1979. Consequently, a motion was made to 
specifically decree the right to property as a
fundamental right. It was adopted with little discussion 
and without opposition. 7 2 Similarly, although the Land 
Use Act which put land under the control of state 
officials managed to survive, it attracted a concerted 
and considerable attack. The common view was that it is 
confiscatory and at best should be an ordinary statute 
rather than a constitutional document.7^ Therefore, 
predictably, a motion which sought to ensure that land 
and water resources be administered without creating a 
landless class of Nigerians was defeated. 7 4 The latter 
was an expression of concern for the way communities have
71. Vol.2, p p .2699-2707, now s.«2 ibid.
7*. Saa Rav.Adigwa and Hanahaw at pp.2683 a 2685 raapactlvaly- Vol.2 now a.44 ibid.
7i. Vol. 1 pp.1229| Vol.2 pp.2448*2464, Vol.3 pp.3749-37S8.
74. Vol.2 pp.2441.
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been dispossessed of large tracts of land for official 
and individual use without adequate and prompt 
compensation, resulting in clashes with the previous 
owners, occasioning loss of life. 75
Finally, the crucial issue of the management of the 
economy was never referred to in the definition of the 
Assemby's agenda. But in the course of the Assembly's 
work, the government speedily pursued its programme of 
deregulating the economy The response in the Assembly was 
mixed and sporadic. There were those who in fact 
encouraged the government and urged that the process 
should be total. On the other hand were members who made 
strong calls for it to be halted as it is inconsistent 
with some of the egalitarian provisions of the 1979 and 
proposed 1989 Constitution. On the whole, the demands of 
the latter went almost unnoticed and therefore without 
debate.
The sum total of these is that it is a misnomer to 
describe the few concessions made as having established a 
welfare state. In fact most of them are a restatement of 
what already obtained. On the contrary, the Assembly 
strengthened the economic aspects of the 1979 
Constitution and used the word "welfare" as a ploy to 
give it a positive outlook, an approach begun by the 
Macpherson Constitution of 1951.The idea was to make the 
document less objectionable to the majority of people
7S. Uiun,l.B.«d. Political Raprosaion In Nlgaria.
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even though its framework and structures bear 
insignificant links to them.
7.C.3 Military Intervention and the Constitution.
More than any issue, the persistent military intervention 
in the political economy of the country was one area most 
members disapproved of. The scene was actually set by the 
president in his inaugural address. He said "I believe i 
reflect the growing conviction and awareness among 
Nigerians that the persistent, destabilising interruption 
and disruption of our orderly political evolution by bad 
politics, bad governments and reactive military 
interventions is a form of national self defeat".7®
While the military passed the buck to civil politicians, 
the members excepting a few nominated members thought the 
military bears almost sole blame for the instability. 
Following this, suggestions to prevent coups were almost 
as many as there were members. But the main proposals
could be crystallized into three options. First, that the
\/Assembly should define it as a crime punishable at all 
times. Secondly, Nigerians should refuse cooperation with 
those who take over government outside the framework of 
the constitution. This is wide enough to include 
civilians who rigged elections. Finally, the citizens 
should oppose such a government and that state immunity/ 
would not apply to their activities. * 7 7
7i. President Babangida. ‘Inaugural Address...* p.l.
77. Vol.2 pp.2049-2066.
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Obviously, these proposals would not in any way prevent 
coups and in fact contain seeds for perpetuating military 
government in the country. As a member rightly noted, if 
the military were aware that its departure would be 
follwed by trials, they may not leave. Similarly, by 
passing the buck to the people, "elite..would now use the 
greater population of this country to test the powers of 
the rifles of the armed forces...The cooperation that 
exists in the body governance of this country is normally 
between the elites and the members of the armed forces 
who eventually take over control..."7® But it could be 
meaningful to encourage civil disobedience of a sort if 
there was a responsible, democratic civilian government 
truly serving the basic needs of the people. The Assembly 
finally settled for the proposal rendering coups criminal/ 
offences, which actually restated the existing position 
in 1979 Constitution and ordinary statutes.
It was apparently as a fall-out of this distate for 
military rule that the Assembly perfunctorily rejected 
the request by the president for a transition provision 
in the constitution along with Committee 22's proposals 
for constitutional dyarchy (mixture of military and 
civilians in government) of a sort . * 7 9 They took umbrage 
partly under the technical fact that the request was not 
in the Decree establishing the Assembly. It was made 
during the inaugural address. Also, that the request
7B. Mustapha, Boas c., ibid pp.2062-63.
79. Tha options offared by tha sub coaailttaa ara at pp.1922-1926. Vol.2.
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would legitimize dyarchy and might lead to conflict of 
legitimacy and since the constitution is a composite 
document, it could not be introduced piecemeal as 
intended.
Therefore, the Assembly resolved to convey its decision 
to the government through a letter rather than as part of 
its recommendations on the constitution, the options open 
to the government. The latter could decide to introduce 
the constitution into force progressively by Order 
beginning in the first quarter of 1989 until 1992 or it 
could enact a decree bringing the constitution into force 
and containing all the provisional sections it desired . 88 
7.C.4 Party Structures.
A two party structure was one of the issues taken outside 
the purview of the Assembly. Consequently, most 
developments in this sphere were determined by the 
government. The latter conferred on the National 
Electoral Commission (NEC) responsibility for the
recognition and registration of political parties in 
fulfilment of an earlier promise. 80 1
Following elaborate guidelines issued by NEC including a 
deposit of about £3500 , any association wishing to
register as a political party was invited to submit 
applications. In the end, 13 associations did and after 
their scrutiny, the NEC in its Report and
80. Tha proposal* war« largoly aada by Prof. Xjalayo and Prof.Ango Abdullahl- Vol.3, 
pp.«174-76.
81. Can. Babanglda, Addraas to tha Nation on tha Political Program»« for tha Country 
(FRN.1987) p.7.i National Blactoral (Aawndt.) (No.2) Dacraa No.37, 1989.
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Recommendations, found "foreboding signs" . ® 2 They were 
found to have been riddled with factionalism evidence of 
intolerance and personalization of politics, rigging and 
falsification of claims, disregard of the main guidelines 
and poor organization. More ominously but not
surprisingly, it found their antecedents deeply tied to 
the past and the banned politicians and a financial base 
largely dependent on "charity/donations from undisclosed 
sources". Their executive committees were filled with 
wealthy individuals while the manifestos tended to 
"cluster around the centre of the ideological spectrum, a 
little to the left and a little to the right" . 82 3
Given this structure, orientation and attitude of the 
associations, the government rejected and subsequently 
abolished them as "we will not serve our people
yesterday's food in glittering new dishes" and that " 
while we have no intention of succeeding ourselves, we 
shall not hand over the third republic to money bags 
either" . 84 Certainly, this result was a direct effect of 
the government's suppression of politics based on overt 
ideology evident in its aversion to extremists on the 
left of the ideological plane. But it is obvious that it 
plays one, evident in its unpretended adoption of market 
oriented economic policies and programmes. That explains 
why everybody sought to occupy a centre position in the
82. National electoral Commission, Report and Recommendations on Party Registration, Sept.1989, p.8.
83. ibid, pp.8-13.
84. General Babangida, THE DAWN OF A NEW SOCIO-POLITICAL ORDER, An Address to the 
Nation on the Occasion of the Registration of Two Political Parties, Oct. 7, 1989 (FRN,19890.
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ideological spectrum, worsened by the refusal of the 
Assembly to relax the rules regulating entry into power 
through elections so that only those in private vocations 
have a free rein.
In their place, the government after reviewing various 
options decreed the two parties complete with names ( 
National Republican Party-NRC and Social Democratic 
Party-SDP), identical constitutions and ideologically "a 
little to the left and a little to the right" and 
manifestos only differing in nuances. 8 5
But it must be observed that some of the structures of 
the parties contain ingredients for limited popular 
democracy if properly explored and popular awareness is 
fostered. It is to be a "Grassroot Democratic Two Party 
System" which is intended to have:(i) a mass base and 
which would throw up leadership on the basis of equality 
of opportunity, (ii) De-emphasise the role of money in 
politics, prevent the emergence of old cleavages and 
chart a new pattern of recruitment and participation as 
well as institutions.
Frameworks were provided to accomplish at least some of 
them. First, membership registers will be kept at the 
ward/local government levels and elections for party 
leadership and other elective offices will be conducted 
through series of elections by electoral colleges which
85. Transition to Civil Rula (Political Program)*) (Am*ndt.) D*cr** No.26.1989.
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begin from the ward level.8^ At the formation period and 
partly subsequently, they were to be administered and 
funded by the government. Recently, the government 
decreed that elections will be conducted by open ballot 
thus minimising the chances of rigging and manipulation, 
subject to the possibility of intimidation of voters to 
cast ballots one way or the other . 8 7
In recognition of the fact that the elites bear almost 
sole responsibility for the problems of the country, the 
government decreed a Centre for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions. Its task would be to "seek out and identify 
sources and types of anti-democratic attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviour in Nigerians and devise measures to correct 
them through our educational, bureaucratic and political 
institutions..[It will]..homogenise the bureaucrats of 
political parties using short term training, workshops, 
seminars and conferences" in the values of representative 
democracy, republicanism, fundamental rights, secularity 
of the state, etc . 88
The snag here is its reliance on existing institutions to 
undertake the reorientation. It is these institutions 
which reproduce those negative values associated with the 
political class and other leaders of the country. 
Therefore, any reform has to start with them. However, 
although the government conceded too little and mainly on
•* . Ibid, Sa.10-11, Also FN. 52 p.19.
•7. woat Africa, B-14 April, 1991.
88. Ganaral Babangida, "Th# Dawn of a naw Era..." op.cit.14-17.
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electoral matters only, it- indeed provided a window of 
opportunity which might enable a minimum popular 
participation if thoroughly implemented.
The available evidence on the composition of the Assembly
and their attitude on basic issues shows little to
suggest that they could have fared better than the
government in the direction of providing for the people. 
They shied away from most developmental and issues of 
popular democracy. For instance, the creation of
"Development Areas" recommended by the P.B., watered down 
by the government was described by the Committee which 
dealt with local government as containing "a booby trap" 
which ought to be removed. 89  90 Hence, it was further 
mutilated by empowering only the states to create a 
prescribed number for a local government. The latter 
would no longer participate in its creation.
The Assembly preoccupied itself with clamour for the 
creation of more local governments and greater financial 
autonomy which, although legitimate, was handled with 
little consideration for its structure and especially how 
its activities relate to the people. The structure was 
marginally touched by the military later by introducing 
presidential system whereby the chairman and the 
supervisory councillors would form the executive and 
other ordinary councillors, the legislature . 9 8 Similarly, 
the chairmen were empowered to appoint their secretaries,
89. Vox.2, p.l9S2> See s.7(J) 1989 Const.
90. W.A. 18-24 rob.4 18-24 March, 1991.
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hitherto appointed by state governments from within the 
civil service.
Finally, although the government created a siege 
situation for the members which they generally lamented, 
their attendence of the Assembly was extremely poor and 
generally less than the minimum prescribed quorum of 300 
most of the time. It was a constant source of tension 
within the Assembly itself and as a result had to be 
reduced to 200 at the instance of the chairman . ®1 He was 
anxious that the Assembly may be dismissed 
unceremoniously if it did not complete its work on 
schedule for lack of attendance. Later on at the end of 
the exercise, fearing that decisions arrived at without 
the prescribed quorum may be tampered with or go down 
unwell in posterity, the chairman sought to 
retrospectively legitimate it by requesting members to 
give assent to those decisions. It was rightly
declined . 92
Against this background and the general supervisory role 
the military ascribed to itself, it was not a surprise 
that after the submission of the Assembly's Report, the 
government did some retuning. First, it was clearly 
irritated by the pre-occcupation with the perceived 
negative role of the military and rightly described the 
anti-coup provisions as tautology. 9 3 In the sphere of the
9l. VOX.3, pp.3254-3255 .
*2. Ibid, p.4277.
9i. This and the followong government decision*  are drawn from the National Concord, May S, 1989.
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executive, the number of advisers to the president were 
pruned from 7 to 3. Also, limitations placed on the 
president in negotiating foreign loans which required 
involvement of the National Assembly was removed while 
the provision establishing Security Fund was deleted. 
Finally, the president must go to the senate for 
confirmation of his ministers and not just to consult 
them as was originally provided.
In the legislative arena, legislators will now serve on 
part time, partly to save cost but also to encourage 
independent minded citizens to become law makers "without 
any disadvantage to the pursuit of their legitimate 
livelihood" , a thinly disguised reference to those in 
private vocations. 9 4 The President actually adopted a 
similar recommendation made earlier on by an official 
body whose reason was to make politics less lucrative . 95 
Also to save cost, the size of senate was reduced from 95 
to 64.
In respect of the judiciary, the changes on the Sharia 
Courts have already been noted. The new provisions 
granting some measure of financial autonomy to superior 
courts was removed because separation of powers does not 
mean water tight compartments. Finally, five newly 
proposed commissions were deleted9 6 but the government
*«. ibid.
95. FRN, Report of the Judicial Comm1s,ion of Inquiry into the Affaire of federal 
Electoral Commission, 1979-1983, Summary of Findings and Recommendations,MOV.1986. p.356.
96 ■ The commissions were> the Armed Forces Services Commission, National Assembly 
Service Commission, National Environment Protection Commission, Police Service Commission and Science and Technology Commission.
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evidently did not contest -the rejection of some of the 
institutions it wanted constitutionalized. Following this 
amendments and like its 1979 counterpart, the
constitution was enacted by the Federal Military 
Government, with the constitution attached as a 
schedule.*7 It comes into force on the 1st October, 1992 
(S.331), subject to the provision in the Decree 
empowering the President to by Order appoint an earlier 
date for the coming into force of any of its provisions.
Meanwhile, since the transition process begun in 1989 
with the local government elections to be followed by 
that for governor and legislatures at states level, their 
powers, functions and duties and relationship with the 
central authorities will be regulated by decree to be 
promulgated by the Government (S.l of Promulgation
Decree).
In conclusion, the substance and procedure of the
exercise was riddled with protectionism. On the one hand, 
the military was anxious to protect the values it 
believed in or it thought are agreed ingredients of 
Nigerian politics. On the other hand, there was little to 
suggest the C.A.as constituted would have come up with 
serious alternatives. Already, even in those areas it had 
elbow room, they were more pre-occupied with matters 
which affected them individually or as a group defined 
geographically, economically or primordially.
97. The Constitution of ths Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree. 1989.
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The real intention of the exercise was to provide a 
semblance of popular legitimacy to a constitution whose 
main structures and philosophy were decided by the 
government against the background of free market 
orientation and the broader transition process given the 
government's rejection of referendum. It was not really 
intended that the Assembly would provide substantial 
concrete alternative arrangements.
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CONCLUSION,
This research set out to determine primarily the 
prinicipal beneficiaries of the constitutional evolution 
of Nigeria largely based on the background of the major 
participants. For this purpose, a certain periodization 
was made both for clarity but more importantly, to 
reflect the increasing complexity of the process due to 
the enlargement of the contending elements who sought 
protection by constitutional provision, and their 
relative strengths.
Constitution making in the first period, 1900-1946, 
reflecting the Governor's constitutions, was a relatively 
straightforward affair, made primarily for the 
convenience of officials in the field (the most obvious 
being the creation of Nigeria in 1914), economy for 
Britain in administration (notable in indirect rule) and 
exploitation of resources. Increasingly however, the 
governors had to contend with the emerging but small 
pressures from within, which were reacted to mainly 
through cooptation and subtle repression. The former was 
by nominations as unofficials into the legislature 
initially, and later the executive.
However, between 1947 and the period leading to 
independence, against the background of the decision in 
the Whitehall to decolonize, the constitution became the 
main instrument for channelling that decision which 
resulted in the modification of strategy and tactics by 
colonial officials. First, guided by the lessons learnt
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from the precipitate retreat from India and some degree , 
of violence in Ghana, the strategy was to remain in firm 
control of the process by anticipating demands, grooming 
heirs and generally cultivating goodwill. In this way, 
the colonial structures such as an uncritical system of 
education, bureaucracy, organisation of the economy and 
trading partners remained unchanged.
The objectives and strategies were fully realized in the 
making of the Macpherson Constitution, 1951 which refined 
the Richards' Constitution. Through further reforms, it 
subsequently became the pillar of the independence and 
republican constitutions of 1960 and 1963 respectively. 
Contrary to the perspectives presented in the main 
writings on this period,1 and a widely held view that the 
Macpherson Constitution was the product of an elaborate 
process of consultation at the grassroots level, it was 
in fact a totally manipulated process. In the process, 
local leaders identified as militants such as Azikiwe and 
others were shoved aside.They in turn submitted as 
reluctant victims, while others, especially the 
traditional rulers in both North and Western regions, and 
the Lagos based elites who were engaged in commerce and 
the professions, collaborated and connived in the 
imposition and adoption of institutions.
The instrument used to tie the hands of those reluctant 
to connive was largely the lethal and effective ideology
1. odumosu, 0.1.(1963) The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development. (London, 
Sweet and Maxwell): Ezra, K.(1960) Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge Unlv. Press, London): Bliss, T.0.(1967) Nigeria: the Development of Its 
Laws and Constitution (London, Sweet t Maxwell).
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of consultation and powe* to the people. Under the 
resulting constitutional framework, independence was 
handed to regionally based "select circle of heirs" and 
"within the largely unaltered framework of the colonial 
system".2 The "flag independence" was therefore at best "a 
battle won in a war lost overall"3 by the nation and the 
majority of its population.
Unsurprisingly, the constitutional schemes conjured up 
primarily to carve spheres of influence in terms of 
regions and resources for the feuding dominant groups 
failed to secure the requisite trust the system needed to 
survive. It collapsed and led to a costly three year 
civil war which itself introduced a new element into the 
structure of the political economy-the military. 
Henceforth, the latter became first among equals, played 
the role of the colonial ruler viz-a-viz other internal 
groups (at the same time feathering its own nest) without 
the stigma of alien rule. More seriously, by usurping and 
waving the banner of patriotism, it determined the rules 
of entry to power and access to resources.
The constitutional instruments which ushered in the 
second republic and those in place for the putative third 
republic were fashioned in periods when much of the 
theoretical environment but less of practical politics 
had shifted. Beginning with the latter, the excitement
2. First. R.(1970) The Barrel of a Cun (London, Penguin) p.55
3. Turok, B. (1991 Reprint), Africa, what can bo dona? (London a N.Jersey, zed Books) 
P-9
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and hope of the flag and anthem independence has been 
replaced with uncertainty, gloom and soul searching and 
groping for new institutions largely to resolve 
intractable intra-elite squabbles.
Thus, the CDC of 1976 was established for this purpose. 
Its membership reflected people who have been over-used 
and immensely benefitted from the economic and political 
administration of the country. Contrary to a widely held 
view,4 the most spectacular achievement of the CDC was not 
the switch to the presidential system, although itself 
important. Rather, it was the constitutionalization of 
what informally obtained in the private sector since the 
economic nationalism of the 1960s onwards but especially 
magnified since the indigenisations of the 1970s whereby 
the main individuals of the dominant class were fused and/ 
largely united in the boardroom of the local subsidiaries 
of MNCs, public sector parastatals, etc and generally 
socially cohesive. This now goes under the slogan of 
"federal character".
Its cardinal principle was not a broad distribution of 
services, or economic and political participatory 
structures for the majority of the population. Rather, it 
aimed to regulate access to power, resources and 
patronage among the dominant class of the population, 
being the culmination of a process initiated by colonial
Thi» is «specially «spoused by Nwabueze. B.O.,a leading positivist writer on 
constitutional law in Africa, who was a member of the CDC- Nwabueze.B.O.(1982 ) 1 
Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (C.Hurst t Co London).- Nwabueze, B.O. ( 198S ) 
Niger la-s Presidential Constitution. 1979-1983, the second Experiment 
Constitutional Democi Executive Under the ►
The
the
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regimes. In attempting to constitutionally —  widen the 
scope of patronage, some aspects of bourgeois values and 
first generation rights were re-emphasized to ensure that 
those interests were secured, a struggle akin to the 
development of these values in Europe in the first place.
The Constituent Assembly that followed it overwhelmingly 
adopted most of its prescriptions with changes that were 
only matters of detail. The cleavages that appeared 
disclosed a number of interests defined economically, 
geographically and at times primordially but the basic 
structures remained unaltered. Thus, the notable 
departure from the previous constitutions was not so much 
the creation of new institutions as the willing 
refinement of old ones to coopt and accommodate as widely 
as possible the same historically determined heirs, their 
wards and clients and some of those who due largely to an 
open education system acquired formal qualifications but 
remained at the periphery of the power structure.
Unlike the first part (1975-1979) of the second phase of 
the constitutional process (1975-1989), the second part 
(1986-1989) which came up during another period of 
military intervention was conducted in the thick of 
emerging concern for the lot of the impoverished and 
marginalized majority of the population in the third 
world. This concern is reflected especially at the 
international level through the ongoing intense debates 
on the concept of the right to development, the research 
activities of legal pluralists and ethnographers who
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possibility of adopting social welfare schemes based on 
the social solidarity obtaining in the societies of the 
third world. We shall come back to these later.
What is notable in the analysis and prescriptions of the 
Political Bureau comprising overwhelmingly of apparently 
liberal minded intellectuals was the lack of reflection 
of these debates in its work even if to serve as a future 
guide for the constitutional development of the country 
although it evinced honest concern for the neglected 
groups. Its overall aim, similar to those advocated by 
present day Marxists, was to install socialism, empower 
the people to weaken neo-colonialism and imperialism and 
turn the economy away from capitalism.5 But this was 
undermined by the choice of strategy, largely statist 
measures in pursuance of socialism now even though a 
common view among Marxists now is that the material and 
political preconditions for implementing socialism do not 
obtain at the moment.6
It is in fact the absence of these elements and an 
alternative popular power base that partly enabled the 
government to unilaterally overturn limited redeeming 
features in the recommendations of the Political Bureau 
and impose on the country economic policies and 
institutions in the constitution which were clearly
Turok, op. cit.part 3.
ibid; A lucid summary of ths debates among the socialists and Marxists and the 
obstacles confronting them is made by Beckman, Bjorn (1989) whose Democracy? 
Bourgeois versus Popular Democracy in Africa. Paper presented to the 1989 
Conference of the Review of African Political Economy: Taklno Democracy Seriously- Socialists and Democracy in Africa. 22-2« 9ept. University of Warwick, These are 
evident in the prescriptions made by the Usman Y.B.i Osoba Minority Submissions.
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beneficial to the dominant groups. Similarly, the
government, dispensing with the subtleties of its
colonial predecessors, in the later period shoved aside 
people who did not believe in its kind of constitution 
and political order, guided apparently by theories of 
liberals within and external to the constitutional 
process.7
These elements sought to "roll back the frontiers of 
state" in the management of the economy and the 
administration of the country. The former was pursued 
with vigor through the government's Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) while the constitution was being debated. 
In the constitutional sphere, what emerged in substance 
was a mix of grains of liberal principles, especially in 
the provisions for first generation rights-civil and 
political.8 But the substance was heavily developmental. 
Developmentalism, used as an ideology for one party and 
other authoritarian regimes in Africa and Asia seeks to 
jettison and suppress plural forces and other centres of 
power in the society because it is said to be a luxury of 
the West which other societies can not afford given the 
hierachical structures of their society and especially 
the urgency of the tasks of development.9
7. For theorisations outsida, saa Diamond,L., Llnt.J.J.. Llpsat, S.M.ads (1988)
Damocracv in Davalooina Countrlas. Voluma Two: Africa. (Bouldar, Lynnas Rienner);
Nigaria's Third Republic" 88 African Affairs J50, pp.»1-100.
8. Those classification of rights was first mada by Vasak, Karol in 1977-see Rich. 
R.(1988) “The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples" in Crawford, J.(ed.) The 
Rights of Peoples. (London, clarendon)
9. For a short and critical overview of this co: 
M.(1990) "The Social Basis of Constitutional!
i ncept and its use, see Mamdar.i, 
lonallsm in Africa" 28 The Journal of
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Its manifestation in the constitution was the adoption of 
the two party structure justified in those terms by the 
Political Bureau and when later established by the 
government, with one a little to the left and the other a 
little to the right. Others were introduction of part 
time legislators, rigid requirements for contest for 
office and power as it relates to those in the public 
service, exclusion of so-called extremists and the 
mainstream of the society in framing the constitution and 
for whom structures for participation were not provided.
Insofar as there was greater regimentation and
exclusiveness in the process of and the institutions 
created in the 1989 Constitution it was a negative 
development compared to its largely liberal based 1979 
counterpart. In both, no serious efforts were made beyond 
pious declarations to dismantle the inherited colonial 
structures as attempted in Ghana during Nkrumah's regime 
and Tanzania since the Arusha declaration of 1967 
although the former was a failure while the latter had 
only very marginal successes.* 10. Both Nigerian
constitutions were however interest based, the 
predominant being economic especially in setting the 
agenda but substantively preserved in more subtle ways 
than other cleavages which emerged. The latter tended at 
times to blur the social cohesiveness and real unity
Modern African Studies, 3 pp.3S9-374; Shivji, 1.(1989) State and Constitutionalism 
in Africa, Keynote Paper for the African Regional Institute of the American 
Council of Learned Societies Comparative Constitutionalism Project, Harare, May 
22-25.
10. Hyden, Goran (1980) Beyond Ujamaa in Tansaniai underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry (London). Also Hyden, 0.(1983) No Shortcuts to Progress! African 
development management in perspective (London, Berkeley)
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enjoyed by the dominant groups in the economic structures 
of the country.
On their part, the CRC and the CA played minor roles, the 
latter mainly to legitimate the constitutional process 
and the larger transition programme.However, the
apparently non economic cleavages that manifested in the 
C . A . did draw attention to the existence of diverse, 
competing and effective centres of power in the country 
which actually have stunted the development and practice 
of obvious class politics.These cleavages also largely 
contributed to the fragility of the nation itself (now 31 
years since independence), so much that the
concretization of liberal values such as the rule of law, 
first generation rights, etc would have been an
achievement by itself. They could then be available to 
progressive elements and those genuinely sympathetic to 
the mainstream of the population as tools to organize 
alternative popular power base apart from jettisoning the 
militarization of society, inevitable in having military 
regimes.
However, the most notable feature in the constitutional 
evolution of the country since its creation is the/ 
exclusion and passivity of majority of the people. This 
"failure to democratise the overall development process 
has.. .grossly undermined the mass participation of the 
[country's] most important resource-its people".11
ll. THa Lagoa Plan of Action, quoted In Turok, op. clt.p.ll
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Although concern for the majority of the population 
entered the constitutional agenda only tangentially and 
as an ideological weapon, an object rather than as 
partner, these marginalized people were the subject of 
emerging theoretical debates and discussions (with huge 
practical potential) in the international fora and in 
some legal-ethnographic studies as noted. The aim here is 
not to plunge into the ongoing debates on the right to 
development as a human right nor advocate its immediate 
provision in the constitution given that its essence and 
contours are still the subject of debate and discussions. 
But the constitution makers manifested lack of foresight 
in not noting as a useful path for the future 
constitutional progress of the country given that a 
constitution has to be a living law and adaptable to 
changing climates to maintain relevance to its community. 
Their immediate relevance is in the fact that they draw 
attention to the failure of governments and extant system 
to tackle the pathetic situation of those marginalized by 
them and who form the bulk of the population.
The Constitution And The Right To Development.
The case for a right to development as a human right was 
first pointed out by the former president of the Senegal 
Supreme Court, Keba Mbaye.12 The central theme of his 
argument was that all other rights, including the right 
to existence has no value without the right to 
development, and that this right needed no further
12. Mestdagh, Karal da Vey, (1981) "The Right to Developments From evolving Principle to 'Legal Right'i In Search of Subatanca" 28 Natharlands Intarnatlonal Law Ravlaw. 
pp.30-53.
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instrument pointing to Articles 55 and 56 of the UN 
Charter where the joint responsibility of the 
international community for the welfare and respect for 
human rights is a central aim. He also noted Articles 22- 
27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
concerned with social and economic rights.1*
Acting on the resolution of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 1977, the Secretary General prepared and 
submitted a report in 1979 which was endorsed by th 
Commission and the UN General Assembly.13 4 However, the 
final work produced by a Committee of experts appointed 
to elaborate a more precise formula did not save it from 
a minefield of controversy regarding its legal
foundations, substance and the beneficiaries whether 
individuals, collectives or the state.15
Despite the current inadequacies, it is an extremely 
significant development all the more so as it is 
presented as third generation rights emerging from the 
third world as a response to the effects of colonialism 
and imperialism.16 The first generation rights are said to 
be the political and civil rights being the product of 
American and French revolutions.The second generation
13. ibid.
14. 41/128 of 1986, Reprinted In UN Copy-DPI/918, NOv.1987, Declaration on tha Right 
to Development.
1*. A very staunch case la made for It by Rlch.J. op.cit.i Alston, P.(198S) "The 
Shortcomings of a 'Garfield the Cat' Approach to the Right to Development" 15 
California Western International Law Journal, 510.j a very critical comment is 
made by Brownlie, I. ‘The Rights of People in Modern International Law’ in 
Crawford, op.cit.
16. See note 8.
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rights are the economic and welfare rights which emanated 
from the revolutions in USSR and ertswhile Eastern bloc.
The concept stresses the centrality of the human being as 
a participant and beneficiary of development. For this: 
purpose, all human beings bear responsibility for 
development and states have a duty to cooperate with 
each other. In concrete terms, states have responsibility 
to "eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of 
human rights" and to "eliminate obstacles to development 
resulting from failure to observe civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights" 
(Arts.5-7).
These declarations could in the near future provide sound 
legal and ethical foundations for :i) Careful scrutiny of 
national legal systems in structuring electoral process, 
criminal and preventive legislation including law 
enforcement policies and personnel and providing the 
basis for challenging extra legal measures.17 ii) The 
removal of obstacles to human rights and freedoms
including the structures of government if they constitute 
impediments by non-observance. Moreover, violators need 
not be state officials. They may include holders of 
social status like traditional rulers in Nigeria and 
holders of economic power.iii). The strategy for
attacking injustice can then be modified to pointing to 
cases of injustice rather than concentrating on sterile
17. Baxi, Upendra (1988) "The Development of the Right to Development" In
Venkatarmlah, E.C.(ed.) Human Rlghta in a Changing World (International Law 
Association, Delhi) pp.1-11.
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debates on the definition of injustice, iv) The role of 
non-governmental organizations both internally and 
externally could become more important as oversight 
mechanisms for assessing and reporting on implementation 
or otherwise. Finally, but by no means the least, at the 
international level, they could provide basis for 
examining the entire structure of the international 
economic order and international law which serves as its 
legal foundation.
Undoubtedly, there are enormous practical obstacles to 
realising these aims, the objections of positivist 
lawyers apart. But looking at it from an optimistic 
viewpoint, it is a formula that could operate beyond the 
inhibitions of the charade of national sovereignty which 
in the third world has been used as a sword against 
citizens but not to prevent intervention from outside 
mostly for baser aims.
Social Welfare For The Larger Population.
We have noted the rejection of state social welfare 
schemes by the constitutional bodies except the Political 
Bureau.Their reason mainly was lack of funds which we 
noted is spurious. However, a number of ethnographic 
researches and studies on the practical administration of 
state welfare shemes in some third world countries have 
showed the futility of such approach in relation to the
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state welfare shemes in some third world countries have 
showed the futility of such approach in relation to the 
larger segment of the population due to structural 
obstacles in their society and economy.16
In industrialized nations where state welfare schemes 
obtain, the requisite conditions which obtain and conduce 
to it ares i) The family is structured on a compact 
nuclear base with discernible clear division of roles,
although the growth of feminism is increasingly seeking 
to modify the old scheme, ii) The economy is organised 
with most people in wage employment relating to employers 
as individuals earlier on, but now largely through trade 
unions in respect of terms of employment. iii) A certain 
minimum set of living conditions and a fairly
ascertainable average income which the state tries to 
maintain. If subnormality sets in, in both cases, the
measures aim to prevent it from degenerating to misery 
and starvation. Finally, but the not the least, it
requires a minimum level of national economic prosperity 
and organisational structures.
Clearly, most of these conditions are not met on the 
scale required to successfully dispense state social 
schemes covering all segments of the society in most 
third world countries. First, most of its population live 
in rural communities and engage largely in subsistence 18
18. That* are discussed in detail in Benda-Beckman. P. at al (1988)
"Introduction,Between kinship and the State" in Benda-Beckman, P., Woodman,C.R. at 
al. Between kinship and the State, Social Security and Law in Developing Countries 
(PORIS-Holland t U.S.A.); Zacher, H.P. "Traditional Solidarity and Modern Social 
Security, harmony or conflict" ibid pp.21-38, Puchs, M., 'Social Security in third World Countries* ibid, pp.39-51.
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sectors on the one hand and the lower echelon of the 
strata employed in these organisations or engaged in 
petty trade as craftsmen, tailors, etc.
For these reasons a strong case has been made to consider 
and build social security on the traditional social 
solidarity of these groups. In any event, there is a lot 
of interdependence between what the state offers to the 
smaller segment of the population and the larger 
population due to the continuity of the symbiotic 
relationship between urban wage earners and their rural 
relations which we noted, stunts the development of full 
fledged proletarians. The idea is not to dispense with 
formal social security but rather to adopt a system of 
"social security pluralism" where the former is only one 
element. That is, a mix of "externalising" and 
"internalising" solutions .The latter "solve problems by 
acting in the areas in which they arise" that is, relying 
on the norms and mechanisms generated and used in that 
environment while the former "solve problems by acting 
outside those areas".19
Obviously, internalising solutions are best suited to the 
problems of rural populations as such schemes would 
stabilize and bolster community solidarity endeavours. 
For instance, in the event of shortage of rains or loss 
of livestock due to "epizootic disease", etc provision of 
seed, replacement of livestock, etc. Similarly,
19. Zachar, Ibid p.25
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cooperative structures may be fostered to stabilize 
breakdown in ertswhile solidarity structures or engender 
new values such as equality of women, emancipation of 
individuals from oppressive norms such as the Osu caste 
system among the Ibos and other communities in Nigeria.
However, externalising solutions are required to dispense 
formal education, medicare as well as applying them to 
those in wage employment, etc. But, despite the continued 
injunction to the constitution makers to evolve schemes 
unique to Nigeria or not practised anywhere in the world, 
these aspects in concrete terms were conspic'ous in their 
absence from the deliberations or prescriptions. That it 
is practicable is evidenced by the fact that the Nigerian 
Folklore Society established in 1980 was active and 
influenced the formulation of cultural policy for Nigeria 
in 1988. More importantly, it is reported to have made 
vital contributions towards the promulgation of Decree 
No.47 of 1988 on Nigerian Copyright Law.20 The Society 
also noted the potency of folkways as a tool to reach out 
to the rural majority in the transition programme which 
emphasized mass participation. To be sure, during the 
constitutional debates, there were constant references 
for a return to the old days. An objection to these 
schemes would be that Nigeria is huge, pluralistic and 
with complex social structure and the adoption of any one 
of them would pose political difficulties.
20. West Africa, 10-16 Juna, 1991.
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This objection may be met by noting that their 
unsuitability is not due to the size of the country. 
Rather, it is lack of authority on the part of the leader 
of the particular community to dispense it to those 
external to it21 and the lack of reciprocity of a sort by 
the latter that poses the problem. This is easily 
overcomed by governments that have authority and 
responsibility for the entire country. In any case, those 
who will oppose schemes that are beneficial to the common 
man on the ground only that it emanates from other 
societies would not be the ordinary man, but the elites 
who exploit such sentiments for base, personal aims and 
who in fact import most of their values and institutions 
from alien societies without regard to their utility.
The real reason for the refusal to consider these schemes 
lies in their incompatibility with the development of 
capitalism.22 The latter atomises society dealing with 
people as individuals in the dispensation of reward and 
hardship. Informal social security on the other hand is 
based on group solidarity and continuity of kinship whose 
maintenance is a drawback to capitalism. That is why in 
some third world countries, formal social security was 
attempted principally to stabilize the labour force to 
prevent the practice where workers employed in MNC
21. Benda-Beckman, P..at al, ’Introduction...' op.clt.p.14
22. woodman, G.R. (1988) "The decline of folk-law aocial security in common-law 
Africa* in Bend-Beckman, F., Woodman, G.,et al op.cit.p.85
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recurrently went back to their preserves in the rural 
areas thereby destabilising services.23
In this light, the makers of Nigeria's constitutions the 
largest group of whom were drawn from private concerns 
found it convenient to ignore, consequently indirectly 
participating in the continued collapse of existing non 
state social solidarity schemes. Thus, as the final phase 
of another constitutional process ends, the lot of the 
majority of the population seems to hang on non 
governmental institutions.
23. Fuchs, N.’Social Sacuilty...* ibid pp.39-51.
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APPgPIX A ,2 iv
SCME NIŒRIAN CHIEFS WO ARE MAJCR DIRECTORS CF NIŒRIAN 
SUBSIDIARIES OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
Foreian Multinational 
Tate and Lyle of U.K 
Unilever of U.K 
Mobil Inc. of U.S.A
Inchape Holdings of U.K 
Degremont of France 
Henkel of W. Gennany 
Lennards of U.K
Glauber of U.S.A 
Hoechst of W. Germany
Nigerian Subsidiary 
Tate and Lyle (Nig) Ltd 
U.A.C. (Nig) Ltd 
Mobil (Nig) Ltd
Bewac (Nig) Ltd 
Degremont (Nig) Ltd 
Henkeis Chemicals (Nig) Ltd 
Lennards (Nig) Ltd
Glauber Enterprises (Nig) 
Nigerian Hoechat (Ltd)
Nigerian Chief
So lemon Akenzus, Cha of Benin
Shehu Idris, Bnir of Zaria
Alfonsos Of ala Okagbuei, Obi 
of Onitsha
Abo Bayero, Quiz- of Kano
A.A. Sijuade, Ooni of Ife
Unaru Ndayako, Etsu Nupe
Nelson Asigbaro Nene-Afejuku, 
Eson of Warri
Sulu Gambari, Einir of Ilor in 
Abali Muhammadu, Emir of Fika
Source: The Analyst, Voi.2, No.5, 1987.
Arçpnriix A. 3
Nigerian
1. Inchcape Overseas Ltd Bewac Ltd 1) chief Mrs. Kuforviji-Olubi
2) Alh Ado BaYero (Bnir of Kano)
3) Alh K.O. Shuaibu
4) Mallam S.D. Umar
5) S. Adeniji
6) A.A. Ayida
2. Habib Bank Ltd 
Karachi
Habib Bank Ltd 1) Major General Shehu M.Yar'Adua
2) M.K.O. Abiola
3) Dr. Ismaila B. Jose
4) Alh. Tanko Kuta
5) Ad a m u  Bello
6 ) Ail Abubakar Koko
3. G.E. U.S.A I.G.E of Nig Ltd 1) A. Ayida2) Alh. Marnnan Daura
3) Alh. Ibrahim Dasuki (Sultan of Sototo)
4) Alh. U.S. Birma
5) M. Onisade
6) A.A. Desalu
4. Unilever, U.K A.G. Leventis 
(Nig) Ltd
1) Alh. Nuhu Bamali
2) S. Ada John
3) H.S.A. Adedeji
4) J.E. Iriabe
5) C.C. Ifeanyi
6) Hon. Justice Okigbo Savage
7) H.R.H. Muhaimvadu Basher (Bnir of Katsina)
5. Not named. But 
10% foreign owned
Mercury
Assurance Co Ltd
1) Alh. Waziri Ajuji
2) Lt. Col. H. Abdulkadir
3) B.A. Nwkoru
4) H.R.H. Do Ogugua (Trad, ruler)
5) Alh. Ahmadu Habibu
6. Mobil, U.S.A Mobil Oil (Nig) Ltd
1) G.T.S. Adokpaye
2) Major Gen. I.B.M. Haruna (rtd.)
3) H.R.H. A. 0. Of ala Okagbue (Obi of Onitaha)
4) P.0. Akinyelure
Nigerian Agric.
& Co-op Bank Ltd
1) Grp. Captain U. Jibrin (rtd.)
2) H.B. Mohammed
3) Unaru Imam
4) Prof. M.B. Ajakaiye
5) Mohianmed Unar
6) E.E. Eneyo
7) Abu Ibrahim
8) Ail Bilyaminu Usman
9) J.S. Tarka, Jnr.
10) C.H. Nwogu
vi
7. Singer Sewing 
Machine & Singer 
Intern. Security
Nigerian Sewing
MachineManufacturing
Co. Ltd
1) Mai lam A. Coanassie
2) Major Gen. R. Adsyinka Adebayo
3) Olufemi 0. Aiyeyoni
4) Joseph B. Olaiya
5) Chief M.N. Ugochukwu
6) Chief Chris Ogunbanjo
8. British American 
Ttabacco Co. Ltd
Nigerian Tabacco 
Co. Ltd 1)2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Pius N.C. Qkigbo 
P.A. Adegbesan
0. 1. Akinkugbe 
C.A. Atoki
1. M.O Eronim
H.R.H. Alh Shehu Idris (Bnir of Zaria)
9. Leyland, U.K Leyland (Nig) Ltd
1) Chief Olu Akinkugbe
2) J.N.E. Qnyiuke
3) Lt. Colonel 0. Anifowose (rtd.)
4) Captain P.0. John
5) Caleb Yaro
Source: Nigeria Company Handbook(j.M Services Ltd, Lagos, 1988); Redasel's Caipanies of Nigeria (Research and data 
services Ltd; London, Lagos).
Table I - STATES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
Appendix B 1
AN 1 1
Ayes
1 8
PA ______ 10___________ 10 0
BD 10_________ 0 6
BN . .ip___ _____0_____ _  3___ __
BO ii ____n _____ _ _ 0_____
CR 12 _Q_____ 1 1_____
GG 10___________ 4 l
IM 13___________ 0 13
KD 13 7 4
KN 16___________ ____13_____ _____0_____
KW 8 6 - _____1_____
IG JQ_ J
NG 7 - - i___  _ 1
OG 9 0 7
00 -10_________ 0 7
Oi 15 _ Q _____ ____ 13_____
PL 9 1 6
RV 8 0 5
14 8 _  0_  _  _
H/gg— 27 7 13
Proceedings of the Consituent Assembly Official Report, 1978. 
Source« Vol.II, Par.1926-1928.
Appendix B ii
Table II - STATES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
AN 1 1
Noes
s 5
BA 10 0 7
BD 10 1 6
BN 10 4 6____
BO 1 1 4 5
CR 12 1 6
GG 10 2 6_____
IM 13 2 1 1
KD 13 1 _____12_____
KN 16 6 3
KN 8 1 _6_____
US 8 0 7
NS 7 0 4
OG 8 1 5 (
CD 10 _ft 9OT 15 2 13
PL 9 6 2
RV 8 5 2
SO 14 0 ______2
N/ac ______ 21___________ 3 _____IS_____
Source* Vol.II, ibid, par. 2018-2021.
Appendix B
Table III - STATE REPRESENTATIVES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
H)tal of Delegates Members Present & Voting
AN 1 1 0 10
BA 10 ___8 0
BD 10 0 7
BN 10 1 ______£L
BO 1 1 5__ 0
CR 12 0 _ __ 2_
GG 10 6 3
IM 13 0 12
KD 13 __8___ 3
KN 16 10 1
KW J___ 2 1
in 8 0 5
NG 7 5 ______0_____
OG ____ 8 0_____ 7
CD 10 0 8
OY 15 0 14
PL 9 0 6
RV 8 0 _8__
SO 14 8 0
H/CPC__ _______ 22___________ ______3_____ _____ Ifl_____
Sourcei Vol.II, Par. 1986-1988.
Table IV - STATE REPRESENTATIVES AMD VOTING STRUCTURE
¡sent & Vatina
AN 11
Noes
0 10
BA 10 5 0
BD 10 Q___ ___ 6____
BN 10 0
BO 11 4 3
CR 12 1 8
GG 10 3 ______3_____
IM 13 0 13
KD 13 4 4
KN 16 11 1
KW 8 3 2_____
LG 8 Q_____ 7
NG 7 5 __ 2
OG 8 0 6_____
CD 10 0 9_____
OY 15 0_____ 15
PL 9 2 5
RV 8 0_____ 7
SO 14 6 1
H/CK .. ______ 21___________ _____ 2_____ ______ 12____
Source: Vol.II, Ibid, par. 2035-2038.
Table V - STATES REPRESENTATIVES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
Appendix B ill
AN 11 3 2
BA 10 1 3
BD 10 1 __ ___6_____
BN 10 4 3
BO 11 ______0_____ ______1_____
CR 12 1 3
GG 10 2 ______5_____
IM 13 5 4
KD 13___________ 4 4
KN 16 ___ 0_____ 7
KW 8 Q_____ _8___
LG 8 0 ______5_____
NG 7 _2___ _____ 5_____
OG 8 2 4
OD 10 3 3
OY 15 4 _____ 8_____
PL 9 ___6____ l
RV ___8 2_____ 4
SO 14 1 9
n /cdc ______ 21___________ ______1_____ 9
Sources Vol.II/ ibid, par. 5747-5750.
Table VI
States Total of Delegates__ pent i Voting
AN 1 1
Noes
8 0_____
BA 10 4 . ______0_____
BD 10 _ ______2_____
BN 10 1 4
BO 1 1 2 3
CR 12 4 _____ 0_____
GG 10 3 2_____
13 6 l
KD 13 4 4___
KN 16 2 ___4
KN 8 6 2_____
LG 8 0 ______1_____
NG 7 3 3_____
c x? 8 1 2OD 10 3 3_____
OY 15 5 5_____
PL 9 3_____ ______ a_____
RV 8 4 0
SO 14 5 ___ 1_____
H /ta c ______ 21___________ 7 ______2_____
Sources Vol.II/ ibid, par. 6107-6109.
Appendix B
Table VII - STATES REPRESENTATIVES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
iv
AN 11 0 7
BA 10 5 0
BD 10 1 3
BN 10 4 2
BO 11 6 1
CR 12 0______ 6
GG 10 2 2
IM 13 1 6
KD 13 _Q______ 3
KN 16 5 0
KW 8 4 2
1/3 8 3 _______ 0______
NG 7 _____S______ _______0______
OG _________ 8 ___ 3______ _______ 0______
OD 10 5 2
OY 15 5 2
PL 9 _______3 ___ Q_
RV 8 _______0 _______ a______
SO 14 7 0
N/CDC . ________ 22________ _____6______ _______ 5______
Source: Vol.II, ibid, Par. 6850-6852.
Appendix B
Table VIII - STATE REPRESENTATIVES AND VOTING STRUCTURE
AN 11
Aves
4 2
BA 10 6 0
BD 10 1 5
BN 10 5 1
BO 11 6 0
CR 12 4 4
GG 10 5 1
IM 13 4 3
KD 13 11 ______0_____
KN 16 9 0
KW 8 7 ______0_____
1/3 8 1 3
NG 7 6 ______0_____
OG 8 3 2
CD 10 2 5_____
OY 15 6 ______5_____
PL 9 6 0
RV 8 1 3_____
SO 14 8 0_____
N/CDC _______22___________ _____ 8_____ ______0_____
Source: Vol.II, ibid. Par. 6507-6509.
APPENDIX C i
Div. I, Par. 2134-37, vol.3.
AI 20
Aves Noes
0 ,14 0
AN ________ 29 18 _3______ 0
ba 20 1 0
BD 20 13 _____ 4 ____ 0
BN ___19__________ 12 1 0
BO 24__________ 3 0 0
CR 8 _ ___ 6 0 0
CG 2 1 8 3 0
IM 30 22 3 0
KD 13 6 0 0
KN ______ 4£_ 1 _____ 0______ 0
KT 20 0 0 0
KW 14__________ 6 0 0
in 12 4 1 0
NO 10 0 0 0
OG 12 8 3 1
OD 22 6 0 0
OY 42 16 5 4
PL 16 7 1 0
RV 13 10 0 0
SO 37 0 0______ _____ 0
PCT 1
N 113 33 4 1
Jsaal__ _____ 124_______ ______22_______ ______6______
Div. II, P.2237, Vbl.3.
Members Pres
AI 20
Noes
14 3
AN 29 3 6 3
BA 20 1 1 1 0
BD 20 0 7 0
BN 19 3 0______ _____ 0_____
BO 24 2 17 0
CR 8 1 3 0
GG 2 1 12 S 1
IM 30 9 5 0
KD 13 6 3 1
KN 46 2 30 0
KT 20 0 1 1 _____ 0_____
KW 14 1 7 0
in 12 1 _4______ 0
vn 10 1 3 0
OG 12 0 6 _____ o -
CD 22 1 7 0
OY 42 0 17 _____ 0_____
PL 16 1 9 1
RV 13 4 1 _____ 0_____
SO 37 1 _____28______ ___ 0___
N 113 ___2_ _____43______ 1_____
_____62______ __226___ 8
Div. Ill 2271-73, Vol.3. il
AI 20
Ayes Noes
02 8
AN 29 18 0 0
BA 20 1 1 0
BD 20 11 1 0
BN 19 _____ 1 1 2 0
BO 24 0 14 0
CR 8________ 3 2 0
OS 2 1 7 4 0
IM 30__________ 18 0 0
KD ________ 13__________ ______ 0_____ _____ 4______ ______0______
KN 46 _ ______0_____ ____26_____ ______0______
KT 20 0 8______ ______0
KW 14__________ 2 5 0
Iß 12 0 6 0
NG 10 0_____ 3 ______0______
OG 12 0 7 ______0______
CD 22 1 12 0______
OY 42__________ 1 18 1
PL _______lfi_________ ___  2_____ 2 0
R V 13 6 1 0
SO 37 0 24 0
PCT 1__________ 1 0 0
N 113 34 1 1 0
______ 25_____ _____182______ ______ 1______
Div. IV, Par. 2348-52, vol.3.
AI 20
Aves Noes
______0______9 0
AN 29 19 1 0
BA 20 3 4 0
BD 20 10 2 0
BN 19 1 1 2 1
BO 24__________ 9 4 1
CR __ 8 3 1 0
OG 2 1 13 1 0
IM 30 19 1 ______0______
KD 13 2 1 0
KN 46_______ 25 5 3
KT 20 8 2 1
KW 14 5 1 0
LG 12 4 1 0
NG 10 6 0 Q______
œ 12 9 0 0_____
CD 22 16 2 ______ 0______
OT 42 2 1 0 1
PL 16 2 1 ______ 0______
RV 13 4 0 ______ 1______
SO 37 13 ______6______ ______0______
PCT 1__________ 1 0______ ______0______
N 113 32 14 ______2______
____ 244_____ ____________ ___C=lfl______
Div. V Par. 2393-96, vol.3. Ill
Members Pres
AI 20
Noes
05 3
AN 29 14 0 0
BA 20 0 7 1
BD 20 8 3 0
BN 19 0 5 0
BO 24 0 17 0
CR ___8__________ 0 4 0
GG 2 1 1 10 1
Di 30 8 0 0
KD 13__________ 0 5 1
KN 46 0 36 0
KT 20 0 10_____ 0
KW 14__________ 1 2 0
LG 12 7 0 0
NG 10 0 4 0
OG 12 4 0 0
OD 22 12 1 0_____
OY 42 12 3 0
PL 16 0 ___1 1
RV 13__________ 0 3 0
SO 37 0 22 0______
FCT 1__________ 0 0 0
N ÏÏ3 8 35_____ ______0______
7>?tal__ _____ai______ ___ Ififi____ _____ 4____
Div. VI Par. 2517-24, voi.3
ent & Votino
AI 20
Noes
013 0
AN 29 18 3 1
BA 20 2 13 ______0______
BD 20 13 1 0
BN 19 16 1 0
BO 24 6 6 2
CR 8 7 0 0
GG 2 1 13 2 0
IM 30 13 1 1 0
KD 13 7 3 0
KN 46 0 35 1
KT 20 1 18 0
KW 14__________ 6 2 _____ 0______
LG 12__________ 6 1 0
NG 10__________ 2 2 0______
OG 12 9 0 0
CD 22 14 0 0
OY 42 25 2 0
PL 16 10 1 0_____
RV 13 9 0 0_____
SO 37 0 32 0
FCT 1 1 - -
N 113 35 23 2______
_____ 232________ ______IS5_______ ________fi________
Div. VII, Par. 2657-62, vol.3 iv
Abstentions
20 010 ______2
AN ________ 23__________ _____13_____ 2 0
BA 2Q__________ ______0. _____13______ 0
BD 20__________ ____14 0______ _Q______
BN 19 1 1 ______1 0
BO ___24____ 1 _____ 9 ______Q
CR J!_______ 3 1 _____ 0______
QG 2 1__________ 7 _ 2______ 0
IM 30__________ 8_____ 2_____ __Q______
KD _______13__________ 7 ______3_____ 0______
16 0 29 0______
KT 20__________ 0_____ ____ 1 2 0
KW 14__________ 3 ______3_____ Q______
Iß ________12__________ ______1______ ______1_____ _____ 0______
NS ________ IQ__________ 1 ________ 2______ _____ Q______
œ 12 _________ 8 __ Q______ 0
OD 22 15 ______ 0______ _____ 0
OY 42 23 5 0
PL 16 6 3 0
13 7 2 0
so 37 0 27 0
POT 1 1 0
N 113 20_____ 31______ _____ 0______
Jötal__ ____ 165______ ____ 161______ ______0______
Div. Vili, Par. 2674-80, Vol.3.
Members Presjent & Votino
AI 20 010 0
AN 29 21_____ ______0 0
BA 20 1 17 ______1____
BD 20 1 1 0 0
BN 19 2 7 1
BO 24 1 12 _____ 0______
CR 8 7 0 0
OG 2 1 2_____ _____ 1 1_____ 1
IM 30 22 ______0 _____ 0______
KD 13 0_____ ______8_____ _____ 0_____
KN 46 0 35 0
KT 20 0 14 _____ Q______
KW ___14 0 5 _____ Q______
Iß 12 5 1 0
NG 10 0 6 _____ Q_____
OG 12 7 1______ _____ 0_____
CD 22 18_____ ______0______ l
OY 42 22_____ ______6______ _____ 3_____
PL 16 0 ______9______ _____ 1______
RV 13 10 0______ Q______
SO 37 ______Q_____ _____31______ ______s______
POT 1 0_____ _____ 0_____ ______Q_____
N 113 23 ____ 13_____ ______3_____
W a l ____169_____ ____2ie_____ 13
Div. IX, Par. 2736-60, vol.3.
AI 20
Ayes Noes
______0______ 1
AN 29 3 6 0
BA 20 0 4 0
BD 20 3 8 0
BN 19__________ 9_____ 5 ______0_____
BO 24__________ 5 6 1
CR ___8_ 2 ____ 4 0
GG 2 1 10_____ 4 _____ 0_____
IM 30 3_____ 15 0
KD 13 0 2______ 0
KN 46 16 14 0
KT 20 _ 7 3 0
KW 14__________ ______3______ ______5_____ 0
113 12 0 ______6______ ______0_____
NG 10 0______ ______3 _____0_____
OG 12 _A_ 5 ______ 0_____
OD 22 6______ 12 0
OY 42__________ 7 17 1
PL 16 0 3 0
RV 13 4______ 1 ______ 0_____
SO 37__________ 20______ ______4______ 0
POT 1__________ 1 ______ 0______ ______Q_____
N 113 7 _____42______ 1
____US______ ____ ISO______ ______i_____
Div. X, Par. 3007-09, voi.3.
ent & Votino
AI 20
Noes
03 0
AN 29 8____ ______0 0
BA 20 1 0 ______0_____
BD 20 6 0 0
BN 19 2_____ ______0_____ ______0_____
BO 24 4 0 0
OR _____ 1 0 0
GG 21 9 1 0______
30 12 0 0
KD 13 2 0 0
KN 46 0 0 0
KT 20 0 0 ______0
KW 14 , 2 0 0
in 12 5 ______Q_____ ______0_____
NG 10 1 0 0
OG 12 ___8 0 _____ 0_____
CD 22 7 0 _____ 0_____
OT 42 13 _____ 0_____ _____ 2______
PL 16 1 0 0
RV 13 6 ______0 _____ 0_____
SO 37 0 _____ 0_____ ______Û_____
POT 1 1 0 0
N 113 16 2 ______0_____
-Ma i__ ____ 1 1 2______ _____ 2_____ ______2______
Div. XI, Par. 3300-05, vol.3. vi
AI 20
Noes
014 0
AN 29 22 0 0
BA 20 1 _____16..... 0
BD 20 10 0 0
BN 19 2 1 1 0
BO 24 0 15 0
CR 8______ 5 0 0
GG 2 1 1 7 1
rM 30__________ 13 0 0
KD 13 1 _____ 2______ 1
KN 46 0 29 0
KT 20 0 15 0
KW 14 0 12 ______0
LG 12__________ 1 1 1 0
NG 10 0 4 _____ 0
OG 12 2 2 _____ 0______
OD 22 13 1 0
OY 42 9 10 0
PL 16 0 8______ 1
RV 13 12 ______0______ 0
90 37 0 _____24______ ______0______
FCT 1__________ 0 1 0
N 113 20 37 1
jasal__ ____ 122______ ____205______ . A  .
Div. XII, Par. 3345-55, vol.3.
AI 20
Aves Noes
00 13
AN 29 5 1 1 ______0
BA 20 14 1 0
BD 20 2 1 1 ______0______
BN 19 4 12 0
BO 24 7 10______ 0______
CR 8 0 3 0
GG 2 1 9 4 0
IM 30 1 17 0
KD 13 8 0 0
KN 46 36 0 0
KT 20 14 0_____ _____ 0______
14 5 1 0
IG 12__________ 1 3 0
NG 10 3 1 0
OG 12__________ 0 7 0
CD 22 4 7 _____ 0______
OY 42 0 18 0
PL 16 2 ______6______ ______0______
RV 13__________ 1 6_____ 0______
SO 37 25 2 Q______
FCT 1 1 ______0_____ Q______
N 113 34 25 ______0______
____1 1 1______ ____ 162______ ______0______
Div. XIII, Par. 3491-5, vol.3. vil
AI 20
Aves Noes
12 8
AN 29__________ 0 18 0
BA _______2Q__________ 4 _ ______ 2 0
BD 20__________ 1 10 0
BN _______ 12__________ 0 9 0
BO 24 ___ 14 _______1 0
CR ___ 8_ _ 2 2 0
œ 2 1__________ 4 1 1 0
m ________ 30 0 2Q_____ ______0______
KD 13 4 3 0
KN 46 18 ______ 0_____ ______0
KT 20__________ 12 0 0
KW _______ 14__________ 1 ___ ______0______
Iß 12__________ 0 7 0
NS 10 5 1 0
OG 12 ___Q_ 8 0
CD 22 0 14 0
OY 42__________ 1 20_____ 1
PL 16__________ 1 _______2_____ ______ 0
FV 13 1 6 0
90 37 2 1 _______0_____ 0
PCT 1__________ 1 0 0
N 113 23 30_____ ______ 1
JÖtfll__ ____ 112_____ _____184_____ ______3______
Div. XIV, Par. 3678-84, vol.3.
AI 20
Aves
017 0
AN 29 25 0 ______0_____
BA 20 2 10 1
BD 20 12 0 0
19 8 ______2 1
BO 24 2 12 2
œ ___8 4 0 ______0______
GG 2 1 12 5 0
m 30 28 0 0
KD 13 7 2 0
KN 46 0 39 1
KT 20 0 16 0
KW 14 2 5 0
Iß 12 7 0 0
NS 10 0 6______ _____ 0_____
OG 12 9 0 0
OD 22 16 0 0
or 42 26 0 0
PL 16 7 3______ 0______
RV 13 8 0 0
SO 37 0 25_____ ______Q______
PCT 1 0 1 0
N 113 36_____ _____34______ 3
Jöfcol__ ____232_____ ____ 16Û______ ______a_____
A Note on Methodology, Assumptions and Sources.
The choice of the subject matter of this thesis was largely 
influenced by the absence of a complete and coherent study and 
analysis of the making of Nigeria's constitutions, most of the 
current books are limited to the precolonial developments but 
also had the severe handicap of lack of access to official 
records.
On the other hand, the discussions on the post independence 
period are haphazard and limited to some of the constitutional 
bodies only. However, more importantly, the interplay of 
political forces and interests has been little discussed, 
particularly against the bacground of the heavy discussions 
and arguments on the interest based nature of the U.S.A. 
Constitution of 1787. Most Nigerian lawyers who write on the 
subject seem to come heavily under the influence of positivist 
approach to law. For this reason, they largely concentrated on 
the constitutional documents themselves.
This project is therefore an attempt to fill in these 
important gaps. To this end, the methodology is overwhelmingly 
analytical following the footsteps of Charles Beard, Calvin J. 
Jillson, etc who adopted this approach in respect of the 
constitution of the U.S.A. Inevitably, the data and other 
resources are documentary. This is based on the assumption 
that it is futile to conduct an interview to determine the 
personal interests (whatever it may be but more so if 
economic) of the interviewee.
i
Moreover, it is a near impossible exercise to interview the 
large number of people who participated in the constitutional 
process. But even if samples may be used, the latter to be 
credible for analytical purposes must take into account the 
"federal character" of the country, an enormous obstacle.
For these reasons, the author considered documentary evidence 
entirely sufficient. The documents were, in respect of the 
colonial period, official records of communications of key 
officials as documented and are available to the public in the 
Public Records Office, Kew and the Commonwealth Office 
Library, London. For the post independence era, the 
proceedings and official reports of the various constitutional 
bodies, communications of key officials and relevant 
legislations were obtained during a field work trip to 
Nigeria.
The materials for the economic biography of the members proved 
more difficult to obtain for the reason that such documents 
are treated with a great deal of secrecy in Nigeria, apart 
from the lack of culture of maintaining a comprehensive and up 
to date information in the libraries. From my experience in 
the field, only the libraries in the Office of the President 
and the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, 
Kuru (access to both is highly restricted) maintain a measure 
of comprehensive and current materials. This is mainly because 
top government officials patronize these libraries. The one in 
the Presidency was of immense help as it had some current 
information on the directorships of companies in Nigeria, 
apart from the Companies Registry, the latter, a very
i i
difficult office to deal with although supposedly a public 
office.
It must also be noted that not all the participants had such 
economic background given the practice in the country where 
directorships/chairmanships are accumulated in few 
individuals, who it is assumed wield great influence in the 
political economy. But for analytical purposes, there were 
enough of these patrons or their wards in the constitutional 
process to draw credible conclusions.
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